The Health Ministry has often found itself standing alone in addressing tobacco-related health problems and implementing effective legislation since the 1980s, according to Australian-based researcher Mary Assunta.

If hopes were raised by a July 1992 announcement that the ministry intended to bring in comprehensive regulations to prohibit indirect tobacco advertising, these were to be dashed within a year.

When the Control of Tobacco Products Regulations was passed in May 1993, the most crucial component - a ban on indirect advertising - was missing, said Assunta, who recently reviewed moves to control cigarette advertising in Malaysia.

A University of Sydney PhD candidate, she is currently compiling her findings, with her most recent segment being completed on Nov 18.

Her research, conducted between November 2001 and March 2003, involved extensive review of previously secret tobacco industry documents dated mainly from 1970 to 2000.

Her findings were made available to malaysiakini , which reported yesterday that the tobacco industry used highly placed government contacts to thwart numerous initiatives against cigarette advertising between 1982 and 2000. A ban on direct advertising was eventually imposed last year.

Assunta, a former media officer with the Consumers' Association of Penang, won the prestigious Luther Terry Award in August "for outstanding individual leadership ... in opposing the tobacco industry's rising influence in developing nations".

Watered-down provisions

The watered-down 1993 regulations were passed just four months after the release of a damning report on the cancer-causing effects of second-hand cigarette smoke by the US Environmental Protection Agency.

Ironically, the regulations could not have highlighted government weaknesses any clearer, with Assunta even describing them as a "major victory for the tobacco industry".

"They were devoid of reference to the advertising of tobacco brand names on non-tobacco products and sponsorship activities by tobacco companies, thereby paving way for indirect cigarette advertising to continue," she said.

She outlined the main deficiencies from the perspective of the no-tobacco lobby:

  • The mandatory health warning was only to be placed on the side of cigarette packs, which meant that it would be less conspicuous to smokers than if placed on the front as originally proposed.

  • The proposed five percent tax to be tagged on to cigarette sales was dropped - the money was to have been used in tobacco-control programmes.

    • Although the regulations brought in a ban on selling cigarettes to minors, Assunta argued that this was "hardly of consequence" because it was "notoriously hard" to eliminate the practice.

    Similarly, the ban on cigarette vending machines was of no significant loss to tobacco companies, since these were never widely used, she said.

    Search for targets

    To understand how the tobacco industry lobby presented its input to the government over the regulations, Assunta pointed to proposals found in a September 1992 document by cigarette manufacturer RJ Reynolds.

    Such previously secret industry documents - including internal correspondence - have been made public since 1998 as part of a US multi-state court settlement agreement.

    These reveal how industry efforts and the pro-tobacco positions of certain ministries had jointly frustrated early initiatives by the no-tobacco lobby to tighten the advertising code in the 1980s.

    The RJ Reynolds document, for instance, referred to a project proposed by the Confederation of Malaysian Tobacco Manufacturers (CMTM), comprising Godfrey Philips (subsidiary of Philip Morris), British American Tobacco (BAT) and Japan Tobacco.

    CMTM's 'Project Muafakat' (consensus) was suggested either in 1992 or earlier. It was apparently aimed at identifying the health minister's "real agenda" and selecting "political targets" to be lobbied.

    The document suggested that CMTM would need to develop "effective contact with key politicians and bureaucrats" to "prevent the passage of regulation".

    Project Muafakat aimed to lobby as high up as the prime minister and his deputy, by proposing to "explore feasibility of appropriate political support at party or government project level", Assunta said.

    In addition, it proposed to "review sponsorship by type and agree (on) a spread ... to cover community activities ... known to be supported or participated in by key politicians".

    However, Assunta said further searches for Muafakat-related documents were unsuccessful.

    She noted that, given Malaysia's poor record of disclosure and transparency, there is no other way of ascertaining if the project was ever implemented or if tobacco companies did contribute to political parties.

    However, Assunta said the project was "in all likelihood" carried out, since certain strategies under the proposal were later implemented.

    It is also important to consider that documents on Project Muafakat were possibly destroyed, she said, citing an Australian court case in April 2002.

    In McCabe v British American Tobacco , she said, it was revealed that BAT had discussed document destruction with its subsidiaries in Malaysia in 1992.

    Investment welcomed

    The tobacco industry continued to devise new ways to frustrate tobacco control regulation. According to a Philip Morris document, Malaysia was viewed as "one of the most profitable cigarette markets in the region".

    It noted that, unlike in the US, Asian governments and its media are usually not inclined to go on a "crusade of political correctness", but are more concerned about the economy and living conditions.

    Clearly, some segments within the government also saw potential in the country becoming a leading regional exporter of cigarettes.

    In 1995, the primary industries minister opened Philip Morris' first tobacco processing plant in Seremban, saying he "welcomed investments by tobacco companies as a contribution towards making Malaysia a leading exporter of tobacco".

    Assunta said that, in this respect, manufacturers in Malaysia are allowed to import tax-free tobacco to make cigarettes meant for export.

    She also cited the headlines of press reports to reinforce her case that the tobacco industry had influenced the government to soften its stance, after initially agreeing to ban indirect tobacco advertising. ( See Table )

    "Over three decades, sections of government had made known their intention to ban all tobacco advertising - direct and indirect - but this only came to pass in August 2002," she noted.

    "The see-sawing between whether or not to prohibit advertisements was most likely influenced by the tobacco industry, with support from among top political leaders within government."

    New law proposed

    Earlier this year, though, a major move was made in the right direction - in September, Malaysia became the 63rd country to ratify the World Health Organisation's Framework Convention of Tobacco Control , aimed at banning tobacco advertising globally by 2006.

    A Health Ministry official told malaysiakini that the ratification reflected a large degree of political will to ban on all forms of tobacco advertising and promotions in Malaysia.

    Dr Zarihah Zain, principal assistant director of the cancer and tobacco unit, said the cabinet had issued a directive on this last year. Administratively, therefore, the ban on advertising and promotions came into effect even before the ratification.

    "All advertising, sponsorships and related promotion activities that publicise tobacco products or brand names is no longer be allowed.. Temporary exemption has been given to football up to the end of next year and to motor sports up to the end of 2005," she said.

    This has not deterred at least one tobacco company. With the support of a television station, it has quickly moved on to make its presence felt via sponsorship in other fields before the directive is translated into law.

    Tomorrow: Circumventing policies, with government help

    Click here to read yesterday's report.