I refer to the article Religious freedom: A challenge to PAS by Wan Saiful Wan Jan.

Wan Saiful's argument that the curtail on missionary works by non-Muslims as being unconstitutional, displays weakness. He backed his arguments by quoting Maududi claiming that the reformist believed non-Muslims should be given a free hand to proselytise.

On the freedom to proselytise, what if a cult believes that to practice their religion, they need to perform human sacrifices every year on Feb 28? Given the constitutional mandate that every person should be allowed to practice their religion, should the government allow the sacrifice? We do not have to go far in the discussion to know that the practice cannot be allowed. Even if there is a willing human sacrifice, the government cannot allow it to happen. But does this not impede on the followers' right to practice?

In any discussion on rights in law, there are various other questions that are raised. The fact that some religions promote evangelism does not necessarily mean that every society should allow it. The issue of common good has to be addressed. It may be argued that common good will not be abused if proselytisation occurs. But is common good only in reference to non-spiritual matters or should it also encompass spirituality?

An example is a ban on homosexuality. If the said cult endorses homosexuality, should the adherents be allowed to practice it? What if it is only in the confines of the home of two consenting adults? Should Malaysia allow it given there is no impact on others?

Societal norms do not always remain norms. Society's value changes. Fifty years ago, we would not have thought it necessary for an American president to attempt a ban on same sex marriages. Let alone have it defeated. Thus, if laws are only reflective of society's attitude, it stops its role in providing signposts as to the good.

But is preventing the propagation of another religion necessarily unconstitutional? We need to determine whether the constitution protects the obligatory practices or the endorsed. Case laws in Malaysia have shown that the laws protects the obligatory practices.

However, there were several cases, notably the issues of 'niqab' and 'sarban' that showed that if a practice is deemed preferred or endorsed, it is not protected by the constitution.

While there are religions that promote proselytisation, it cannot be argued that the adherents are compelled by their belief to promote their faith. Thus, the ban on the propagation cannot be argued in terms of breaching of constitutional rights. As to whether it reflects on the weakness of the Muslim society, it depends on how far we take an argument.

In Islam, an unlawful act does not occur in solitary. The road that takes the individual to the unlawful is also proscribed. Thus, the prohibition on fornication states that the Muslims not only cannot commit fornication but must also avoid circumstances that can lead to commission of the act.

Thus, in the case of non-propagation conversion, it should be seen in its duality. The protection of faith is not only one-sided, that Muslims should not (beyond cannot) convert, but they should not be placed in the position that causes them to receive propagation. It is not reflective of a weakness, but rather an attempt to provide a holistic approach to the issue.

In regards to Maududi, Wan Saiful accepted one part of the quote he provided while discarding the other. The quote, 'Not only may they propagate their religion, they are even entitled to criticise Islam within the limits laid down by law and decency' was not fully explored.

Sure, Maududi argued that in his society, propagation by non-Muslims should be allowed. Here Wan Saiful provided the added context of the British law to ensure decency. But is that all to the argument?

What seems to be ignored is the argument that it should be made within the confines of law. He did not argue that the law only caters to decency. If it did, then the statement pertaining to the law would have been redundant since he mentioned decency too. It would be well for Wan Saiful to explore the limits as prescribed.

Finally, what seems confusing is that after Wan Saiful argued against the law, he made his challenge to PAS. It can be appreciated, that given his statement of support for PAS, he would like it to pick up the mantle.

But it is a jump from his thesis on the ban. PAS is not the government and could not be said to have been the party responsible for the ban. That PAS supports the ban is secondary to the argument.

If Wan Saiful's position is for the law to be changed, then it should be directed to the parties that can change the law. PAS is not in the position to do that.