It won't just be the dailies who practice selective prosecution. However, Ronnie Liu's statement offers a lousy defense for PKM.

Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmi, PKMM's founding vice-president, was appointed while he himself was in Singapore due to his leadership reputation during the Japanese occupation. As Ahmad Boestamam recorded, PKMM was established with the cooperation of a Malay division in the Malaya Communist Party (Rejimen 10) under Mokhtaruddin Lasso, an Indonesian.

With Sutan Djenain, another member of the Indonesian Communist Party, they became the backbone of PKMM. Ramlah Adam (2000) cited the same book Ronnie Liu cited (Ahmad Boestamam, 1972), but he failed to mention that PKM's influence in PKMM was evident right from the start.

Burhanuddin was not a communist and he, like Pak Sako (Ishak Haji Mohammad), was from the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) days that saw the betrayal of Ibrahim Yaakob to the Japanese. Burhanuddin, was an Islamist and stated clearly that his vision that the fight is of the middle way, against colonialism but not pro-communist.

He was still an aspirant of the Melayu/Indonesia Raya ideal in 1947, but PKMM was packed with communists and he had to cooperate with PKM to counter Umno. His leadership in PKMM since 1946 is testament to that reality.

I don't know where Liu learns of the fact that PKMM proposed to reject the Malayan Union, but Burhanuddin and PKMM supported the Malayan Union early in 1946.

I quote, Ramlah Adam (2000) citing the official voice of PKMM, Pelita Malaya (p. 46): 'The best way is to accept the present Malayan Union scheme. The rights of the Malays, ie the rights of citizenship can be safeguarded if the Malays will demand that the conditions jointly governing the question of citizenship for non-Malays be tightened'. - Pelita Malaya, May 3, 1946.

Note that PKMM felt that the only thing to work out was the matter of citizenship of the non-Malays. Burhanuddin and PKMM then realised their serious error when the Malays disagreed, and in particular, he took the official line of offence that the Malayan Union failed to reflect the historical past of the Malays in Malaya.

PKMM then 'decided' that Malayan Union was out to wipe out the Malay-ness of Malaya, by a colonial trickery of 'Malayanising' the nationality of the Malays.

It is with this sentiment PKMM attended the Malay Congress in March, 1946. It was a very important moment for PKMM who made the earlier mistake of calling for support for the Malayan Union.

For example, the Persatuan Melayu Selangor was revived to distance and differentiate themselves from PKMM's original pro-Malayan Union stance. Noting the massive change in popular political sentiments, PKMM's 'willingness' to unite with PKMBR (Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu-Umno) to topple the Malayan Union in the Congress was a very important turning point.

PKM too was hoping that PKMM could wrestle the leadership and political momentum from the others, notably the state Malay parties and organisations. In the Congress of 1946, Ahmad Boestamam was the one who carried PKMM's assault on the Malayan Union.

In his closing speech, however, Burhanuddin, president of PKMM graciously acknowledged Onn Jaafar's leadership role in the Congress and in fact, endorsed his appointment to lead the Malay cause against Malayan Union.

What staged walk-out by the PKMM when their proposal was rejected? That's was during the Umno general assembly in June 1946 in Ipoh. Can Liu check and verify what he has written with proper historians first?

The truth is Burhanuddin got into hot soup with PKM with his closing speech on March 4,1946 on the last day of the Congress. PKM complained that PKMM was given a smaller share of votes and attacked Onn Jaafar for his aristocracy tilt. In truth, PKM preferred the Malayan Union to returning power, however symbolic, to the royalties.

API, the PKMM youth wing under Ahmad Boestamam, blasted and questioned Burhanuddin's leadership after the Congress. It was Boestamam that attended the Umno meeting in June because Burhanuddin 'couldn't make it'.

In actuality, Burhanuddin attended another Congress in Johor Baru aon May 11,1946 and signed the charter that gave birth to Umno, together with Zulkifli Ownie. PKMM's relationship with the Congress lasted for three months.

It was Boestamam who walked out of the Umno assembly in June 1946 and the official excuse is that PKMM lost by one vote to Ikatan Setia Kampung Baru in deciding the offcial Umno flag. Onn Jaafar's PMSJ suggestion for the flag got 19 votes.

Readers can decide whether there was a proposal which Liu claims 'was rejected by the Congress and the PKMM delegation staged a walkout as a protest on the third day of the Congress'. What a bunch of mistakes.

You can get the real story behind why Boestamam was upset over the flag - they just didn't want the keris which symbolises the royalties. Other than that, PKMM and ISKB's designs are mostly similar (Ramlah Adam, 2000, p. 52-53).

Burhanuddin accepted Boestamam's action and explanation (he was in total control of PKMM anyway) and PKMM actually went on to be on the side of the Malayan Union by working with AMCJA and Putera, again, with close ties to PKM.

PKMM/Putera supported the Malayan Union with additional terms, such as Malay language as the official tongue and Islamic elements in development. On April 1,1946, PKMM supported and welcomed Sir Edward Gent's appointment as the Governor of the Malayan Union.

Read Ramlah Adam's biography of Burhanuddin (page 55) for that. In the end, Burhanuddin was soon fighting two fronts, Umno and the British because it decided to play both sides. They were upset when Umno was invited to discuss a replacement for Malayan Union, and PKMM was left out.

More importantly, the return of the royalties was too much for PKMM. Umno was labeled as 'reliant' on the colonials and was accused of not fighting the British full-heartedly. The British did sideline PKMM, but that's only obvious after Umno gained ground. ,

In February 1947, Burhanuddin returned to the fold, fighting for Malay rights and compromising on many fronts. PKMM no longer differed with Umno on major points, so their dissent was ineffective.

Then in desperation they turned to the Islamists. PKMM became Malayan in outlook too, as tempered by their later cooperation with Putera-AMCJA. They failed again, and PKM was utterly dejected.

Ishak Haji Mohamad took over PKMM in1947, and freed Burhanuddin to his Islamic pursuits and other platforms. He returned to the political scene as the leader of PAS in 1956.

Ronnie Liu conveniently fast-forward the clamping of the British on PKMM in 1948 and attributed that as the reason why PKM turned to arms. What a gloss over, including of the Hartal.

I know Liu is not a historian, but literature on the matter is available all over the place. I do not claim to be clever, but what Liu related is so different from a biography I have read many years ago and that is distressing.

I sure hope Liu can check his facts. I mean, granted, there is a lot of revisionism in history, but this one stands out like a sore thumb. Let's put aside politics for a while and appreciate past events as they had taken place - not as spun by politicians both from the ruling or opposing coalitions.

History is an academic exercise with differing takes and perspectives, true, but it is not to be packaged with misleading lies to influence the public. Deriding our past prime ministers and doubting their nationalistic struggles just because they worked with the colonialists is downright silly. But that's politics, not history, I suppose, and many parties are guilty of that practice.