In an article published in The Star newspaper, 'Questions about ex-CJ's new job', on June 5, 2003, the writer raises the question of whether the independence of the judiciary would be adversely affected should judges join legal firms upon departure from their judicial office.

This was largely in reference to the immediate past chief justice joining Skrine & Co shortly after leaving office as head of the judiciary.

In a reply published in The Star on June 7, 2003 entitled, 'Setting the record straight on ex-CJ' , Skrine & Co went on to counter this criticism in a manner quite baffling to those uninitiated into the arcana of lawyerly argumentation.

They dilligently unearth musty examples, from days of yore, where judges have joined private legal practice upon retirement. In fact, they provide a whole list of them. You see, lawyers are by training inclined to justify actions in the present on the grounds that the thing has been done before on a previous ancient occasion.

This may seem strange logic to you, but then you are just an ordinary reasonable person who places a premium upon common sense and sound reasoning to persuade others of your point of view.

But lawyers, who assumed a distinct identity in antediluvian times (hence their reliance on things done in the misty past), are a different kind of creature entirely. They are wont to put on bands and robes and solemn looks and sombre airs, and proceed to discourse in terms incomprehensible to anyone else.

Their modes of reasoning may seem outlandish - a thing is right because it's been done before, never mind the rights and wrongs of it - but it is entirely valid in the surreal mental world inhabited by that odd creature, the advocate.

They spend long years, beginning at law school, bending and shaping their minds to the tortuous twists and turns of this type of fantastic reasoning process. And so, when called upon to make a reasoned argument outside their own narrow sphere, surely it is scarcely surprising if they fall into the same method of argument?

They go on to say that the regulations don't insist on a "cooling off period" before a retired judge can join legal practice. Never mind about the rights or wrongs of it.

The rules don't say that it can't be done, and shame on anyone who says that such accomplished interpreters of rules and regulations, such as this prominent legal firm, are not entitled to milk the rules to the last drop of advantage to themselves. It's their right to do so, and they have said as much by relying upon rules and regulations and conventions and strictures several times in their letter.

They began their letter by saying that they wish to set the record straight. I can't see that they have had much success in doing so.

However, we must be thankful to them for providing for us and posterity, a very instructive example of the fascinating type of reasoning employed by some lawyers. Their letter is a very useful contribution to studies on the impact of vocation upon ratiocination. In short, by any standards, it is a marvelous curiosity.

Even first-rate lawyers forget things at times, and there is an important matter not dealt with by Skrine & Co in their reply.

Intentionally or otherwise, they do not address the question of whether public perception of the independence of the judiciary would be adversely affected should judges join legal firms upon departure from their judicial office. This was the pith and substance of The Star's article on June 5.

Neither did they address the question whether any offer was made to the former CJ whilst he was still on the bench. As lawyers are fond of saying, justice must not only be done, but it should be seen to be done. The overriding concern here is not the injured vanity of anyone, but public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice.