The story of Lai Tek makes for fascinating reading but for its being a "tale of treachery, espionage and intrigue" ( New Straits Times , Oct 21)

Dr Cheah Boon Kheng has done well trying to unravel the intricacies in the life of this illusive character. Hopefully this would add to the existing body of knowledge on the structure and functioning of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

However, even as it stands, many insights into the workings of the party as well as many questions needs to be answered. The response here will be limited to two main dimensions namely; the implications arising from the failure of the party leaders to recognise that Lai Tek was simultaneously a double agent to the Japanese and the British and the impact of this, especially on the effectiveness of the party's activities and the decision to cooperate with the British on the eve of the Japanese surrender.

To some extent, the trust placed by the leaders and the rank-and-file of the MCP towards Lai Tek, despite clear evidence of betrayal, is unsurprising. The literature on MCP (including that in my own book, 'The Finest Hour: Malaysian-MCP Peace Accord in Perspective') points out that not all members of the fighting force were in fact card-carrying (hardcore) MCP members. Therefore, they were not die-hard, disciplined and ideologically-committed communists who would be quick to spot out a traitor.

Instead, my book has shown that many fighters were in fact forced to fight because of dire socio-economic circumstances. Also the induction 'indoctrination' courses on Marxist theory were poorly organised and was neglected as the struggle proceeded, with more attention being given to securing food supplies (with the success of the setting up of the New Villages). Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Lai Tek "regarded the communists as expendable, to be used by him".

The blind and misplaced trust can also be explained by poor leadership. For instance, Cheah points out that Lai Tek was a "great organiser and agitator in the trade unions. He took a militant line to appear acceptable to the leadership". At the same time, he was undermining the strategy of the party in certain crucial areas.

For example, in the MCP's inability to use the mass media for propaganda purposes (something that Chin Peng laments in his many interviews in Canberra in 1998), Lai Tek was instrumental in passing on information to the Special Branch so that the "British conducted several raids on communist premises and printing presses" thereby cutting off much-needed MCP publicity of their policies.

But this question of leadership takes centre stage when the relationship between Lai Tek and Chin Peng is brought into focus. Cheah comments that it was "ironic" that the latter was "so close". In fact, Chin Peng was groomed by Lai Tek and yet Chin Peng "did not know" he was an agent. Cheah explains this by saying that this was because Lai Tek was a good actor with a scheming personality but it is suggested that there might be more reasons than this.

The organisational structure of the MCP was essentially decentralised so that the lines of communication between the fighters on the ground and the central committee policymakers was weak. Ground-level leadership was even able to mount militant operations without the approval of the central committee. Indeed, I have shown that almost all the "atrocities" committed by the MCP (such as the Sungei Siput murders, the assassination of Henry Gurney, Bukit Kepong and the Johor 'racial' incidents were undertaken without the approval of the central committee).

With this lack of close surveillance, it would have been relatively easy for Lai Tek to undertake his covert activities and to keep Chin Peng in the dark, so to speak. But it is unbelievable that even after Lai Tek's cover was blown, Chin Peng merely convened a central committee meeting expecting the former to attend and explain himself. Alas, it was only after Lai Tek had absconded to Bangkok with MCP funds that Chin Peng finally decided to "hunt him down".

Cheah has succinctly pointed out that Lai Tek "may have influenced the very course of Malaya's political history after the Japanese surrender". It is well known that at this time the Japanese had firmly decided to back MCP with arms so that they could jointly-engage and hopefully defeat the returning British army.

While much of this can be dismissed as speculation, Cheah points out that the revolutionary spirit among the rank-and-file MCP members was very high and they, in fact, wanted to launch an armed rebellion against the returning British.

At this time, it must also be remembered that the progressive political forces among the Malayan people (Putera-AMCJA) had come together in launching the first ever 'hartal' followed by the preparation of a Malayan Peoples' Constitution as an alternative to that prepared by the British with the collusion of Umno and the Alliance Party.

It is argued that if the MCP backed by the Japanese had in fact militarily-resisted the returning British, there is every likelihood that the latter would have been forced to negotiate with Putera-AMCJA rather than the Alliance Party, for political independence. Had this happened, it would most certainly have changed the course of Malayan history.