Court and Bar right to object Sivarasa's application
I am surprised that R Sivarasa has taken his case to the court of public opinion via malaysiakini even as he has evinced his intention to file his appeal to a higher court ('A sad day for the Malaysian Bar' Aug 25).
Isn't this what they call sub judice , a contempt of court? The dictionary elucidates that this legal term is Latin in origin and is used to refer to a case that is still being considered by a court of law and therefore cannot be discussed in public lest it may influence the court.
No doubt no appeal court is sitting now, but to provoke public discussion ahead of, and that may well continue to that sitting by the appeal court, will influence that court and should tantamount to contemptuous sub judice on the writer's part.
It seems plain to even a layman the ordinary and grammatical meaning of section 46 of the Legal Profession Act (LPA) which bars the members of the Bar Council like the writer from holding offices in political parties (as vice-president of PRM) or trade unions simultaneously.
Whether the writer likes it or not, it is still the applicable law of the land that as a lawyer he should know. If he does not think such a law as fair, then he should galvanise sufficient political support in Parliament through PRM to change it. Until then section 46 of the LPA will have application as law.
As I understand it, the writer's lawyer Tommy Thomas cited Article 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution that provided "all citizens have the right to form association". He went on to argue that section 46 of LPA promulgated by Parliament was void and ought to be declared illegal to the extent that it conflicted with the more important law of the land, the Federal Constitution ('Quashed : lawyer's attempt to hold both Bar Council and political party posts' Aug 22).
It is not as if Section 46 of LPA prevents the writer from exercising his constitutional right to associate with others who share similar ideas, interests, and goals for cooperation and concerted action. It merely provides that he should not hold office in the Bar Council whilst at the same time holding offices (as distinct from just being just a member) in a political party.
This is because public interest requires the Bar Council representing lawyers in this country in the same manner as the judges to be independent as well as to be perceived as independent. This is to enable whatever decision and resolution it takes or makes to garner public respect above suspicion of being tainted by political influence and bias.
If a Bar Council member (or a judge) were to also hold executive office in PRM, wouldn't any public position taken by such a member on behalf of the lawyers be questioned as not being independent or neutral but serving of his political party's position of which he is also an office bearer?
Independence, as justice, should, as the writer ought to know as a lawyer, not only been actually honoured but seen to be not subject to possible conflicts of interest that would otherwise compromise perception of that independence and neutrality and provoke suspicion against.
This is therefore not a question of the writer's right to association being infringed. This is a question of preventing prospective incompatibility and conflict of interest. It is a question of upholding public trust in the independence of lawyers represented by the Bar Council and freedom from political bias that the bar against holding simultaneously office(s) in the Bar Council and political parties seeks to address.
The writer contended that the then Bar Council in 1977/8 opposed the amendments to the Legal Profession Act including section 46A imposed by the government because it was perceived then that it was a move by the government to muzzle and manacle the Bar by legislating against lawyers of less than seven years experience or holding political office from serving as officers of the Bar Council.
That was 12 years ago. In this span of period, has the Bar Council ever shirked from its role to speak up for the Rule of Law and against human rights violation in maintenance of public trust and duty?
Is the writer now accusing the Bar Council of not being a good watchdog but a cringing dog in relation to these issues all these years?
If the Bar Council is dared not so accused, if it has continued to play that role throughout the 12 years, it simply means that the amendment brought by section 64A of the LPA has not been effective to serve as a device by which the state could manacle, castrate and muzzle the lawyers.
On the contrary, it has kept the Bar Council away from criticisms that it may otherwise be politically motivated and partial by reason of its officers being also officers of political parties. Section 64 helps reinforce the credibility of the Bar Council's voice on public affairs.
This explains why the present office bearers of the Bar Council now oppose the writer's application to strike out section 64A.
The Bar Council today is entitled to take a different view of the issue from the then Bar Council of 1977/8. Life goes on, perception changes along with the learning curve.
Though the writer is entitled to his right to have his day and say in court, he should not raise this issue publicly in malaysiakini with a lot of legal mumbo jumbo and jargon that more obfuscate than clarify the real issues to the lay public. We the lay public may be confused by such legal speak to end up thinking erroneously in my view that the present Bar council is either retrogressive or reactionary or even unprincipled compared with the Bar Council of yesteryears.
Even as a lay person, it seems plain to me the incontrovertible rationale behind the decision of the court and the stand of the Bar Council. They rightly did not entertain the writer's application for want of merits. The writer's application is, in my personal opinion, more self-serving that serving of public interest.


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