While I am a critic of Proton, I also realise the real difficulties faced by Proton. This whole idea of taking a foreign partner for example - its not as easy as it seems.
At the core of difficulties in finding a foreign partner is our own protection of Proton itself. As a general rule, multinational corporations (MNCs) does not like protected markets - its too difficult to predict the outcome.
The value of a stake in Proton to a foreign car company is very different than that to a local shareholder. The Malaysian government will be looked upon as unreliable by an MNC to protect their (the MNC's) share value for them.
Hence any valuation to a foreigner of a stake in Proton would be much lower than to Khazanah/ Petronas. It could be even lower than the current market price because a single foreign shareholder of a stake in Proton is not the same as a large group of voting local minority shareholders.
In addition, a minority share in a national car company for a multinational car company does not make strategic sense. The car industry is firstly about market share and secondly, on engineering, design and technology.
When talking about market share, MNCs are concerned with the Asean market and not just Malaysia. They have to ask themselves if it makes more sense to own 100% of a subsidiary in Thailand or a minority stake in Proton.
But why not both? Because in the end, there is only room for one option. It does not make sense for Toyota or Ford to do both. It does not make sense for Toyota or Ford to make Proton a dominant car company in Asean when it owns only a minority stake.
Since we are all signatories to World Trade Organisation (WTO) accords, it does not make sense for them to invest only as a minority in a car company that they will eventually take away their own companies market share.
Hence, Proton can only find a great global partner only if:
a) it sells it below market price or
b) eventually agrees to sell a majority stake.
None of these options are politically acceptable and therein lies the dilemma. Proton can always partner up with a lesser partner like what it did with Mitsubishi but this means a future that will be equally bleak.
The bottom line is that Proton has been too slow and continues to be too slow. Although the first Proton was launched in 1985, it was hatched about the same time as the Korean cars. Compare a Korean car and a Proton and you get an idea how slow Proton is.
A Korean car can be made for the half the cost of a Proton. Given that a foreign car company will bring at least half the value of a future competitive Proton, why should they pay market price or even accept anything less than half of Proton's equity?
Proton is a classic case why meritocracy and open competitive market matter so much. People may tolerate transfer payments and subsidies for a while but eventually they will not.
People and technology find a way around it. This is the lesson Proton, and still much of our country, has failed to learn.
