The current radical legal and constitutional reviews and reforms being proposed by the Malaysian government are underpinned on the basic and fundamental premise that political stability and economic viability can only be achieved through positive normative and ideological choices beginning with reforming the legal state apparatus of government.

Because the society is characterised by ethnic, social class and racial diversity, and because it functions though a myriad of socio-political cross-cutting cleavages that historically have generally been seen as a source of social vitality and strength, this scenario has been taken for granted.

There has been a tendency by the powers-that-be to downplay, and even ignore, conditions that can potentially generate institutional inter-ethnic and interracial social divisions and conflict.

The outcome of this scenario has been that factors such as ethnicity and race have become overarching entities in themselves, synonymous with political identities. Political mobilisation and the articulation of self–interest accordingly became central to the conduct of politics demanding the articulation of power, thereby by-passing the vital processes and substance of constitution-making within the legal framework of society.

The constitutional power and order of the state therefore gradually became incompatible and incongruent with the overall well-being of society in ways that have generated racial antagonism and heightened possibilities for violent interracial conflict.

It is imperative that the current constitutional and legal reviews underway be adopted against the background of distinct normative value systems and theoretical frameworks in the thinking and talking about ‘ideal type’ constructs. This if such reviews and indeed subsequent reforms are to lead to the peaceful and orderly transformation and organisation of society.

For instance, in the multiracial context, while the recognition of differences and the accommodation of diversity are considered essential for peace, order and good government, the institutionalisation of such differences can, at the same time, lead to precisely the opposite result; namely that of entrenched divisions and conflict.

For this reason, when measured against such ‘ideal type construct’ the empirical fact of diversity itself cannot, and should not, be recognised as an appropriate basis or criteria for constitutional and legal reviews and reform.

Socio-political diversity should therefore be recognised and accommodated only in the context of democratic legitimacy underpinned by the constitutional order along power-sharing lines and liberal values, so that the fair sharing of power itself constitutes a sufficient condition for collaborative decision-making.

The overriding and basic concern is to formulate a coherent normative and ideological foundation in mind sets that is clearly understood by all Malaysians, and upon which principled valued choices can be made between various alternative policy options for appropriate constitutional and legal reviews and reforms.

The socio-political constitutional and legal structure must therefore necessarily encompass the satisfactory sharing of power specifically geared towards the attainment and maintenance of sustained law and order, to the satisfaction of all parties concerned, in the formulation and implementation of policies towards the solution of problems.

Being a federal state, from a constitutional standpoint at least two fundamental elements are involved in the determination of the way ahead. First, power-sharing through inter-state territorial arrangements as well as the functional devolution and decentralisation of power, and second, backed by modalities through institutional arrangements for the implementation of specific functions and policies relevant to the citizens of the respective constituent territories..

These clearly define the framework and requirements of constitutional democracy as well as the limitation of government authority and the protection of basic rights and fundamental liberties of the people in the context of ethno-cultural and religious identities. In short, nothing less than a ‘comprehensive constitutional bill of rights susceptible to robust judicial enforcement’ is needed.

Power-sharing also implicitly means the constitution must ensure that the culture of government is premised on the basis of negotiation, consensus and co-operation disciplined by the rule of law, an independent judiciary and respect for human rights, as an autonomy covenant within the constitution.

In the final analysis, to be meaningful and effective, such reviews and reforms should be operationally undertaken in the context of problem solving. The saying that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’ points to this vital scenario, where not only the proposed changes need to be crouched within objective ideology and theoretical frameworks but these must at the same time, be seen in the context of making a difference in real terms in the improvement in the standards of living and the quality of life of the people.

It would appear that one of the most effective ways this can be achieved is through the planning and implementation of development projects. Most projects are woefully lacking in procedures for power-sharing in the decision- making process, not to mention involvement in ownership and control of resources among those who are directly involved in the production process.

Targeting some of the basic and more important projects for immediate review and reforms in power-sharing therefore cannot fail to generate a positive impact on the producers and the rakyat, that the government is serious in devolving and sharing power with them on a long term ‘bottom-top’ sustainable basis.