In response to Zahirani Nor's criticism in Back up arguments with empirical evidence on my 'simplistic view' and failure to mention usul al-fiqh in Distinguish between syariah and fiqh , I would like to point out that I had attempted to avoid excessive use of technical terminology, as my letter was not written as an academic paper.

However, if he/she wishes to go into the finer points of usul al-fiqh, I would like to mention the following points, partly taken from my dissertation for the degree of Master of Comparative Laws (MCL) at IIUM under the supervision of the late professor Tan Sri Ahmad Ibrahim in 1998.

Fiqh in Islamic legal theory is interrelated with other disciplines eg:

• linguistics (including general (am) and particular (khas) meanings, literal and metaphorical meanings, context and grammar);

Imam al-Ghazzali stated that 'the science of fiqh and its Usul ... draws equally from the purity of revelation (wahy) and the best of reason (aql)'.

Terminology does not reflect the origin or emergence of a discipline. In the development of human knowledge in any discipline, the terms come into use long after the concepts have emerged. Usul al-Fiqh, the roots of fiqh or the science of deducing or interpreting rules of fiqh from the sources, was actually in existence before the terminology 'Usul al-Fiqh' came to be used.

For 400 years, the term Usul al-Fiqh was not used by jurists to describe the discipline - the term is not found in Imam al-Shafi'i's al-Risalah, which is universally acknowledged as the first written work of authority on Usul al-Fiqh. In the early days of Islam, the Companions deduced various rules of fiqh from the sources.

The earlier imams, ie, Imam Abu Hanifah, who died in the year of Imam al-Shafi'i's birth (150 H), resorted to the use of qiyas while Imam Malik applied the doctrine of amal Madinah (practice of the people of Madinah) and the principle of 'al masalih al mursalah' (public interest). Therefore, there were a large number of legal principles including ijma', qiyas, ijtihad, and istihsan, as well as differences of juristic opinions (ikhtilaf) that were not systematically compiled in the early centuries.

The classical theory portrays ijma' as a total agreement of the community or of the scholars, but presents no definite organisation or procedure for its practical functioning. Whether ijma' is still workable in modern times appears largely to depend on the interpretation of the term ijma' itself. As pointed out by Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, the definition of ijma' has many differences among the scholars themselves. Another important factor for the workability of ijma' in modern times is the provision of a practical machinery for the attainment of ijma'. [re. Ahmad Hasan, The Doctrine of Ijma' in Islam, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, 1978]

Qiyas was the last of the four sources of fiqh to gain general acceptance, owing to uncertainty in understanding its elements. 'Illah' or ratio is also open to differences of opinion. Muslim jurists have developed various propositions for identifying the ratio the element of similarity which justifies the transference of the rule. 'Illah is conjectural and leads to probable (zanni) knowledge. Illah and qiyas or judicial reasoning by analogy occur in both the Islamic and common law legal systems. In order to apply qiyas or analogical deduction to a new case, it is necessary to identify the true 'illah or ratio decided in the original judgment.

Qiyas is a legal method for extending the law beyond what is stated in the authoritative sources ie, the Quran and Sunnah or an extension of a precedent, while the doctrine of precedent in the English courts declares that cases must be decided the same way when the legally material facts are the same.

In Islamic law, custom (urf or adat) also play an important role in codifying certain legislation (eg, in the area of family law) based on siyasah shar'iyya. It has been said that a synthesis between Islamic law and adat is possible if the principles of Muslim law in the Quran and Sunnah are subjected to interpretation through ijtihad and ijma' to meet changing social and economic conditions and if the adat itself is modified to meet the needs of such social and economic conditions. [re. Ahmad Ibrahim The Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore: The Laws of Matrimonial Property in J.N.D. Anderson (ed) Family Law in Asia and Africa, 1968.]

Believing that the Quran presents a complete guidance for the Muslims' way of life does not mean that there is no place for continuous human efforts to understand, infer or deduce possible alternative interpretations, from the purposes of the relevant divine text and authentic Sunnah, that may coincide with the divine wisdom in its revelation [re Fathi Osman, Concepts of the Qur'an, Abim, Kuala Lumpur 1997]. Developing the principle of movement and possibility of further evolution of Muslim law, it has been suggested that the Quran be denoted as the originating principle; Sunnah as the exemplifying principle; qiyas as the connecting principle; ijma' as the authorising principle; and ijtihad as the means for understanding.

After the time of the Prophet (s.a.w.), there can be no such thing as a human interpretation, single or collective, of the Quran, infallibly correct for all times and places until the Day of Judgment. The ijma' of the ijtihad of 500 years ago is not necessarily identical with the ijma' of the ijtihad of today. There may even be occasions when a change of place of 100 miles or of time of five years may be enough to result in a change or amendment of ijma' decisions, which can only be protected from error within certain limitations.[re. Kemal A. Faruki, Islamic Jurisprudence, New Delhi, 1988]

It is in the distinction between the Syariah a limited number of injunctions in the Quran and Sunnah and the works of jurists that the impetus towards evolution can be discerned. Juristic reasoning is never final, whether it be reasoning on the implications of those authoritative texts, or reasoning pertaining to occurrences in the absence of a directly applicable text [re. Said Ramadan, 1992. Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity, Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1992].

Bearing in mind the changes of customs and socio-economic conditions in different times and places - through the centuries, as well as in different geographical regions - that is why there are thinking Muslims today who seek to propose a fresh reflection and understanding of the ethical principles of syariah, rather than merely relying on rules of fiqh as historically formulated. Muslims today may not appreciate the context and rationales for the formulation of fiqh rules that were proper and just in the socio-cultural milieu of the societies in the medieval era but are no longer so today.

However, such fiqh rules may provide a guidance, but not a hindrance, to an understanding of syariah by Muslims today. As for any claims to infallibility, just as the fiqh rules of the past were a human approximation of an understanding of the divine syariah in the circumstances of their times, so will the efforts by Muslims today also be a human approximation of an understanding of the divine syariah in the circumstances of our times. And Allah knows best (Wallahu'alam).