If we accept the plural theology of inclusiveness of 'the other' in Islam, then one may run aground in trying to comprehend the often virulent Muslim denunciation of the other. We might find that in our own experiences of this denunciation, Muslim 'deviants' and apostates become the object of greater vilification, presumably due to their 'betrayal' of the 'real' Islam.

In demystifying this phenomenon in Muslim societies, scholars have suggested that such vilification may be tied to issues of identity and authenticity of the particular community. Some Muslims consider it pertinent to define the identity of the community and to prevent corruption by 'heretics' or 'renegades', rather than discovering the actual meaning of that identity in the present national or global context.

When we do not enter that debate in perhaps incorporating other elements integral to that identity or contesting the criteria on 'inclusion' or opposing political manipulation, we are running the risk of succumbing to a particular notion of identity and authenticity which may be anti-pluralist.

The Quranic injunction in 3:110 that "you are the best community ever brought forth to human beings, commanding the good, and forbidding the evil" - does not connect the status of being the best with a self-righteous presumption of the need to convert others. Rather, it ascribes the status of the best to a community charged with the responsibility of instituting good and forbidding evil (Sachedina).

The commanding of good and forbidding evil becomes the ethical basis for inter-religious co-operation in a religiously oriented civil society with equally shared responsibility for the moral well-being of the people.

Modern bourgeois mind

Is it possible to even think, given the enabling, universal and inclusive message of the plural theology of the Quran, that state criminalisation of deviancy and apostasy is a form of religious extremism? This is the kind of hard question, one would not find adequate responses to in the usual inter and intra-religious dialogues.

There are more of these initiatives which cover limited and controlled exchanges on promoting good neighbourliness, learning the basics of the other's religion and clarifying basic guidelines for proselytisation.

Where this may be the case, presentations and discussions border on apologetics, with each side keen to show the finest side of the religion's heritage. There is careful avoidance of references to the actual historical events or contemporary conduct of its adherents.

Farid Esack, a Muslim theologian from South Africa, further opines that he does not share the enthusiasm of partners on the dialogue circuit who are just happy to have a million thoughts bloom for the fun of diversity and pluralism.

Such a social venture which does not take a position is a 'liberal project' which is the perfect ideology for the modern bourgeois mind. It makes a genial confusion in which one tries to enjoy the pleasures of difference without ever committing oneself to any particular vision of resistance, liberation and hope.

Cross-cultural dialogue may underscore our theological differences. However we are collectively compelled to implement the common good in society. The question is how can we work on this common good in the public space which allows for our diverse religious experience.

Sachedina poses the important question, "Can this public space be realised without interfering with the ability of each person to work out his or her own individual salvation?"

While we may not share the dominant group's vision of salvation, co-existence demands that we recognise and implement the religious values of sharing and mutuality, which is the concern with living in peace with justice.

Central to the idea of peace and justice is the Quranic recognition of the concern of human autonomy, especially the freedom of worship, or freedom not to worship. This vision of human religiosity is fundamental in the Quran as it is to that of other civilisations.

No-compulsion verse

The ability to accept or reject faith and to pursue an ethical life presupposes the existence of an innate capacity ( fitra , Q.91:7-10) that can guide a person to a desired goal. The verse of no-compulsion in religion (2:256), negates enforced religion, because true faith abides in conscience, a domain unreachable by compulsion or enforcement.

At no point does the Quran endorse the community's use of political power to compromise freedom of conscience, which is an inalienable right through the very creation of the fitra in humankind. The state would forfeit its claim to be Islamic if it were to coerce people in the matter of the God-human relationship (Sachedina).

Khaled Abou el Fadl in a voluminous work, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law , traces the history, doctrine, juristic response, trends and modern scholarship on combat ( qital ), fighting apostates ( murtaddun ), fighting brigands ( muharibun ) and fighting rebels ( bughah ). It provides for serious reading and not for the faint-hearted.

El Fadl's work is important in its meticulous discussion of the construction of juristic discourse. The co-option, construction, reconstruction of doctrinal and historical precedents is a process which went through and must be understood through a historical continuum.

It suffices to say that the trend of contemporary, engaged Muslim scholarship opposes the criminalisation and execution of apostates. The hadith which provides the premise for jurists to create the penalty (in the face of the no-compulsion rule in the Quran), has been considered unreliable as being based on insufficient evidence of authenticity.

The hadith : He who changes religion, kill him, is reported by one person. Ibn Abbas who reported this hadith was 13 at the time of the Prophet's death. The weight of this hadith was further weakened by the fact that there were apostates during the Prophet's lifetime. There was never any question of war or punishment against them.

The 'war on apostates' arose after the death of the Prophet during the caliphate of Abu Bakar (632-634 AD). Abu Bakar was appointed and not elected, and his authority was soon disputed.

A number of tribes outside Medina refused to give allegiance to Abu Bakar and they refused to pay the zakat as token of their allegiance. They declared that they have abandoned Islam.

Authoritarian politics

The Quraysh tribe, to which Abu Bakar belonged, have long been known to have hegemonic ambitions. Death for apostasy is not a religious rule, but a political rule in the service of authoritarian politics (Charfi).

The term irtidad literally means 'rejection' or 'turning away from' and was historically applied to the battles that were fought against Muslims who had refused to pay taxes to the political authority after the Prophet's death. Hence, murtaddun were those who rebelled against the established order.

Sachedina admits the complexity of apostasy in the jurisprudence in the light of consistent and obvious Quranic treatment of apostasy as "being beyond human jurisdiction". Apostasy is punishable by God alone as the verse in 2:217 "unambiguously characterise apostasy as a non-capital offence". No human agency can negotiate an individual's spiritual destiny. It is a private matter of the individual's conscience.

Sachedina emphasised that in a well-ordered political society, the individual should be able to negotiate his or her vertical relationship with God voluntarily. It is a closed society which allows the community to exercise its collective will to coerce the conscience, backed by the legitimate political authority in enforcing such restrictive ordinances.

The refusal to pay taxes ('apostasy' so construed) was perceived by the political authority at the time of its juristic formulation as a source of instability. This is not a religious offence but becomes a civil offence. Only civil considerations flow from this course.

It becomes a matter of contention if apostasy or deviancy can be construed as a plot against the security of the state.

A crime against the public order requires the state to provide evidence to show that the act complained of is contrary to public interest.

The public through the system of checks and balances as provided by the principles of constitutionalism certainly has a vested interest in scrutinising the state or the acts of any public authority penalising the citizen for allegations of infringement of the public order.

Note: This is the second article based on the writer's presentation at a regional inter-faith conference on violence and peace-building in Cipayung, Bogor, Indonesia, Aug 16-19.

Muslim scholars opposing the criminalisation or execution of apostates include Majid Khadduri (1984), The Islamic Conception of Justice . Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, Mohamed S El Awa (1993), Punishment in Islamic Law . Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, Mahmud Shaltut (1991), al-Islam: Aqida wa Shariah . 17th Ed. Cairo: Dar al_Shuruq, Muhammad Said Ashmawi (1988), Al-Shariah al-islamiyya wa al-qanun al-masri . Cairo: Maktaba

Madbuli.

References:

Abdulaziz Sachedina (2001), The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism . Oxford University Press.

Khaled Abou El Fadl (2001), Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law . Cambridge University Press.

Farid Esack (1999), Muslims Engaging the Other and the Humanum , in A A An-Na'im (ed), Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa. Law and Religion Programme, University of Emory, Atlanta, Georgia.

Mohamed Charfi (2005), Islam and Liberty : The Historical Misunderstanding. Strategic Information and Research Department (SIRD), Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia. This book was first published in French in 1998 as Islam et Liberte .