Aizuddin Danian ('ISA for stability', June 27), is right that in even many well-known democracies, extrajudicial methods and 'undemocratic' preventive detention laws co-exist (the word 'compatible' is not appropriate).
Preventive laws like ISA exist in democracies because public safety always takes precedence over civil liberties.
Whether civil liberties are curtailed for valid public safety reasons or otherwise depends on the circumstances by which such laws are unleashed, and whether there are sufficient legal checks and balances.
In Malaysia's circumstances, although the communist insurgency is over, the multiracial, multicultural, multireligious and multilingual character of society makes her vulnerable to incitement to public disorder and violence by extremist elements.
Unfortunately, such a fragile fabric also provides an excuse for the Executive with a majority in Parliament to promulgate an array of laws giving it wide powers of arrest and detention: Besides the ISA, there are the Restricted Residence Enactment 1933, Sedition Act 1948, Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958, Prevention of Crimes Act 1959, Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975, to name a few.
Given that ISA is amongst the most draconian, and hence the very antithesis of civil liberties, it is imperative that if the ISA were to be retained for public safety in view of the fragility of 'circumstances' stated above, the rule of law should be maintained by building in the safeguard of judicial review of the Executive decision.
(This is to say that the Executive's discretion to detain a person for public safety or prevention of crime is not absolute but may be questioned by the court for basis). Legislation (by way of amendment of the ISA) or case law can build in such a safeguard.
Without such safeguard, a draconian piece of legislation like the ISA not only opens the opportunity for abuse of power by the Executive, but even if the Executive has not done so, it will open an opportunity for its detractors to suspect and accuse it to having done so.
The fact that the threat of ISA had occasionally been invoked to intimidate those alleged to have spread rumours, forged passports, breached copyrights, etc. (which are crimes that may be subject to ordinary criminal laws and are extraneous to public safety or threats to constitution for which prevention is justifiable) have of course aggravated anxiety of its frivolous application and concern for its possible and potential abuse.
In particular reference to Chae Lian's 'Arms heist gets trial, opposition demo, gets ISA?' (June 28), the arms heist was a crime that had already taken place for which there was proof for open court trial.
The ISA was used by the Executive against the organisers of Opposition demonstration to prevent the breakdown of public order in jeopardy of public safety and to prevent illegal challenges to the constitution.
It was a preventive measure. No public order had broken down and public safety jeopardised, nor the constitution overthrown yet (hence no trial) but the Executive justifies it on the basis that if the ISA were not deployed, Opposition demonstrations would lead to that outcome eventually. (The reasonableness of such an opinion should however be subject to proof).
The object of preventive detention then is to prevent breach of peace and public order and challenges to the constitution that would probably occur but for the preventive detention. It proceeds on the basis that a threat to a breach of peace and order and subvert the constitution is as criminal as these acts having already been carried out.
Expanding further on what Andre Bastianpillai said in 'ISA and misplaced idealism' (June 30), Opposition demonstrations are not interest groups' demonstrations as elsewhere intended to protest against some neutral sectional or public issues like rape of the pristine rain forest or pollution or any specific position taken by the government on any issue.
Opposition demonstrations are (rightly or wrongly) perceived to be inspired by those occurring in neighbouring Philippines and Indonesia that constitute a broad base challenge by civil disobedience against a legally constituted government.
Civil disobedience may start peacefully enough but when thousands confront security forces deployed to maintain law and order, there is always a potential that the confrontation will lead to a fracas and then a violent conflagration.
Where any section of the electorate is unhappy with the government of the day, there is always a ballot box to vote the government out and until the election they can have their views disseminated through ceramahs , political rallies (given the permits), or through Harakah or the Rocket or even the independent malaysiakini .
To try to galvanise a critical mass through demonstrations to challenge and force a confrontation with the government and to cause in the process the security forces to kill, maim, wound or arrest demonstrators just so to inflame further animosity against the government is an agenda that is not tolerable in the context of our political and social culture, our laws and constitution.
Why do we have the constitution to provide for periodical elections if the way to change the government is by who can organise the biggest demonstrations and deliver the greater show of force?
Sure one can say that the election mechanism is farcical because the government delineates election boundaries, uses its resources to buy phantom votes and uses the media controlled by it to disseminate its propaganda.
By all means challenge and expose these but two wrongs do not make a right and the lack of 'level playing field' in the election game should not be an excuse for changing the game itself to a demonstration game!
Besides in such a demonstration game, the fact that a crowd of 350,000 demonstrators can force a government down does nothing to edify democracy if such a government is elected in by 3,500,000 voters who do not take to the streets!
In the sense above, demonstrations are not only a threat to public safety but a threat to the constitutional provisions on how a government may be changed by elections.
If the above arguments are reasonable, then the only issue bearing on the recent ISA detentions is whether the Executive had reasonable basis to conclude that the detainees were actively organising a series of demonstrations calculated to have the aforesaid effect.
The Ministry of Home Affairs said that they were. The detractors amongst the Opposition contend that they were not. Who should be the arbiter?
Notwithstanding that our Special Branch is very efficient in intelligence gathering, having informers all over, yet the Executive decision will only be vindicated if it is reviewed by and received the endorsement of our courts.
There will be such an opportunity when the habeas corpus applications are heard. The courts of late have redeemed much of its image of independence. They have to demonstrate if they are prepared to reassert their right of judicial review of the Executive's case that there was reasonable basis for the detainees to be implicated in the organisation of a series of demonstrations antithetic to public order and potentially subversive of constitutional provisions.
