In the letter Al-Qaeda winning battle for hearts and minds , Realist accused me of being '... too nave to understand what the dynamics of the Muslim world and its realms are'.

The same letter criticised '... the Western nations constant fixation on killing the 'operative' rather than understanding the root cause of the whole problem' and concluded that '... he (Osama) is already winning the battle for hearts and minds of the Muslim world'.

It may surprise Realist to know that my previous letter was entirely devoted to understanding 'the root cause of the whole problem'. I went to considerable trouble to not only analyse the political, social and economic roots of terrorism, but also attempt to understand the mindsets of the individuals involved.

It may surprise Realist even more that we share the same conclusion, as I pointed out in the same letter that '... Osama is closer to achieving his aims than we are in stopping him'.

My letter Al-Qaeda crippled in battle with US was not meant to be a litany of '... body counts based on the killed and captured'. In fact, it was a serious attempt to demonstrate, that by early 2002, US-led anti-terrorist operations have been largely successful in breaking up the central core of the al-Qaeda.

Groups within the 'network of networks', and many that were never part of it, began to fragment under this pressure. In Egypt, any militancy that might have survived the crackdowns of the mid and late 1990s was crushed.

In Pakistan, the military government has reversed the policy of 20 years, and tried to rein in terrorists that have been acting as Islamabad's proxies. In the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf suffered under a series of US-aided offensives. Even Saudi Arabia took unprecedented measures to restrict terrorist funding, arrest militants, and prevent further recruitment.

Despite all these successes, the attacks have continued. Why? This is due to the emergence of a 'new style' of Islamic militant violence.

In the Bali bombings (2002), the cell was largely composed of men who had no previous involvement in terrorism. They had not been recruited by Osama or his Afghan alumni. The plan appears to have been their own, and picked for very personal reasons.

The Casablanca bombings (2003) were also carried out by 14 suicide bombers recruited locally. Al-Qaeda, as commonly conceived, provided no help whatsoever.

Similarly the direct involvement of Osama in Iraq (2003-2004) and the Madrid train bombings (2004) appears to be almost non-existent. In fact, as time passes, not only does the involvement of Osama seem to drop away entirely, but so too the Afghan alumni.

The dominance of the 'new style' involving autonomous groups independent of any central authority becomes clear.

The 'war on terror' needs a military component. This has nothing to do with a '... constant fixation on killing the 'operative'', but the simple realisation that dialogue with hardcore radicals is virtually impossible, and that they need to be made to cease their activities, through legal processes or otherwise.

But Realist is correct in pointing out, that to win the 'war on terror', the strategies used need to be broader and more sophisticated. Terrorists need to be eliminated without creating new ones. Military power must be only one tool among many, and used only rarely.

Currently, military power seems to be the default strategy of choice. In fact, the greatest weapon available is the courage, decency, and integrity of the vast majority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims.

It is this that, as Islamic militancy grows more violent and fragmented, we need most. Without it, we are lost.