“‎The greatest danger of a terrorist's bomb is in the explosion of stupidity that it provokes.”

- Octave Mirbeau

The terrorist attack in Puchong, first dismissed by the police and then confirmed as a foreign Islamic-influenced attack on Malaysian citizens, is a culmination of botched propaganda and lapses in our security apparatus. It is also a troubling sign that the state’s security apparatus is bogged down in the internal squabbles of Umno and the partisan conflict of the greater Malaysian political landscape.

As reported in the Australian media earlier this year, the Australian government issued a travel advisory for its citizens of possible terrorist attacks in Malaysia, citing retaliative measures by Islamic State (IS) sympathisers. This was the efforts of intelligence sources and various other joint interagency counter-terrorism investigation following a revenge video posted by IS in response to efforts by the Malaysian authorities in curbing their activities in the country.

Katibah Nusantara​ (Malay Archipelago Brigade) posted a video claiming, “If you catch us we will only increase in number but if you let us be, we will be closer to our goal of bringing back the rule of khalifah [caliph]… We will never bow down to the democratic system of governance, as we will only follow Allah's rules."

Inspector-general of police (IGP) Khalid Abu Bakar in a cavalierly manner dismissed threats from IS saying, "He [Syrian-based Malaysian IS representative Mohd Rafi Udin] only dared to threaten the police because he is far away. Why don't you come back?” I would argue that this is an almost criminally negligent taunt, akin to shouting fire in a crowded movie theatre.

There was also the usual state revisionism at play when the IGP claimed, “That is why I made it my focus this year to monitor social media. It is not to go into some private conversation, but to ensure all these (are kept in check),” which is complete bull manure because the focus was on monitoring the opposition to the extent of the creation of a special task force to monitor “seditious” speech by the opposition and opposition-leaning members of the public.

Furthermore, the IGP also trotted out the old idea of ghettoising non-Islamic entertainment outlets when he said, “This is why prior to this, I had suggested state governments concentrate entertainment centres in one location, so that it would be easier for authorities to monitor them.”

Anyone familiar with the narratives of Islamic clergymen in this country would recognise that this kind of rhetoric serves the purpose of alienating the mainstream non-Malay polity from their Muslim Malaysian brethren, thereby fostering patriotism by isolation sentiment amongst the Malay polity.

This of course does not take into account the various “Muslim” entertainment outlets in the heart of the capital run by Indonesian expatriates and other foreigners that also serves as intelligence gathering apparatuses for various regional intelligence services.

Living in denial

A protégé of a former Special Branch officer told me that Bukit Aman is living in denial, and he does not mean the river in Egypt. Their handling of the Puchong terrorist attack was mendacious, borderline racist and destroys the extremely dangerous work of security personnel who have managed to foil terrorist attacks, or at least disrupt their plans.

The problem is that Bukit Aman is mismanaging the propaganda war against Islamic militants because:

1) They seem more interested in the well-being of their political masters.

2) The police are dealing with mixed signals when it comes to the propaganda that is disseminated to the Muslim-majority polity.

In this instance, it is the unbridled power of the religious corps who maintain that Islamic dogma is the unifying factor in the Malay community and that the non-Malays are a threat to Muslim hegemony, which ironically does not contradict the messages of Islamic extremist groups like IS and their subsidiaries. Furthermore, a very specific form of Islam is mandated by the Umno state and this, of course, causes complications with the various other sometimes benign Muslims sects.

3) The general propaganda or information to the public is dismissed because of the way how the current IGP operates. The fact that he has not enforced secular laws when it comes to religious matters and is thus perceived as untrustworthy when it comes to his role as an unbiased civil servant, but most importantly, he has neither the commanding presence nor persuasive demeanour of someone who supposedly leads the security apparatus charged with maintaining peace and security.

And let us not get into the fact that Singaporean intelligence apparatus is obsessed with Islamic intransigence - and rightly so - and cross-border intelligence sharing is hampered by bureaucratic hiccups on our end because of the current state of political turmoil. You can’t hunt the enemy from the outside when you lump your political adversaries from within as enemies of the state.

Joseph Chinyong Liow in piece for the Brookings Institute titled ‘Malaysia’s ISIS conundrum’ said, “To be sure, Malaysia has a very competent internal security apparatus. But security measures alone are insufficient to deal with the threat the country currently faces. Indeed, without changing the way Malaysian society views and articulates Islam to allow for critical engagement of extremist ideas, the utility of security measures is limited at best.

“Worse still, they might have a contradictory effect of feeding an extremist mindset. While critical engagement will not eradicate the problem, I believe it will go some distance in reducing it. But in order to set a new tone for public discourse on Islam, pluralism, and critical engagement of extremist ideas, it will require political will and leadership at the very top.”

Enemies within

Still serving state security intelligence officers confirm to me that there is a disconnect between their political masters and the committed security personnel who tread where angels dare not. I have faith in those men, who in the words of George Orwell, or is that Edmund Burke, who do the rough work necessary for the rest of us to sleep peacefully in our beds. However, their work is hampered by policies of the Umno state and politicians who have used Islam as a weapon and now find it turned on them.

Special Branch director Comm Mohamad Fuzi Harun, as reported in local media, said this of the surveillance methods of the Malaysian security apparatus, “We monitor not only the target but the family members. I can’t reveal to you police matters about how many police officers or personnel are involved. I think that is not your business. That is our business!”

Citing Mohd Nazri Dollah (of Darul Islam) as a data point of the so-called rehabilitation programme, “He continued his militant activities, recruiting students and other people. So we had to take him back into custody and put him through extra rehabilitation programmes.”

Although I question the efficacy of these so-called rehabilitation programmes, the real issue, the worrying issue is the reality - again confirmed by Umno sources and still serving security personnel - that the state security apparatus has been compromised. We always hear of low-ranking cops who are involved in terrorist activities but as anyone who has worked in the security forces could tell, these cops are exactly the kind of assets that are needed in planning attacks on soft targets.

Furthermore, the scale of the infiltration should worry the general public. As reported in the foreign press, the latest rounds of IS suspects earlier this year also included “... a senior aviation technician for a company that services aircraft used by the country's corporate and political leaders. The 49-year-old suspect is a former flight engineer for the Royal Malaysian Air Force.”

A regional security source told the South China Morning Post: "The suspect is a senior technician, whose responsibility was to check that an aircraft is safe for use. He is the person who gives the green light whether an aircraft is safe to take off or not."

Security personnel tell me that efforts with monitoring mosques and other religious meeting places are hampered by the fact that on-the-ground assets have to filter so-called “anti-Umno” rhetoric that is part of the democratic process and the real threats of anti-government rhetoric by committed Islamic terrorists.

Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the groupthink - the opposition also suffers from this but this is reflected in a different way - embedded in governmental institutions has had a debilitating effect on Malay and non-Malay personnel. When the default position of the Umno state is defensive when it comes to Islam, it is all the more difficult to take an offensive stand against Islam, and the sometimes benign but in this case virulent strand, that poses a danger to the citizenry of this country.

Add to this the complicated reality of security apparatus personnel navigating the petty fiefdoms and the allegiances of said fiefdoms to Umno warlords and potentates and the fact that Malaysia is a nexus for human trafficking, with the complicity - well-documented - of the security apparatus. This last part is extremely important because the unsanctioned flow of illicit human cargo is the conduit for Islamic extremists to leave and enter the country.

Orwell claimed “people sleep peaceably in their bed at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.” A few readers have pointed out that the source of this particular quote is in dispute, but I will stick with Orwell for now.

The “rough men” here in Malaysia who stand ready to do violence to Islamic extremists are hampered by a political apparatus mired in its own internal squabble and a system that nurtures the enemy they have to do battle with.

Tomorrow: On the way to Malaysia’s Islamic paradise

S THAYAPARAN is Commander (Rtd) in the Royal Malaysian Navy.