In this globalised world, different countries seem to be responding differently to the A (H1N1) flu outbreak. In the US, Ground Zero where A (H1N1) began and with nearly a million estimated cases, there are no thermal scanners at the airports.

In Japan, with over 900 cases, travelers only need to fill a health declaration form. In Singapore and Malaysia, airports have thermal scanners, hospitals have special tents for suspected cases, quarantine is mandatory and schools have been closed.

Although new, this flu does not appear to be dangerous. The latest WHO update on June 26, lists 59,814 confirmed cases with only 263 deaths giving a mortality rate of less than 0.5%.

Our response to A (H1N1) may have been inappropriately influenced by the experience with Sars which had a mortality rate ranging from 15% to 19%. In fact, the American Centre for Disease Control (CDC) states that ‘not all patients with suspected A (H1N1) need to be seen by a healthcare provider, only patients with severe illness or those at high risk of complications’.

The document then goes on to give detailed advice on how to care for a patient at home, and how to prevent spread amongst members of the same household. Here we quarantine the entire household, forbidding them from even going out for food.

In fact, the CDC also says that ‘not all people with suspected H1N1 infection need to have the diagnosis confirmed, especially if the illness is mild’.

While our policy is to quarantine healthcare workers who may be exposed to even suspected H1N1 patients, the CDC states that ‘healthcare workers who do not have a febrile respiratory illness may continue to work’ and even ‘asymptomatic healthcare workers who have had an unprotected exposure to H1N1 also may continue to work if they are started on antiviral prophylaxis’.

Although A (H1N1) is a benign infection, it is highly contagious. Over a week from June 19-26, the number of A (H1N1) patients in Singapore jumped from 100 to 365. Singapore has only a small geographical area to trace contacts and enforce quarantine using a highly-trained and efficient healthcare service to implement its policies.

Yet being an open trading country (a trade to GDP ratioof 432%), Singapore’s containment measures have not been successful in preventing the spread of A (H1N1) in the local community.

Malaysia is a similarly open country (a trade to GDP ratio of 218%) with a much larger area as well as multiple entry ports and airports and we are unlikely to succeed where Singapore has failed.

Instead of expanding the number of people quarantined, forcing employers to give full pay unrecorded leave and increasing the strain on our healthcare personnel, we may be better of bypassing the Singapore experience and get onto what the CDC in the US is recommending.

The Ministry of Health has initiated numerous measures in place to contain the A (H1N1) outbreak. Yet patients have expressed unhappiness after experiencing these measures. We are using valuable healthcare resources, both human and material, in this containment policy against H1N1.

How many other healthcare areas will now be left underfunded and undermanned by this diversion of resources? Should we not be proactive, look at the situation of those ahead of us in their experience of A (H1N1), save on resources and avoid unnecessary, hurtful and ultimately unsuccessful endeavors?

Should we not treat A (H1N1) for what it is - a new and highly infectious, probably uncomfortable, but not at all serious or dangerous for those without underlying illness? After all, as doctors we must not make the treatment more unpleasant than the disease itself.