book review
For too long the study of Malaysian politics has been demarcated along a sharp boundary line that divides between 'hard' political-economic analysis and 'soft' social sciences and cultural studies. The impact of culture on Malaysian politics is seldom discussed at length and in detail, and even less has been said and written about the complex ways and means through which Malaysian politics has been culturally mediated.Entitled Islam in Malaysian foreign policy , Shanti Nair's study on the impact of religio-cultural concerns on Malaysian foreign policy is one of the few books that have looked into the complex relationship between religion and politics in Malaysia.
This has to be the best treatment of the subject by any contemporary scholar of Malaysian and Southeast Asian politics, and Shanti's analysis skillfully weaves elements of history (both Malaysian and Islamic), local and regional political developments and a sound methodological approach that neatly ties together her analysis.
Shanti's thesis, simply put, is that foreign policy is just another form of domestic policy by other means. This is clearly evident in the case of those countries that have opted for more active and open foreign policy initiatives abroad, and is certainly not confined to the developed and powerful nations of the North.
Foreign policy
As she tries to show, even in cases of developing countries like Malaysia, foreign policy is often an effective and convenient tool to project a country's image abroad and to secure political goals on the domestic front as well. "That foreign policy can serve as a function of domestic policy is particularly vital to understanding the ways in which small but rapidly developing nations like Malaysia engage in international society" she points out. (pg 6)
Of particular interest is the focus of Shanti's analysis. By locating one variable factor - Islam - as her main concern she has tried to show how and why Malaysia's foreign policy re-orientation both before and during the Mahathir era was shaped by local political demands and the complex intra-Malay-Muslim rivalries in the country:
"Islam's symbolic function in foreign policy under the Mahathir administration is explained primarily by its political relevance to the ruling party Umno and its role of 'protection' of the Malay community. This symbol is particularly relevant to the period in question because of both serious and deepening intra-Malay rivalry and the capacity of international Islam to impinge on the domestic scene." (pg 9)
Shanti tries to explain the factors that led to Malaysia's re-alignment closer to the Muslim world during the 1980s and 1990s. She correctly points out that during the first two decades of Malaysia's independence the country was still very much oriented towards its regional neighbours and the non-aligned movement. (During the Indo-Pakistan conflict of the 1960s, for example, Malaysia did not immediately align itself with its co-religionist partner Pakistan but sided with India instead.)
Islamic revivalism
But as the global currents of Islamic revivalism swept across the Muslim world, Malaysia - already a highly exposed and therefore vulnerable nation-state - was affected by external variable factors that it could not control. The rise of Islamist movements in countries like Pakistan, Iran and Egypt was soon to have an immediate impact on the local political culture of Malaysia and the Malay-Muslim community as well.
Here is where the local variable factors also come into play. Shanti notes that one of the reasons why global Islamist resurgence was to have such a profound effect on the domestic political terrain was the intra-communal rivalry between the two major Malay-Muslim parties (Umno and PAS) that were both vying for the same ethno-religious vote bank, the Malays.
The Mahathir administration employed the rhetoric of Islam as one of the ways to extend its sphere of influence, control and patronage over the Malays while the ideologues of PAS saw it as a convenient tool for attacking the credibility of the government. As this intra-communal rivalry intensified, Islam became one of the major points of contestation.
Religion as a tool
As both PAS and Umno sought to outbid each other's claim before the same Malay-Muslim constituency, Islam and Muslim concerns were highlighted and became the focus of attention for both parties. (The emergence of other Islamist movements like Abim, short for Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement, JIM - Jamaah Islah Malaysia - and Darul Arqam also complicated the scenario further, making Islamist discourse the most hotly contested space in Malaysia).
The net result of this attempt to use Islam to outbid each other was the re-alignment of Malaysian foreign policy. Both the Umno-led government and the opposition Islamist party PAS attempted to promote themselves as the defenders of Islam and Muslim interests and both sides projected themselves on the global stage, forcing a radical turn-around in Malaysian foreign policy and external relations.
To counter the growing influence of PAS (and to a lesser extent Abim) on the international scene, the government of Dr Mahathir Mohamad re-directed the country's foreign policy as well. The first decade of the Mahathir era was marked by a significant re-orientation of the country's political compass.
A new formal ranking of external relations was announced, in the order of 1) Asean, 2) the Muslim world, 3) the non-aligned community and finally 4) the Commonwealth. As Shanti has argued, this shift in foreign relations was matched by a shift in official rhetoric as well.
The rhetoric began
"Throughout the 1980s Malaysia increasingly (but selectively) sought to identify itself with international Muslim issues and (presented itself) as an active member of the global Muslim community. Both government and Umno rhetoric increasingly referred to Malaysia as an Islamic nation and to Umno itself as the third largest Islamic party in the world." (pg 80)
Henceforth, Malaysia aimed to improve bilateral relations with all the nations of the Muslim world, on both political and economic levels. Shanti, however, notes that "expectations were not matched by reality. Although there were individual successes in specific areas of economic exchange, overall trade with other Muslim countries remained only a small sector of the total volume of Malaysian trade with the world and appeared strikingly minuscule compared to trade with developed countries and countries in the Southeast Asian region". (pp 103-104)
But even though nothing much came out of this re-orientation of geo-political priorities (America, Japan and the countries of Western Europe remained the biggest trading partners of Malaysia), the intended effects on the local political scene were considerable. It helped improve Malaysia's self-image and standing as an Islamic country and it boosted the Islamist credentials of the Umno leadership in particular.
Muslim world payoffs
These foreign policy initiatives also helped the Malaysian government reap further benefits closer to home. In time, a number of local initiatives were launched with the help of foreign funding and political support.
The International Islamic University of Malaysia (UIA) which was founded in 1983 happened to be one of them. The UIA project was announced after the prime minister's visit to the Arab Gulf states. Apart from Malaysia, the UIA's initial funding came from Muslim states like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Libya, Turkey and Egypt.
By initiating its own Islamisation programme, the government of Mahathir had effectively stolen a march from the Islamists of PAS. In time, the labours of the Mahathir administration began to pay off. Projects like the UIA received considerable financial assistance from the governments of numerous Arab states. Cash injections came from countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, though they were aimed more at projects related to Islamic dakwah (missionary) activities.
Apart from that Mahathir himself was gaining recognition for his efforts as a Muslim leader. (See endnote 1) In 1983 the Malaysian prime minister was awarded the 'Great Leader' award by none other than President Zia'ul Haq of Pakistan (who had previously anointed the Abim leader-turned-Umno politician, Anwar Ibrahim).
Shanti also notes that the Malaysia's realignment closer to the Muslim world did not make it a passive consumer or recipient of anything and everything that came from other Muslim states. Indeed, as Shanti correctly points out, the realignment closer to the Muslim world was also a way for the Malaysian government to 'sift out' elements and tendencies that it regarded as antithetical to its own model of 'modernist' Islam.
Efforts to woo diplomatic support and economic co-operation with other Muslim states were also a way to establish strong bilateral links with their respective governments and to fend off any unwanted influences that might come in indirectly via non-governmental channels. (See endnote 2)
Gem of a book
Shanti is careful to maintain a sense of balance and objectivity in her analysis. Unlike many other political observers and scholars who misread Malaysia's realignment as a genuine shift closer towards a more radical brand of Islam, she correctly points out that the policy was motivated more by local political demands and the necessities of realpolitik than anything else.
The realignment - though not entirely cosmetic- was nonetheless a case of domestic policy at work under a different guise. Its aim was to knock the wind out of the sails of the local Islamist opposition movements and parties, and to help the Umno-led government reclaim precious discursive ground and Islamist credentials.
Cynics may dispute the Malaysian strategy as being superficial in nature, but they would obviously be overlooking the fact that it did by and large succeed. Despite its marginal status and role in Muslim world affairs, Malaysia has nonetheless made its stand clear and has projected its image as a moderate and progressive Muslim nation abroad.
Proof of this is the fact that in the midst of the present international crisis that threatens to divide the world between Islam and the West, Malaysia is the one of the few Muslim countries that is able to walk the fine line between the two and is still seen as the one predominantly Muslim state which has managed to gain economic success without dressing itself in the burqa of an Islamic state.
All in all, Shanti Nair's Islam in Malaysian foreign policy is a gem of a book, certainly worth reading by all who are interested in the complex relationship between religion and politics and its impact on both domestic and foreign policy. A timely intervention which has helped to elucidate and illuminate many of the murkier quarters of Malaysian studies.
Endnotes:
Islam in Malaysian foreign policy by Shanti Nair is published by Routledge press, London, under the auspices of the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, 1997. 301 pages. ISBN 0-415-10341-X
