COMMENT | The formulation and execution of Malaysia’s foreign policy have long been regarded as the prerogative of the executive branch.

This conventional wisdom has shaped public and scholarly perceptions for decades, leading most analyses to focus almost exclusively on how the executive designs and implements foreign policy and how effective those actions are.

Yet, the Federal Constitution does more than assign foreign affairs to the executive. It also empowers the legislature to scrutinise executive conduct.

Article 43(3) explicitly stipulates that the cabinet is collectively responsible to Parliament. Furthermore, any attempt by the executive to give domestic legal effect to international agreements or treaties requires parliamentary approval.

In legal terms, ratification and incorporation cannot occur without legislative sanction. Parliament, therefore, is not a bystander in foreign policy; it is a constitutionally recognised actor.

Recognising this constitutional design requires refining the prevailing assumption that foreign policy is exclusively an executive domain.

Comparative experience reinforces this point. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the House of Commons has repeatedly asserted its authority blocking military intervention in Syria in 2013 and rejecting executive Brexit legislation three times in 2019.

These cases demonstrate that legislatures, even within Westminster-derived systems, can meaningfully shape foreign policy outcomes.

Malaysia’s record, however, reveals a starkly different pattern. The Dewan Rakyat has historically played an overwhelmingly minimalist role in checking executive authority over foreign affairs.

Across more than six decades, our parliamentarians have succeeded in halting or altering an executive foreign or defence policy decision only once.

They have, on several occasions, managed to set the foreign affairs agenda through parliamentary motions, but these remain exceptions rather than the norm.

The lone triumph: 2008 Eurocopter scandal

The sole instance in which parliamentary pressure compelled the government to freeze a major defence procurement occurred in October 2008.

The Defence Ministry had finalised a deal to acquire 12 EC 725 Eurocopter helicopters for €463.44 million (RM2.32 billion) to replace the ageing Nuri fleet.

Rival bidders alleged that significantly lower offers - such as the Russian Mi 172KF priced at USD427.2 million (RM1.45 billion) - were dismissed without adequate justification.

During the Budget 2009 debate, then-opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim invoked parliamentary privilege under Article 63 of the Federal Constitution to expose irregularities in the procurement process, including allegations of inflated costs and commission-driven decision-making.

As the disclosures were made within the Dewan Rakyat, the government could not resort to defamation suits to silence critics.

Facing intense public scrutiny, then-deputy prime minister Najib Abdul Razak announced on Oct 19,2008, that the cabinet would allow the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to investigate the deal.

Days later, then-prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (above) officially suspended the RM2.32 billion procurement.

This episode remains the only successful instance of parliamentary intervention altering an executive foreign or defence policy decision.

Procedural guile: MP’s token cut move

Given that substantive motions introduced by backbenchers or opposition MPs are routinely defeated or allowed to lapse, our MPs have often relied on procedural manoeuvres to exercise limited influence.

A notable example occurred on Dec 15, 1964. Opposition MP Tan Chee Khoon (Gerakan) observed that backbenchers were afforded almost no dedicated time to debate foreign policy.

To circumvent executive control of the agenda, he introduced a subsidiary motion under Standing Order 67(7) during Budget 1965 debate, proposing a symbolic RM1 reduction in the annual salary of the then-external affairs minister, a portfolio held by then-prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Tan (above) openly acknowledged that the motion was “merely a parliamentary device” to secure speaking time on international affairs.

Tunku recognised the tactic and engaged in debate. Although the Dewan Rakyat ultimately rejected the RM1 cut, Tan succeeded in compelling the executive to defend its foreign policy line by line, demonstrating how procedural creativity can temporarily rebalance parliamentary executive dynamics.

Structural constraints on parliamentary influence

Our Parliament struggles to exert meaningful pressure on the executive largely because it lacks robust democratic procedures and institutional tools.

In contrast, the United Kingdom’s Ponsonby Rule requires that any international treaty be laid before Parliament for 21 sitting days before entering into force, a practice codified in 2010.

Additionally, Opposition Days allow non government MPs to set the parliamentary agenda, providing a crucial mechanism for legislative scrutiny. Malaysia lacks equivalent instruments.

Foreign policy is not an abstract realm of diplomatic ceremony. It shapes national security, economic partnerships, and the allocation of billions in public funds.

The Dewan Rakyat cannot remain a passive observer of decisions made behind closed cabinet doors.

Some progress has been made. The establishment of the Special Select Committee on International Relations and Trade in October 2019 represents a step toward institutionalising legislative oversight.

However, more comprehensive structural and procedural reforms are required to equip our lawmakers with the tools necessary to demand accountability, influence international engagement, and safeguard Malaysia’s sovereign interests.


LAM CHOONG WAH is a senior lecturer in the Department of International and Strategic Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Social Science of Universiti Malaya.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.