Those who thought that feudalism would die a timely death with the end of the colonial era and the birth of newly independent post-colonial nation-states in the 1950s and 1960s have been proven sadly wrong.

The plain truth is that feudalism is alive and well in many parts of Asia, Africa and the Arab World, and what is more, the rapid development over the past few decades has given birth to a host of neo-feudal regimes that have demonstrated their ability and willingness to employ the tools of modernity in order to entrench themselves even further.

Malaysia, once again, is no exception to the rule and in this respect it fares hardly any better than any of the countries in the Asean region.

Indeed, if there is one common international language or discourse that is shared by the elites of Asean today, it is the common understanding of the protocols of neo-feudal politics.

Witness how the governments of Asean were willing to stand by as Indonesia destroyed its rainforests and allowed the pollution from its forest-burning spree to contaminate the rest of the region. Not a single Asean government was able to intervene, all of them unwilling to compromise the unstated code of conduct between equally repressive governments for the sake of 'saving face' and protecting the image of Indonesia, the 'big brother' (albeit a clumsy and inarticulate one) of Asean.

Witness also how the governments of Asean were willing to turn a blind eye even when it became painfully obvious that Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was nothing more than a return to the bad old days of colonisation, and when the annexation of Timor had begun to chalk up a tremendous human cost of decidedly ugly proportions. Once again, Asean leaders stood idly by and kept mum over the issue - purely for the sake of 'respecting' Indonesia's right to do what it wanted to those who came under its dominion.

Neo-feudal politics does, however, have its uses and it is certainly not without its advantages. Theorists of modernisation and development may think that the turn towards neo-feudal practices mark a nostalgic lapse or regression back into the past - but they fail to note that in many cases what is really happening is a move towards the future on the part of conservative feudal elites who themselves are willing to embrace the tools of modernity to empower themselves even further.

This selective appropriation of modernity demonstrates both rational agency and foresight at work: It is hardly an accident if many post-colonial regimes have decided to take only the worst from their ex-colonial masters (death squads, modern modes of torture and surveillance, and infamous laws like the Internal Security Act (ISA) that we have in our dear old Malaysia).

But one factor that can never be overlooked is the human dimension to all this, and this is where our feudal leaders come into the picture.

Feudalism, it must be remembered, is a complex phenomena. It is an assembly of norms of behaviour, codes of conduct, rules of discourse, institutional complexes and culturally-mediated forms of governance and exercise of force and violence. Institutions, constitutions and machines do not produce feudalism, though they may help to consolidate its power and extend its sphere of influence. In the final analysis, feudal and neo-feudal structures of power and governance exist because feudals exist. And feudals exist because they are themselves the products of their own feudal political culture.

Enter the neo-feudals

Malaysia, as we all know, became independent in 1957 (though Sabah and Sarawak only became so in 1963) and its first rulers were all of the feudalist camp. The country's first three Prime Ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein and Tun Hussein Onn were not the likes of ordinary bumpkins like you and me. They were all part and parcel of the traditional ruling elite and they traced their lineage to some of the most revered and respected royal and aristocratic families in the land.

But Malaysia has also had (and still has) a leader who broke from the mould and was not from the high-and-mighty crowd: Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Dr Mahathir came to power in 1981 as the first non-feudal (and, it is alleged, the first non-golfer) to assume the post of PM. At that time, he was supported by a host of Malay nationalist radicals and students, one of whom happened to be a certain Anwar Ibrahim (1).

Dr Mahathir's ascendancy was seen by many as a radical paradigm shift in the development of Malay political culture. He vowed to bring about major changes in the way that Malaysian (and Malay) politics was carried out, including reversals in the country's foreign policy, economic policy and a new perception of political leadership among the masses. In this sense, he can be compared to another famous but ill-fated political actor from the not-too-distant land of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who claimed that he wanted to create a new country where the "honest man in the street can tell me to go to hell" (2).

Though their respective family backgrounds differ (Dr Mahathir was a Malay doctor who struggled against the odds to make his own name while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had inherited much of his father's wealth and power), both these men attempted to do what none of their predecessors had done before: They wanted to re-invent their respective countries and societies according to their own notions of progress and development.

In the course of their careers, both men would find themselves confronted by the Islamist opposition, a stubborn bureaucracy paralysed by institutional inertia, and most of all, a local population that was unwilling to be led by the nose towards some promised land in the near future.

The democratic experiment

When he first assumed power, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP party did not even have a majority in the National Assembly. (The same was obviously not the case with Dr Mahathir and the Umno-led BN coalition.)

Nonetheless, Bhutto committed himself and his government towards the path of reform and democratisation. This was immensely popular with the Pakistani masses who were, by then, fed up with more than a decade of inept military rule under generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. The country was also fed up with military leaders who had taken them on the path to war (1965 and 1971) and had failed miserably time and again.

Zulfikar announced that henceforth Pakistan would embark on a programme of 'Islamic Socialism' that was undoubtedly inspired by the Socialist-Islamic revolution in Libya by Muammar Ghadaffi. But Zulfikar's own brand of Islamic Socialism was also inspired by a number of other great Islamist thinkers like Mao Zedong and Zhao Enlai of China (3).

For Bhutto, Pakistan was a country that was in desperate need of modernisation via revolutionary means. He embarked on a number of grandiose development projects and began to nationalise the key sectors of the national economy. This led to the sudden collapse of the Pakistani economy and the flight of capital (and human resources) abroad (4).

It also opened the way for the social advancement of the lower-middle classes and the entry of the lower-middle classes into once-exclusive institutions like the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army. One of those who joined the army and was promoted during this period was an obscure officer by the name of Zia ul Haq, who would decide the fate of Bhutto in the years to come.

In Malaysia, Dr Mahathir also embarked on a series of radical policy manoeuvres. He actively campaigned to bring an end to the old elite system that had nearly crippled the country's social dynamics. In 1983 he attacked the ruling families and the royal houses for their abuse of power and privileges. He opened the way for a whole generation of non-elite Malays to enter the civil service and the business environment. In all these campaigns, he was openly and actively supported by scores of urban middle-class Malays.

Both Bhutto and Mahathir also spoke about the need for a more open and tolerant democratic culture. They called for the liberalisation of the economy, the bureaucracy and even the press.

But those who dared to go too far and 'tell him to go to hell' would soon discover that Bhutto was not a man to be challenged in public.

In Malaysia, the same fate was in store for those who wanted to take Dr Mahathir's democratisation process further than where he wanted it to go...

End of Part 1

Endnotes:

1) While he was serving as the president of the University-based Abim (Malaysian Islamic Youth) movement, Anwar Ibrahim was actively engaged in supporting Dr Mahathir and promoting him on campus. This, in fact, was one of the charges leveled against him when he was taken under detention under the ISA in 1974. Anwar was accused of making copies of the banned book The Malay Dilemma and distributing sections of it on campus.

(2) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto remains till today the most popular and controversial leader that Pakistan has ever had. His roots go back to the feudal past and his family estate in rural Sindh, where his father, Shah Nawaz Bhutto was practically a supreme overlord over his lands and the people under his care.

Zulfikar's mother, on the other hand was a Hindu dancer who was converted to Islam upon her marriage to her feudal husband. During his early childhood, Zulfikar's mother took him to see a famous fortune teller who read his palm. The man informed him that he would have a great future and become a major leader in the country, but refused to say anything about him after his 50th birthday. (Zulfikar in fact was hanged by Zia ul Haq when he was 51).

During his late teens and early 20s, Zulfikar was sent to Europe and the United States for his education. He then went to university in the US and returned to an active life in politics during the era of generals Ayub Khan (1958-1969) and Yahya Khan (1969-1971).

Zulfikar later fell out with the regime of Ayub Khan, formed his own Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and he finally came to power in 1971 after the debacle of the ill-fated Indo-Pakistan war which led to the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.

3) It was during this time that Pakistan's links with China grew even stronger. Zulfikar had traveled to China several times before and enjoyed a close working relationship with both Mao and Zhao Enlai. The latter advised him to create his own 'people's army' to consolidate his political gains and to protect his regime from counter-revolutionary elements. This led to the creation of Bhutto's own private paramilitary force, the notorious Federal Security Service, which would later play a part in his own untimely downfall.

4) By 1971, Pakistan's economy was practically bankrupt. The economic and human costs of the 1965 and 1971 wars had taken their toll and the 1971 conflict had cost Pakistan the loss of its Eastern wing (which then became independent and was known as Bangladesh). Pakistan needed foreign investment more than ever before, but Zulfikar was adamant that the country should be self-reliant.

Nationalisation was meant to give Pakistanis a stake in their own economy, but the speed with which it was carried out scared the local business community. Overnight, the Pakistani rupee lost much of its value and thousands of Pakistani businessmen immigrated to countries like Britain and the United States instead. This suddenly created a vacuum in many of the country's institutions like the bureaucracy and the army.