I wish to respond to Dr Sarah Verghis's Why different bail standards?

I concur with her conclusion that the different bail standards between a woman accused of physically abusing Indonesian maid and the man accused of raping Indonesian maid is hard to understand but not for her reasons for such a conclusion.

She asked: 'Why are women treated as inferior? If the child can be brought to the mother for breast feeding, can't medical care be provided to an accused rapist in prison?'

Leaving aside the obvious differences between bringing a child for breast feeding and that of a gamut of medical equipment and infrastructure to a prison environment, the two situations ought not to be equalised by denying bail to both but in allowing it for both .

The undertones of gender discrimination are suggested here but I doubt the incoherence of the bail criteria in these instances has anything to do with gender discrimination based on perceived women's inferiority relative to men's.

It is the first time that such extreme cruelty was alleged to have been inflicted on an Indonesian maid, which has been highlighted with prominence in the media that in turn whipped up community outrage with politicians calling for retribution and deterrence.

The decision not to grant bail might well have been substantially influenced by the public and the political masters' call for severe punishment for cruelty as a deterrent or retribution.

Even so, the decision not to grant bail for this reason is not justifiable. The reason for this is because the severest punishment for cruelty and torture for deterrence and retribution - is only justifiable when the accused has her day in court and only then after being proven guilty by law, not before.

Considerations of whether to grant bail or not should not depend on calls for retribution that the public and politicians make a big hue and cry about. It should be based on other factors such as whether if the accused were granted bail, is it likely he or she would abscond or have the opportunity to tamper with witnesses or inflict further cruelty on the same victim or others.

Protection of the community and integrity of the justice system justifies denial of bail.

If the above stated criteria were relevant, then the person accused of rape ought to be denied bail more than the one accused of torturing the maid (the maid being presently no more under the dominion and control of the alleged abuser even if bail were granted).

This is more rational than the other way around which panders to public hysteria and trial by media presuming guilt.

Here I am not saying that the accused under a rape charge should be denied bail. There may well be compelling reasons why in accordance with law, he ought to be so granted. What I am saying is that if one accused of rape is granted bail, I cannot understand why the other accused of abusing the maid should be so denied (unless one already assumes that she is guilty).

As important judicial independence is judicial fairness and rationality based on coherent and consistent principles relating to remand and bail criteria.

One wonders what happens if, as it turns out after their trials, the woman accused of maid abuse is found innocent and the one accused of rape is found guilty? Would such an anomalous result inspire confidence in the public, no matter that it might be the hysteria and outrage of that very same public that might have contributed to the disparity in bail criteria in the first instance?