The latest visit by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine on Oct 17, his fifth since becoming the head of government, inevitably raised the popular concern in China, South Korea and, to a lesser extent, the rest of Southeast Asia, that Japan is now on the path of militarism.

Although I have never dismissed the possibilities, remote as they may be, of Japan reviving the idea of fukoku kyohei (enhancement of national wealth and military strength) of the Meiji era and rearming itself to the teeth, to jump to the conclusion as such solely on account of the repeated visits by Koizumi to the shrine will only cloud us from the real picture.

There are many explanations for the surge of militarism in Japan of the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s. The most widely accepted version is perhaps the breakdown of the decision-making process between the civilian government and the military.

Much as the ineffectiveness of the democratic institutions in the Weimar Republic of Germany in the 1920s, which eventually gave rise to Nazi dictatorship, the weak Taisho democracy in Japan during the same period ushered in a military establishment that was vying for political influence at the expense of the civilian officials.

Herbert P Bix, author of Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan and a critic of US military policy, wrote that General Jiro Minami, among others, successfully convinced Emperor Hirohito that a military advance into north-eastern China could help Japan cushion the severe effects of the Great Depression and trigger the necessary internal reform. The end result? A discredited puppet state known as Manchukuo.

Bix later likened the Washington-led War on Iraq of 2003 to the Manchurian Incident of 1931, as in both Manchuria and Iraq, "the reasons for going to war were fabricated". While the militarist government saw the natural resources and vast territory in northeast China as vitally important for Japan to survive a world in turmoil, "oil, military bases, and revenge were important factors in the decision of the Bush administration to go to war in Iraq".

Like or not, Japan since 1945 has come under the rule of successive civilian governments, with the Self-Defense Forces under the purview of the cabinet. The military establishment, acutely aware of the wartime disasters and owing to the pacifist constitution, has long been adhering to the collective decision-making process of the civilian officials in Tokyo.

Agonising process

There is also a sociological theory for the surge in militarism in the 1930s Japan. FC Jones, a British historian, once wrote that the Japanese people in the early 20th century were going through an agonising process of industrialisation and urbanisation, with the rural population, which far outnumbered its urban compatriots, losing out big time. The resentment felt by the peasants was so strong that it eventually translated into overwhelming support for a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology.

Fast forward to the 21st century. Today, as many as 78 percent of the Japanese live in urban areas, while the peasants, small in number they may be, are among the wealthiest in society. Watching Oshin , a popular TV drama in the 1980s, I was profoundly moved by the plight of the peasants living on the rented land in the early 20th century. The days of serfdom are long gone, and I have faith in the peace loving Japanese people when it comes to making wise decisions for their future.

Militarism is defined as an ideology that military strength is the source of all security, which seeks to subjugate the entire nation to military control and makes all areas of national life in service of military objectives. Japan in the first half of the 20th century was a militarist state par excellence. So were Bismarck's Prussia, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

But such characteristics are evident neither in Japan nor Germany today. Interesting enough, some critics would argue that characteristics of militarism could be observed in the United States, China, France, Israel, Syria and Russia.

Moreover, Japan's pacifist constitution, imposed by the Americans after World War II, severely restricts Japan's military actions. True, the end of the Cold War, the mercurial North Korea, and a rising China have all prompted the calls within Japanese society for a revision of Article 9 in response to the changed environment. Still, the majority of the Japanese public remains sceptical.

Series of opinion polls suggest that only one third of the respondents think the near-sacrosanct article that renounces war should be revised. Ironically, it is the US that has been testing and stoking Japanese sentiments in regard to Article 9, in the hope that a revised constitution would enable Tokyo to fight alongside Washington in future military adventures.

I have in the past argued that Japan has been projecting itself as an ultimate victim of war due to atomic bombing by the US. Although I harbour strong reservations about this somewhat distorted perception, I am nevertheless of the view that the horrendous crimes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki have convinced the new generations of Japan of the darkest consequences of war. The work now is to make them understand they must also move from the perspective of a victim to that of an aggressor.

In the words of Motoshima Hitoshi, a former mayor of Nagasaki, "We must not forget the fact that the evil consequences of the atomic onslaught were preceded by Japan's aggression against others."

Be so as it may, militarism as a consciousness is alive and kicking in Japan, and is probably well received by a significant segment of society. But I must also caution against equalling such consciousness to a revival of militarism as a practised ideology.

The pacifist constitution aside, Japan is now a vibrant and functioning democracy. When the militaristic government of the 1920s began to impose totalitarian programmes such as media control, a thought police and a state ideology that forced the entire nation to make utmost sacrifice in the name of the emperor, a compliant Japanese public did not raise a finger to protest.

However, when Koizumi sought to commit Japanese troops to Iraq two years ago, it triggered heated debates in the Diet, Japan's parliament, and many community organisations held road-shows around the country to explain to the Japanese people the dangers of such military commitment. Ichiyo Muto, a leading international peace campaigner, was greatly encouraged by this development, although he concedes "we are not on the winning side, but we must fight on".

In June this year, five former prime ministers issued a joint statement in which they urged Koizumi to refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, while the Democratic Party of Japan criticised the prime minister's political grandstanding as 'childish'. Such dissenting voices were practically absent in the first half of the 20th century.

In short, one would have to scratch harder enough to conclude that the Japan's socio-economic dimension is now being radically militarised. Unless and until there are clear signs of attempts by the military establishment to overthrow the current democratic and parliamentary system, any suggestion that Japan is bracing for a resurgence of militarism is far-fetched.

External constraints

Even if Japan was to pursue the disastrous path of militarism, it would no doubt be fraught with external constraints and obstacles. China and the two Koreas, the countries most traumatised and exploited by Imperial Japan, are now in a much stronger position to check against any militaristic tendencies in their former aggressor.

Yasuhiro Nakasone, the first post-war prime minister to have visited the Yasukuni Shrine, stopped the provocative act in 1985 after vociferous protests from Beijing and Seoul, saying that Japan's national interests took precedence over personal sentiments. Always a pragmatist, he advised Koizumi to do likewise early this year.

The militarist adventure of Japan in the 1930s resulted in nightmarish consequences both in Japan as well as its neighbouring countries, and this was done while China was still a sickman of East Asia and the Korea Peninsula a Japanese colony. Imagine what catastrophes Japan would bring should it attempt to wreak havoc again in an era when China is a regional power and South Korea a close US ally. I for one do not believe such thought would have escaped a diehard militarist.

Following the approval of a revised textbook by the Japanese authorities, and subsequent to Tokyo's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) earlier this year, the Chinese press in Malaysia has been awash with anti-Japan reporting and analyses. In their haste to popularise the view that militarism is now officially sanctioned by the Koizumi government, the so-called commentators and senior editors have only laid bare their scant knowledge and understanding of Japan.

To be very blunt, I was taken aback at their ignorance of a very simple fact that Japan, for all its staggering economic achievements and technological progress for the last few decades, is militarily at the mercy of the US. Despite their global strategic partnership, the US will think twice before it concedes greater diplomatic independence and military autonomy to Japan.

This explains why the greatest obstacle in Japan's UNSC bid lies in the US' insistence that no veto power shall be granted to any newcomer, as such concession would allow Tokyo to sail more freely than Washington would like to see, thereby defeating the purpose of having the Japanese on the US side when it comes to vital international issues.

At the risk of arousing the wrath of the Chinese chauvinists, I personally think Koizumi's wishes of regularising the Self-Defense Forces reasonable and understandable, which is fairly in line with the similar desire of Germany. Instead of making a fuss over this issue, one should bug Koizumi with the question as to how a regular military establishment could convince Asia of Japan's new-found normalcy, given that Tokyo is willing to play second fiddle in the global strategy of the US, as evidenced in the latter's National Defense Strategy.

One may give credits to the US for having successfully transformed Japan from an expansionist state. Still, the Americans are partly responsible for the inability of the Japanese to face up to Japan's war crimes during WWII. Many have lost sight of the fact intellectuals in Japan went much further than their German counterparts in grappling with issues of war responsibility immediately after the war, while people from all walks of life discussed and debated publicly and openly the role of Emperor Hirohito and the pre-war state ideology.

Such liberal, left-leaning atmosphere led to the first socialist government in 1948. Sadly, this development was deemed too unpalatable to the US administration, and the Americans sought to nib the budding socialist movement by restricting the then burgeoning trade unions and purging leftwing politicians from government, effectively halting the war-reflection progress and paving the way for the pre-war rightwing politicians to return to active politics.

Therefore, to conclude that militarism is now making a comeback in Japan without taking into account the various internal and external inhibitions, especially the US factor, is half-baked at best. Japanese politics is no doubt taking a gradual turn to the right, but one with a decent level of intellectual capacity should be able to differentiate between militarism and rightwing tendencies.

I do not dismiss militarism as a notion is still visible and detectible in Japan, but whether this will translate into concrete action remains debatable and questionable. A man may have the urges for greater, more miraculous sexual performance, but whether he can actually materialise such desire is, needless to say, subject to a variety of health conditions. For a heavily inhibited person, such desire is often light years away from reality.