I have written so many times about the poor security checks at our airports but nobody in MAHB or the airport police seems to be bothered. Based on observations from my many trips abroad from KLIA/KLIA2, I am publishing the lapses I noted that may allow a terrorist to smuggle a gun onboard a plane:

1) One could buy a mini gun (assembly set) that can be assembled to become operational. The Internet is full of examples on how to make simple guns from household items. With Mindanao-based terrorists being able to slip in and out of Sabah easily, it shouldn’t be too difficult for a bad guy to procure a small weapon from one of them.

2) They could then hide each unassembled piece in their hand-carry, especially in the handle, roller compartment and zip lining. (They may get an accomplice if one bag is insufficient.) I think they won’t worry about the security officers dusting for gunpowder traces because in KLIA2, this was not being done as of Oct 1, 2014. A random chemical residue check on boarding passengers is seen as less important than conducting DNA tests on someone’s backside.

3) In their hand-carry luggage, they would put in a bottle of water and a huge tube of toothpaste (more than 100ml) so that their hand-carry luggage will be pulled up for physical inspection upon radar screening. The inspectors will be busy checking for these obvious disallowed items, they will lose sight of what’s inside the handle and other compartments, etc. I have personally witnessed this happening in the old Terminal 2.

4) A smart terrorist would carry the trigger mechanism on his person when he crosses the radar boom. They would likely carry some innocent items like a pen or key when crossing the boom. The officer will ask him to cross the boom again and of course it will beep. To fool the security personnel, he will meekly pull out the pen and show him that was the cause of the alarm.

I once showed my metallic name card case and he waived me by without even considering that there could have been other dangerous items on my person. The perpetrator may even time the ‘beeping’ for the same time as the officer scanning his bag gets excited. The attention will be diverted to the water and toothpaste for sure.

5) Given the various forms of terrorism these days, if she was a full veil (‘burqa’) wearing female, she can even carry these inside her mouth. In KLIA, I once saw a female officer pat down a burqa wearing woman (I think) when the radar beeped but did NOT ask to uncover her veil. I must say, the pat-down wasn't all that convincing either. (In comparison, in India and Japan, the pat-down can be mistakenly interpreted as foreplay.)

How on earth would you call this a security check in KLIA when everyone knows these persons are higher risk given the region of conflict they come from. The full body radar screening should be enforced in KLIA as soon as possible.

6) Once inside the plane, the perpetrator(s) will have many hours to plot what to do with the weapon(s) they have smuggled into the plane as I doubt, there are air marshals on MH planes. It’s time for MAS/MAHB to employ professional air marshals.

We need to have highly trained and intelligent airport security staff if we are serious about fighting air terrorism. One could easily penetrate the existing security measures in place at KLIA/KLIA2. I hope, the lapses mentioned above will be immediately looked into with a view to plugging a potential breach.

RAMESH RAJARATNAM wonders when Malaysia will take flight security seriously.