When Keadilan looks back upon its near total annihilation in the recent general elections it needs to come to terms with this defeat and analyse what went wrong. What were the external and internal factors that contributed to its defeat?

As far as the external factors were concerned, all opposition parties had to deal with an extremely uneven playing field. However the BN's use of money, media and government machinery are nothing new. They are simply a part of the political landscape - a given.

These external impediments did not stop the opposition from winning 45 parliamentary seats nor did it prevent PAS from making an almost clean sweep of Kelantan and Terengganu in 1999. Neither did these impediments prevent the DAP from making some minor gains this time.

No one suggests that we don't speak out on these issues or criticise the Election Commission (EC) for its incompetence. But it is important that Keadilan considers its own mistakes and internal shortcomings in deciding the way ahead. What are some of the hard questions that Keadilan needs to consider?

Did Keadilan overestimate the extent of support for the opposition from within the Malay community? I know many activists who believed that it was an established fact that 60 to 70 percent of the Malay ground was with PAS and Keadilan. This may have been true in some parts of the country in 1999 - but it obviously did not hold true this time around.

Did overconfidence and the continual mixing with people who saw the world in exactly the same way as they did prevent party activists from detecting the mood on the ground and picking up the warning signs?

Was Keadilan a victim of its own propaganda? The amount of spin that exists in Keadilan circles is just phenomenal. Is this kind of political culture healthy? Is it possible that all this spin makes one's supporters detached and unconnected with what 'normal' Malaysians think and feel?

Did Keadilan spend enough time and resources, these past four years, in strengthening the party? Or was this hard and painstaking work neglected because it was easier to just depend on PAS' machinery and network?

Did Keadilan overextend itself? It stood in 58 parliamentary and 118 state seats. Given its limited resources and weak party machinery, did it have the capability to take on such an immense task? Can some of the reason for the defeat be attributed to an overstretched party?

Have leaders in PAS and Keadilan overestimated the size of the radical constituency within the Malay electorate? Should the successes in 1999 have been interpreted as an endorsement of what PAS stood for or were the successes due to factors that had little to do with PAS ideology?

The push to enact the Hudud, pronouncements relating to segregation and PAS release of their Dokumen Negara Islam were all geared towards playing the ideological issue to the hilt.

Certainly there is a core constituency for which these issues are extremely important. However the question remains - what is the size of this constituency? Have PAS, Keadilan and some social activists overestimated the size of this ideological hardcore?

What was the effect of pushing and harping on these ideological issues on both the Malay and non-Malay electorate?

Has Keadilan made the effort to project its own image and ideology? There are core differences between what PAS and Keadilan stand for - but has enough effort been made to demonstrate these differences?

Or has Keadilan's muted response and occasional silence lead to the public perception that in the ultimate analysis whatever PAS believed and wanted to do would prevail in the coalition between the two parties? Is Keadilan's continued alliance with PAS a liability?

Keadilan seems unable to question this relationship on account of the misguided notion that PAS had a stranglehold on the Malay ground. Now that it has been learnt that the situation is much more complex and fluid, is it in Keadilan's long-term interest to continue with this relationship?

Did Keadilan misread and mishandle the Badawi phenomenon? They chose to deal with Badawi in the same combative manner in which they had dealt with Mahathir. But Badawi succeeded in projecting a different persona to the public. The public sensed him, rightly or wrongly, to be of a different mould.

The failure of Keadilan to deal with his demeanour and to show a little appreciation for some 'genuine' policy initiatives was a strategic error. By insisting that he was simply part of the same old system, the opposition began to appear more and more unreasonable in the eyes of the public.

This list is not exhaustive but it represents some vital concerns that Keadilan will have to deal with if it wants to move on.

It is important that at this difficult juncture in the life of a political party, to remember that Keadilan still has a lot going for it. They have thousand of young, energetic and idealistic supporters. More importantly Keadilan has shown that it is able to garner both Malay and non-Malay support.

When Keadilan burst onto the political scene in 1999, they promised the Malaysian public a new brand of politics - a break with the politics of the past - politik baru, alaf baru . They gave the people hope to get more involved in the political process. This hope still burns strong.

As Keadilan grapples with its demons in the dark days ahead, one hopes that its leadership is capable of rising to the occasion. Leaders must lead. It is in difficult times that bold and decisive leadership is required, capable of coming to terms with the truth.

Keadilan's leadership must critically take stock in order to provide hope and direction. Keadilan must not compound its electoral debacle but singing the same old tune or by refusing to look within. There are important lessons to be learnt in defeat.