Samuel P. Huntington argued more than ten years ago that the post-Cold War world would be characterised by incessant conflicts between civilisations. To prove his point, the Harvard professor divided, crudely, erroneously, and arbitrarily, the world into nine civilisations.

Strangely enough, the Republic of Korea, where Christians (both Protestants and Roman Catholics) make up as much as 30 percent of the population, is categorised as part of the Sinic civilisation, much to the chagrin of Korean nationalists who are eager to develop a national identity that is distinct from that of their giant neighbour.

Huntington was also negative about any potential conflict between Russia and Ukraine, contending that "these are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships for centuries and between whom intermarriage is common". Which led him to conclude that the Ukrainians would "generally cooperate closely with Russia".

The despondent tone of the professor could not be more apparent.

The successive colour revolutions in Russia's near abroad therefore came as pleasant surprises. From Georgia to Kyrgyzstan, the wave of regime change brought in leaders that were largely seen as inclined towards the United States. Huntington must have been excited over the prospect of a US-friendly climate in the south-western tier of Russia, or he might have wished that he had not written off Ukraine so quickly in the first place.

However, it is hard for an esteemed scholar like Huntington to admit his flawed argument. Just like it is virtually impossible for those who were as adamant as George W Bush that invading Iraq was the only way to do away with Saddam's tyranny to confess they had been in the wrong. Francis Fukuyama is perhaps the best known exception now that even the president himself is having serious difficulties in fending off his severest critics.

Cultural affinities

Many a time, moral certitudes can be a positive force. But, more often than not, they so blind a capable leader that atrocities are committed against the innocents instead.

The outcome of the just concluded parliamentary elections in Ukraine has perhaps got Huntington thinking again whether his 'clash argument' indeed stands the test. After a year of political shambles and economic malaise, the pro-Moscow presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, ignominiously defeated by his rival Viktor Yuschenko in a presidential rerun in December 2004, has made a dramatic comeback.

A decade on, I trust Huntington is now discerning enough to know how the so-called Orange Revolution came about, and why the voters in Ukraine are disillusioned with the liberal and seemingly democratic politicians in whom they once placed so much confidence. It all boils down to interests national as well as individual.

No amount of cultural affinities and civilisational commonalities can move the Ukrainians to choose a pro-Russian leader. In a similar vein, once the resentment of the people over deteriorating economic prospects as well as never-ending political feuds and bickering can no longer be contained, even the friendliest pro-West politician has to be ditched through the ballot box.

It is not too difficult to understand why Washington and ardent advocates of a US-centric alliance are constantly worried about Russia. After all, it took them four decades to finally see the Soviet Union consigned to history. Still, with its relatively strong military stockpiles and advanced nuclear technology, Russia is far from being a shade of its former self. Having a cluster of smaller states to check against Russian influence will be conducive to the US' grand scheme of things in the region.

Transatlantic differences

In fact, Moscow has learned the bitter lesson and is now proactively seeking to broaden its strategic options. It has successfully reached a gas deal with Beijing, and is probably pleased that President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus has headed off his challenger. That this is done through an iron fist is immaterial as far as the Russians are concerned.

The Americans may think they have stunned the media world with the allegations that Moscow had fed the Saddam regime with crucial intelligence and information regarding US invasions, but such attempts to cast aspersions on Russia are, honestly speaking, nothing new. What is left unsaid is that all governments - big or small, east or west - are engaged in clandestine information sharing activities to varying degrees. The more powerful a country is, the more likely that it exchanges vital intelligence with its strategic partners.

It could also be that Huntington began to doubt (if he ever did) his own clash theory as early as days before the Iraq War in March 2003. Then, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld lost patience with a number of European leaders due to the transatlantic differences over the planned invasion, and described them as embodying "Old Europe".

The thing is that a key feature in Huntington's overrated book lies in his enthusiastic depiction of the US and Europe as belonging to the same monolithic and static "Western Civilisation", or a Judeo-Christian tradition shared between the two. Suffice to say there are marked differences between them. The Harvard professor had nevertheless called for the West to pull itself together in order to confront the threats and challenges from the Rest. To his dismay, he was seeing waves of protests against the Bush administration in many of the European cities on the eve of the Iraq invasion.

A foregone conclusion?

A Europe drifting apart from the US aegis cannot be more nightmarish. Washington may be able to create "mini Natos" in other parts of the world, but it is not to be denied that the Nato proper remains by far the biggest and most effective military grouping today. It has to be kept intact at all costs, if not enlarged.

Hence, when the world media was caught in the overblown controversy over the allegedly blasphemous Danish cartoon, many could not wait to reach for a copy of Huntington's book for insights and inspirations. The hell let loose, and conspiracy theories abounded. The right wing Daily Telegraph ran an article that expressed its puzzlement at the sudden yet plentiful supply of Danish flags in the Gaza Strip, asking: who, really, was behind all these spontaneous anti-Danish protests?

But is a clash of civilisations between the West and Muslim worlds a foregone conclusion? And why have not many have stepped back and pondered this: who was instrumental in the republication of the Danish cartoons nearly four months after their first appearance in September last year?

In other words, when some European nations begin to show an independent streak, what would be the best way to bring them back into the fold? To "reveal" to them the imminent threat from the Muslim fanatics, perhaps?

A copy of an updated version of the Clash of Civilisations , anyone?