In the first part of this two-part article, I examined the underlying attitudes of the DAP and PKR leaders before coming to the negotiating table.

I also analyzed split ticket voting patterns using polling station data collected from the 2004 general election to show voters of different races chose to split their votes in favor of either DAP or PKR, depending on the nature of the contest and the race of the candidates.

In this part of the article, I want to further probe the short and long term dynamics underlying the seat allocation exercise between DAP and PKR as well as discuss some longer term issues of political identity and political space in regards to these two parties.

Let's start this section with the following question � given the evidence, based on the 2004 general election results, that DAP Chinese candidates performs much better than PKR Chinese candidates, why does PKR still insist on negotiating for some Chinese majority seats to be allocated to it, as the current negotiations seem to indicate?

I can propose a few reasons for this.