"(The) conservatives among us are always suspicious of social change, mainly because it affects their interests. However, they have to be involved in the process of social change. They must realise that they are not the judges, they are as much party to the debate as others are. They have to argue their case to the public. It must be clear that nobody has the right to exclude the other from the debate." Interview with Prof Muhammad Khalid Masud, 'We no longer communicate, we just go to war' (2002).

In the first part of this series Dyala Hamzah and myself looked at the erosion of the public sphere in contemporary Muslim-majority societies worldwide. Our argument was that the narrowing of public space was the inevitable result of the structural crisis of the postcolonial state; the emergence of both authoritarian political elites and conservative right-wing religio-political movements attempting to usurp the role of 'guardian of public interest', and the demonisation tactics used by some groups to silence the opinions of others and to foreclose the public arena of debate and contestation itself.

In this, the second half of the series, I would like to focus on the last point in particular: How the public sphere has been systematically diminished as a result of the hate-campaigns and strategies of deliberate misrepresentation used by some groups.

It is a sad indicator of the plummeting levels of accommodation in our society that I have to begin by clearly stating my own subject-position so as not to be misrepresented in turn, so here it goes: For the umpteenth time, I state again that I, Farish Ahmad Muhammad Noor, am an old-fogey type with a receding hairline who does not go to trendy clubs in the 'notorious' Bangsar area. Having stated the above, I would now like to deliver my argument. But let us begin with the setting.

The Jawi fiasco and its aftermath

The torrid mess known as the 'Jawi raid fiasco' is something that most of us would be familiar with by now. It all began when a group of officials under the auspices of the Federal Territory Religious Department (Jawi) raided a popular club in downtown Kuala Lumpur and apprehended about a hundred Malaysian citizens whom they accused of indecent/immoral behaviour. The strong reaction to the Jawi raid was occasioned by the manner in which the Malaysians were treated, which can only be described as dehumanising and abusive.

In the wake of the Jawi raid, a number of Malaysian academics, writers and activists spoke up in protest and called for a thorough-going re-examination of not only how these raids were/are conducted, but also the basis of moral policing in the country itself. In reaction to this protest, a counter-protest of sorts was organised by a number of different Malaysian-Muslim NGOs and individuals.

Seen from the point of view of a political scientist, the train of inter-related events gives a rather good picture of how Malaysian society works. Let us begin at the beginning: The raid involved a governmental authority (Jawi) that is known to have contracted out its services to self-appointed moral vigilantes. Here we already have a somewhat ambiguous entity that spans the state and non-state frontier, at times relying on non-governmental actors (the vigilantes) to carry out its tasks.

The response to the Jawi raid also shows how pluralized Malaysian society has become. The initial reaction involved a host of NGOs and organisations that spanned the ethnic, religious, racial and cultural divides of Malaysia.

The counter-reaction is equally interesting for in the case of the first pro-Moral policing petition at least 40 Malaysian Muslim NGOs and organisations had put their names down on the document. (See: Siaran Media 1 April 2005, Pencegahan Maksiat dan salah-Laku Moral Harus Dipertahankan).

It is interesting to note that the singular factor that united all of these groups is that they happen to be Muslim organisations representing Muslim interests primarily.(1) Thus from the outset the parameters of their activities are demarcated by sectarian (religio-communal) concerns.

Secondly it is interesting to note that even within this broad alliance of Muslim groups, racial differences still exist, as testified by the presence of at least three groups (Teras Pengupayaan Melayu (Teras), Pergerakan Belia India Muslim Malaysia (Gepima) and the Persatuan Cina Muslim Malaysia (Macma)) that cater to the communitarian concerns of their respective racial/ethnic communities. Not to be left out, the Vice-Chief of the Keadilan (PKR) party's Youth Wing, Shamsul Iskandar Mohd Akin, also issued a statement four days later. (See: Anti-Moral Policing Campaign: A Misguided Move and Sheer Hypocrisy. April 5, 2005)

Two concrete examples

The two statements (Pencegahan Maksiat, April 1 and Anti-Moral Policing, April 5) provide us with two concrete examples of how Muslim-Islamist groups can and cannot, should and should not, engage in the public sphere. Though both address the same issue, in terms of form, content and substance they differ radically. In them we see how different movements can engage in debate in the public sphere and how some groups uphold the norms of civil exchange, while others, to put it bluntly, are simply uncivil. Let us now consider the two statements closely, and begin with the positive example first:

A good example of Islamist engagement in the public sphere: The April 1 'Pencegahan Maksiat' statement.

The April 1 media statement emphasised the need for the state to play a role in the 'promotion of virtue and the eradication of vice' ('Penegasan pencegahan maksiat sebagai prinsip dasar dalam Islam'. Sec. A, pg. 1.). It should be noted that the promotion of virtue and the eradication of crime/vice is not unique to Islam and Muslim societies alone, and that the same principle is upheld even in the context of secular societies/states.

At no point in the initial memorandum condemning the actions of Jawi did any of the NGOs or individuals disagree with this fundamental principle, it should be noted: the issue was the manner in which the raid was carried out, and the infringement of the rights of Malaysian citizens as a result.

The April 1 media statement goes on to state that the task of promoting virtue and eradicating vice should be guided by religious guidelines ('dikawal oleh nilai-nilai dan garis panduan agama', Sec A.ii, pg. 2) and this raises the thorny question: In the context of multi-religious Malaysia, which religion should serve as the reference point and standard for such moral policing? This was precisely the concern that was being raised in the memorandum of protest against the Jawi raid, as well as the calls for an inter-religious council in Malaysia.

If the groups behind the April 1 media statement were/are serious about the need for there to be some religious basis to the legal/constitutional set-up in Malaysia, then the question of which religion shall serve as the template for the constitutional-legal framework is inevitably raised.

The fact that Malaysia is a Muslim-majority country does not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that religious-sectarian majoritarianism should hold sway in the country, to the point where other religious communities are effectively marginalized from the discussion. However this is precisely what is being suggested later in the statement, when it goes on to say that 'religious diversity (in Malaysia) does not give the licence (sic) for other religious groups to involve themselves in the religious norms and praxis of others'.(2)

Despite these points which this writer personally takes objection to, I would like to point out that the April 1 media statement stands as a model of how Islamist groups can indeed engage in the public sphere while leaving the channels of debate and engagement open. There are many passages of the April 1 statement that are positive in the sense that they are presented in the spirit of accommodation, compromise and co-operation. (To mention a few: Section B, paras i, ii, iii, Section C, paras ii, iv.)

Can agree to disagree

The most important concession found in the April 1 media statement is the recognition that the complaints of those who supported the memorandum of protest against Jawi were indeed understandable. The statement recognises that any governmental/institutional system (Jawi included) is not immune from abuse and defects (B.i), and that the enforcement of criminal laws is likewise vulnerable to weaknesses (B.ii). The statement also accepts that the reform and re-thinking of such legal frameworks and institutions is required time and again (B.iii).

Most importantly, the April 1 media statement leaves the door open to all groups to come together to discuss the matter seriously, in depth and in the spirit of co-operation, recognising the common aspiration of all groups for a better, safer society. (C. ii). In closing the signatories of the statement assert that their own effort was carried out in goodwill and with the hope that it will not jeopardise the 'common commitment and solidarity' of all parties (C. iv.)

On points and areas where we can agree, let us agree. And on the points and areas where we do not agree, let us agree to differ- but in a civil, rational and responsible manner. The April 1 statement leaves room for precisely this sort of pragmatic, instrumental and ultimately useful negotiation and co-operation.

Most importantly it represents a collective effort on the part of a number if Muslim-based groups to reach out to Malaysian society as a whole, and it views Malaysian society as its primary audience. This was a statement that was intended to be inclusive and accommodating, rather than exclusive and divisive. The obvious refrain from the tactics of innuendo, defamation and slander is strikingly evident, as is the spirit of openness that runs throughout the argument contained within the document. The same, however, cannot be said for the rather off-the-tangent salvo that was to come from PKR four days later

A bad example of Islamist engagement in the public sphere: The April 5 'Sheer Hypocrisy' statement.

Four days after the April 1 media statement was released, another statement was released by the Youth Wing of the Justice (PKR) party. Entitled 'Anti-Moral Policing Campaign: A Misguided Move and Sheer Hypocrisy', the document read as a chain of sweeping, unwarranted and unsubstantiated slurs on those who questioned the basis of the Jawi raid.

The author of the PKR statement alleges that 'the proponents of the anti-Moral Policing campaign' have 'failed to give proper regards to public morality, the parameters of which are naturally defined by social and religious values'(3) and this 'has grave implications on the creation of a morally upright civil society in Malaysia'. The statement goes on to state that 'We (presumably referring to the PKR Youth Wing) are particularly appalled by the uncompromising attitude of the anti-Moral Policing proponents in trying to impose on the Malaysian public their misguided (sic) views on the primacy of private space which is devoid of any guidance in moral and religious values (sic).

Not part of dialogue

The focus of this attack was the NGO Sisters In Islam (SIS), which the statement claims to have promoted a 'skewered understanding of religion' and has 'deceived the Malaysian public'. It then states that "We challenge Sisters In Islam to drop 'Islam' from its name for it has caused much confusion about the religion in the eyes of Muslims and non-Muslims alike".

The statement goes on to add that "It is also shameful to note that the organisation and its cohorts, while extremely vigorous in campaigning against moral policing, are almost muzzled when it comes to challenging the pillars of the Malaysian authoritarian regime. We see nothing but a sheer hypocrisy (sic) at work."

From the outset it is clear that the PKR statement was not intended as part of a dialogue at all. The deliberate slander cast on the NGO Sisters In Islam was designed to deprive SIS of a common standing that would be required for a reply in a public arena. Likewise the tone of the statements ("We challenge Sisters In Islam", "misguided views", "We see nothing but sheer hypocrisy", etc) are judgemental and exclusive in nature and effect.

One can only wonder what was in the mind of the author/s of the PKR statement that day when they put pen to paper. Among the numerous contradictions that are embarrassingly evident in the PKR Youth Wing statement are the following:

If, as the PKR statement suggests, the Malaysian state should be held into account for its authoritarian mode of government (something which we personally agree with) then obviously institutions such as Jawi that represent yet another arm of the state's vast policing apparatus should be called into question as well. Does the author/s of the PKR statement not realise that Jawi is merely another appendage to the state's already expansive security-policing complex, and that it merely adds to the over-policing of Malaysian society?

Surely any NGO, group or individual that protests against the authoritarian instrument that is the ISA should also direct his energies towards campaigning against moral vigilantes who threaten the rights of Malaysians?

Silence views of others

In response to the spurious claim that the 'anti-Moral Policing campaign' is an exercise of hypocrisy for the reason that it does not target other repressive laws and instruments of the state such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), has the author conveniently forgotten the fact that among the NGOs that signed the original memorandum of protest against Jawi were groups like Suaram, Hakam and others, who have consistently campaigned against the ISA for decades?

Then there is the equally facile and shallow accusation/insult towards Sisters In Islam, which contained the claim that SIS was guilty of misinforming and deceiving the Malaysian public on matters of religion.

Here again we find a statement designed not to accommodate differences in thought/opinion, but rather designed to silence the views of others. It is sad indeed that such a tactic of foreclosure should come from PKR, which claims at least to stand apart from its erstwhile ally PAS that is better known for such strategies of closure and silencing.(4)

What are we to conclude from this grandiose claim on the part of the PKR? Does the Justice party now claim that it can decide on who is fit to speak on Islam, and who is not? Is PKR really concerned about opening up and expanding the public sphere in Malaysia, so that subjects like religion and politics can be discussed openly and rationally; or does it intend to foreclose such public discursive space with its own claim to monopolise the discourse of Islam and public morality?

And finally, if the fundamental question that riled the author/s of the PKR statement so was the issue of hypocrisy, perhaps they could have focused their critical energies on asking why the icon of the Keadilan movement Anwar Ibrahim was seen backing the Neo-Con Paul Wolfowitz for the top post as head of the World Bank. Instead the PKR statement was nothing more than a list of jumbled and ill-conceived accusations and slander, which raised more questions than answers.

Defending the culture and praxis of debate

As we have argued in the first part of this series, our main concern has been to understand and explain how and why the culture of debate and differences of opinion is so evidently weak in Muslim societies today. While the restrictive effects of political authoritarianism is one of the major consequences of the structural crisis in the Muslim world, it is also a fact that such authoritarian modes of governmentality are often reflected and mirrored in the non-civil culture of the societies that are distorted as a result.

Political Islam today has to struggle against such repressive, authoritarian and anti-democratic politics, but in the course of doing so should not fall into the trap of becoming equally authoritarian and anti-democratic as well. Islamism is supposed to stand for something: for honest, open, politics. But how can the Islamists maintain this if they themselves resort to fitnah and slander?

It is for that reason that the two media statements examined above show us and Malaysian society as a whole how to proceed and how not to proceed. Furthermore they underscore the very important fact that we society, rather than the state are capable of evolving and defending our own common public sphere and democratic culture if we choose to do so.

The 'end-debate' in the Muslim world - Part 1

Endnotes

(1) The joint memorandum was signed and supported by 40 Malaysian Muslim organizations, including: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Abim), Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim), Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Malaysia(PKPIM), Persatuan Guaman Syarie Malaysia (PGSM), Ikatan Siswazah Muslim Malaysia, Persatuan Pengguna Islam Malaysia (PPIM), Muslim Professional Forum (MPF), Teras Pengupayaan Melayu (Teras), Persatuan Kakitangan Akademik Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia (UIAM), Pertubuhan Kebajikan An-Nidaa' Malaysia, Yayasan Pembangunan Ummah (YPU), Persatuan Ulama' Malaysia (PUM), Sekretariat Himpunan Ulama Rantau Asia (Syura), Research & Information Centre on Islam, Allied Coordinating Committee of Islamic N.G.O.s(ACCIN), Institut Kefahaman Madani, al-Hidayah, Pergerakan Belia India Muslim Malaysia (Gepima), Persatuan Cina Muslim Malaysia (Macma), Persatuan Al- Hunafa', Persatuan Darul Fitrah Malaysia, Darus Syifa', Kesatuan Pelajar Islam Perak, Persatuan Pembimbing Pelajar Islam Kelantan, Kesatuan Pelajar Islam Melaka, Kesatuan Pelajar Islam Johor, Pers. Kebajikan Dan Pendidikan Islam Wilayah Persekutuan Dan Selangor Darul Ehsan., Pers. Pembimbing Pelajar Islam Pulau Pinang., Ikatan Pengkajian Islam Pahang, Pers. Pelajar Islam Muslim Sabah, Pers. Kebajikan Pelajar Islam Sarawak, Pers. Pendidikan Islam Negeri Sembilan, Islamic Outreach Abim, Yayasan Takmir, Kelab Pemikir Muda, Nadwah Persuratan Islam Malaysia, Sekretariat Perhubungan Koresponden Antarabangsa , Kumpulan Prihatin, Himpunan Pencakna Budaya Kelantan.

(2) See: page Sec D, iv, pg 5: "Pada masa yang sama, masyarakat kita harus diperingatkan bahawa kebebasan beragama di Malaysia tidak sepatutnya menjadi lesen untuk kita mencampuri hal agama lain, lalu memberi tanggungjawab untuk merubah ajaran agama para penganut lain." It should be emphasised here that the original memorandum of protest against Jawi did not touch on the matter of Islamic faith and praxis, nor were any of the fundamental tenets of Islamic belief (aqidah) held in question. Those who supported the memorandum Muslims and non-Muslims alike did so on the basis of their concern that the rights of Malaysian citizens were being compromised by the actions of groups like Jawi.

(3) The suggestion that the parameters of public morality are 'naturally defined' by BOTH social AND religious values is precisely the logical question that has not been addressed in the PKR statement, for this already concedes that society may have values that are distinct from that of religious dogma/discourse. Such a concession admits the possibility that society may develop value systems independent of religion itself, which the PKR statement does not follow to its logical conclusion.

(4) Later on April 8, the PAS leader Salahuddin Ayub submitted a memorandum to the government urging it to act against the NGOs behind the anti-moral policing campaign. According to the PAS leader: "The action taken by the 50 NGOs and 200 individuals who criticised moral policing is an act of incitement and provocation," said the PAS leader. (See PAS MP withdraws from human rights caucus )