I feel almost petty in replying to the many interesting points raised in Azaman's ( Pro-war position too virtuous to be true

) letter. However as I think that answers to at least some of his questions are in order, I will attempt to provide some clarification:

In response to Azaman's questions o­n the parts in the resolution which have been ignored by Iraq and o­n evidence of weapons of mass destruction, I would strongly urge him to read again UN Security Council Resolution 1441

, especially Paragraph 3, which states that not o­nly must Iraq provide an accurate list of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related components, materials, and production facilities, but that it also provide the "location" of such weapons, components, materials, and production facilities.

Azaman should forget about inspectors finding the proverbial 'smoking gun'. It is not their job to 'find' the weapons in a country the size of France.

The burden rests o­n Iraq to make an accurate description. Instead, Iraq decided to recycle previously submitted information that did not address any of the unresolved issues detailed in UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission to establish the terms and conditions for a formal ceasefire between Iraq and the coalition of member states cooperating with Kuwait)

document S/1999/94 and the Amorim Report (report by the UNSC commissioned panel o­n disarmament and current and future o­ngoing monitoring and verification issues) S/1999/356.

As Dr Hans Blix himself has very clearly stated: "...significant outstanding issues of substance...listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) ...should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such issues 'deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside...'.

"The declaration submitted by Iraq o­n Dec 7 last year, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing.

"Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions."

(UN Security Council Briefing, Feb 14, 2003).

Azaman also raised the question of whether "...Iraq is the o­nly country in the world so far that has not complied with UN resolutions?

No, Iraq is not. However Azaman has completely missed the point.

The UN distinguishes between two sorts of Security Council resolution. Those passed under Chapter Six, which deal with the peaceful resolution of disputes, entitle the council to make non-binding recommendations.

Those under Chapter Seven give the council broad powers to take action, including military action, to deal with "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression".

Such resolutions, binding o­n all UN members, were rare during the Cold War. But they were used against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait (1991).

None of the resolutions relating to the Israeli-Arab conflict comes under Chapter Seven. By imposing sanctions, including military o­nes against Iraq but not against Israel, the UN is merely acting in accordance with its own rules.

Azaman further raises the point that "I also know of another country that has declared that it has nuclear weapons and is not about to back down from its stance. It has even suggested that should the need arise, it can launch a pre-emptive strike against the US or any other country.

"Would the Security Council be any more relevant or taken seriously if it does not take any action against this country?"

This question reveals evidence of some conceptual confusion o­n Azaman's part.

UN Security Council Resolution 487 castigated Israel for sending its aircraft to bomb Iraq's Osiraq reactor, which Israel said was being used to manufacture a nuclear weapon, despite being given a clean bill of health by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Noting that Israel had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) as Iraq had, the UN Security Council called o­n Israel to put its own nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards, as the NPT requires.

Two decades o­n, Israel has still not signed the NPT. This infuriates the treaty's supporters, who have been striving to make it 'universal'.

But as with any other treaty, the governments are free not to sign. What they are not free to do is sign, receive the foreign (civilian) help to which signing entitles them, and then try to build a bomb secretly. This is what Iraq has tried to do.

Azaman is right to be concerned with reports that Israel is thought to possess a large nuclear arsenal, about which it is not being open and honest, and this is provoking its neighbours.

But this case is not evidence of what Azaman considers to be "double standards". Being a nuclear power is not, by itself, a breach of international law.

The purpose of my e-mail was not to mock the anti-war protestors (although I did note that there were no banners or placards calling o­n Saddam Hussein to disarm).

I was trying to point to what I sincerely believe is a real and growing threat to the world - the proliferation of WMD.

North Korea has thrown out inspectors and pulled out of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iraq has let inspectors back in but not yet handed over the illicit WMD it is thought to possess, nor come clean about its nuclear ambitions.

Suddenly the very edifice of treaties and agreements that for decades has helped block the spread of WMD, especially nuclear o­nes, is in danger of collapse.

The NPT has been signed by almost everyone: in the 1990's South Africa, Argentina and Brazil abandoned nuclear programmes to join. o­nly India, Pakistan and Israel have stayed resolutely outside.

And yet from the right in Japan to the left in Brazil, politicians are wondering aloud whether having the bomb might be better than banning it.

The anti-war protestors blame the five official powers (US, UK, France China and Russia) for hanging o­n their bombs. However this criticism is unfair.

Nuclear stockpiles have shrunk dramatically since the Cold War ended. Some blame Mr Bush's 'aggressive' refusal to rule out a nuclear response if attacked by WMD. They completely miss the US' intent: to deter all use of such weapons.

Others condemn Mr Bush's 'axis of evil' rhetoric for acting as a spur to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. However this is far from proven. North Korea started its uranium enrichment programme during former US president Bill Clinton's administration.

The real danger to the NPT arises from the temptation to let off the rule-breakers.

To good-faith-joiners the treaty is a valuable security tool. They can show it to their neighbours that they are not seeking the bomb, while being reassured that their neighbours aren't either.

But they cannot be reassured if inspectors are fooled or the world turns a blind eye.

After all, if countries like Iraq can abuse their non-proliferation commitments with impunity, what is to stop countries like Brazil, keen to strut their stuff o­n the world stage, and having watched other proliferators get away with it, from wondering if going nuclear will also earn them respect?

After the Gulf War (1991), inspectors discovered that, despite signing the NPT, Iraq was close to having a nuclear weapon.

That is why the UN Security Council ordered Iraq to give up its WMD. But the UN Security Council failed to back up the inspectors and Iraq slipped from their clutches.

The US has prodded the UN Security Council to try again. But the millions of anti-war protestors around the world should be aware of the implications that if the disarmament process fails a second time, treaty abusers everywhere will celebrate.