In reply to detractors , the Raja Segaran case is not an appropriate judicial authority to cite against the Bar Council holding an EGM on the issue of controversial appointment of judges.

In that EGM, the Bar Council's call for the suspension of Chief Justice Eusoff Chin was based on unsupported statements of judicial impropriety allegedly attributed to de facto Law Minister Dr Rais Yatim as reported in the New Straits Times .

Rais was not called as a witness to verify his press statements. Neither was any affidavit or simple letter from the minister was obtained to prove that he actually made and stood by those statements. Justice Dr RK Nathan granted Raja Segaran injunction against the Bar's proposed EGM on grounds that it was based on hearsay of Rais' statements, which unsubstantiated, cast the EGM in contemptuous light.

Whilst the earlier EGM stopped by Raja Segaran's injunction was based on unsubstantiated claims, the present proposed EGM by the Malaysian Bar is not based on unsubstantiated hearsay of judicial promotions.

There is no doubt of veracity that the promotions of three judges presiding over ex-deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim's hearings were actually made, and their criteria, publicly defended by the current chief justice. The inference of contempt drawn in Raja Segaran's case ought not therefore to be extended to the present call for EGM by reason of the different factual matrix.

The thrust of Wilmot J's concern in R v Almon (1765), is that the justice (meaning impartiality) of judges should not be arraigned (meaning called in question) lest it would "excite in the minds of people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indispose their minds to obey them" (Joseph P's letter , 'EGM call on judicial promotions contemptuous'). This simply means that it is contempt of court to undermine men's allegiance to law by questioning impartiality of judges.

As far as I can see, none of those requisitioning the Bar's EGM has alleged bias on the part of any judge promoted. Their dissatisfaction lies in the criteria of promotions. There is concern that the promotions and their criteria should not be controversial. Otherwise, even if the judges promoted are actually impartial and unbiased, yet they might not escape unfair imputation to the contrary by certain sections of the public supportive of Anwar.

It follows then that the Bar Council's EGM is not intended to undermine men's allegiance to laws and administration of justice. On the contrary, in seeking greater objectivity and accountability of criteria in promoting judges, and taking a stand against controversial promotions, the Malaysian Bar is actually trying to avert suspicions from being levelled against the judiciary that will surely undermine "men's allegiance to laws and administration of justice."

Rohani Ariffin's sarcasm of my 'understanding' of English political history having little relation to the legal principle abstracted from the Almon's case reveals her lack of appreciation that legal rules are not immutable but do change according to felt needs and actually lived experiences depending on social and political context and shifting social and moral mores. This is basic jurisprudence 101.

Your readers critical of the Malaysian Bar for bordering on contempt are probably lawyers by training or profession judging from their writings and legal jargon used but, notwithstanding, they appear to have failed to distinguish the woods from the trees in treading narrowly on the mere letter of legal precedents, rather than the moving spirit of what is just and proper by which they are laid down.

They cited, for example, the Federal Constitution, and its principle of separation of powers between executive, legislative and the judiciary to prevent an abuse of power derived from Montesquieu's famous work, ' The Spirit of the Laws' .

And they asked the narrow question: where does the constitution provide that the Bar representing the lawyers could have a say on appointment or promotion of judges? Admittedly, nowhere does the constitution either state or prohibit so.

There is however a broader question - what if, in a hypothetical case of a dictatorship in which the legislature is controlled by and the judiciary beholden to the executive? Could not the law of contempt of court be abused as an instrument of oppression? Would not a bad judge escape calumny and escape accountability by imprisoning in each instance his critics by the simple expedience of citing contempt of court? Can fair criticisms of judges or the machinery of administration of justice for public good be contemptuous?

If so, where is the institutional check and balance? Is it fair for any judge, or by extension the judiciary as a whole, that has acted improperly to suppress fair criticisms by punishing his critics for contempt and in so doing adjudge the merits of his/its own cause?

This is where the Bar must rise up to the occasion and not shirk to act its duty as a bulwark against executive's transgression of citizens' rights when others whose job it is to do, fail to do so.

That the Malaysian Bar has this duty is evident from its promulgating enactment, The Legal Profession Act 1976. The objects and powers of the Malaysian Bar as provided in section 42(1)(a) (d) and (g) of the Act direct it to "uphold the cause of justice without regard to its own interest or that of its members, uninfluenced by fear or favour; and where requested so to do, to express its view on matters affecting the administration of law in Malaysia and to protect and assist the public in all matters touching ancillary or incidental to the law." I disagree with any imputation that it is ultra vires (exceeding the legal powers) for it to do so.

It is the first object of civilised societies governed by the Rule of Law rather than the Law of the Jungle is that a referee adjudicating dispute amongst men; and justice between state and citizens must be not only be fair but also be seen to be fair.

Just like the referee in a football game, when he blows the whistle and makes a decision, that decision has to be respected by all or else there can be no game played or no finality of the scores decided.

But precisely because the decision of the referee needs to be respected, it is imperative that his appointment or promotion must be perceived proper and free from bias for or against any team by spectators who will otherwise not accept his decision as referee.

So whilst it may be contempt to challenge the referee in the field and during the game, it is not so to express opinions of what the spectators of the game will think and give input to the determining authority on the propriety of any appointment/promotion of any referee before the game. It is all for the sake of the integrity of the game and finality of the scores made that the referee's impartiality should be beyond question and seen to be so.