(IPS) analysis

US President George W Bush may sincerely believe, as he told congressional leaders in Washington recently, that the ''anti-terrorist'' mobilisation underway would provide ''an opportunity to refashion the thinking between Pakistan and India''.

But as Operation 'Enduring Freedom' gathers momentum, India and Pakistan are locking horns and returning to the mutual hostility that has marked their relations for over half a century.

This hostility may acquire nasty and dangerous proportions in the coming weeks, wiping out all the gains of the process of dialogue launched in an uncertain manner at the Agra summit between the hostile neighbours in July.

During much of the Cold War, New Delhi and Islamabad were on different sides of the East-West divide. While Islamabad was more or less a US ally, India espoused non-alignment from the 1950s onwards, and in 1971 signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the former Soviet Union.

Today, in an ironic twist of history, the two rivals are clashing although they are both on the same side - with the Western alliance being put together under US leadership to launch a war against global ''terrorism''.

Remarkably, this has come about because India and Pakistan have been vying with each other to become America's 'frontline' partner in the impending large-scale attack against the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

India reacted quickly to the Sept 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

It offered full military cooperation to the United States - even before US agencies had collected significant evidence on responsibility for the attacks. Many Indian policymakers and shapers could barely hide their glee at the ''historic'' possibility of a new Indo-US ''strategic partnership'' opened by the attacks.

However, Pakistan has beaten India at this. It has cashed in on its obvious locational advantage, its logistical edge, and its leverage over the Taliban that rules Afghanistan.

This has produced resentment and rancour within New Delhi's ruling establishment and resulted in both ruling establishments abusing, maligning and parodying each other's intentions and plans.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee now says neither he nor his foreign minister will visit Pakistan ''in the foreseeable future'', although they had agreed at Agra to do so.

Grand game plan

The familiar rhetoric of hostile verbal exchanges, or war of words, is back in the subcontinent.

In his Sept 19 address to the Pakistani nation, General Pervez Musharraf announced a momentous policy decision: to withdraw from Pakistan's seven-year-long involvement with the Taliban and join the US-led camp that aims to destroy that militia and its training facilities.

Among the four reasons Musharraf cited for this highly contentious decision to switch sides, three pertain directly or indirectly to India or India-Pakistan relations.

Two of them, namely Kashmir and the ''safeguarding'' of nuclear weapons capability and other strategic ''assets'', have direct implications for the strategic hostility between the two states.

In his speech, Musharraf directly named India and accused it of hatching a ''grand game plan'' to ''win over America on to its side'' and harm Pakistan's vital interests.

He said: ''They want Pakistan to be declared a terrorist state to damage our Kashmir cause. I want to tell them, 'Lay off'.'' Musharraf also referred to the 1971 Bangladesh war that broke up Pakistan, and questioned India's interest in Afghanistan.

This sharp attack drew an immediate rebuke from New Delhi, which termed it ''most regrettable'' and said the issue ''confronting the international community'' is terrorism and not India-Pakistan relations.

Perpetual hostility

The next day, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh attributed Musharraf's tirade to his ''domestic compulsions'' and wondered what was meant by the ''flamboyant'' remark, ''Lay off''.

He attacked Pakistan for ''indulging in compulsive and perpetual hostility'' and patronisingly added: ''I do not want to further compound the difficulties (Musharraf) faces domestically.''

Indian officials, including Singh, have returned to harping on their favourite theme: namely, Pakistan's support for ''cross-border terrorism'' in Jammu and Kashmir and its strong linkages with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Singh held Pakistan responsible for the Taliban's ''birth, growth and nurturing''.

But to New Delhi's discomfiture and resentment, Musharraf has used this very factor - and Pakistan's intimate knowledge of the Taliban's military machine, storage facilities, supply lines and leadership structure - to his advantage in driving a bargain with the United States.

Some of Musharraf's conditions for joining the United States as an ally were leaked (although subsequently, not convincingly, denied). These included US help in resolving the Kashmir dispute, and the demand that India and Israel be kept out of any military operation in Afghanistan.

Musharraf may be taking a myopic policy course by collaborating with the United States in massive (and probably brutal) military operations in the region - with likely high civilian casualties, which can only breed enormous resentment and discontent.

But Indian leaders are being no less short-sighted in assessing the positive and negative impact.

On the positive side, the emerging US-Pakistan collaboration will mean a crackdown on Islamic extremist guerrilla groups active in Kashmir, such as the Harakat ul-Ansar (Volunteers' Movement) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed), which are listed by Washington as ''terrorist organisations''.

The largest such guerrilla group in Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure), is on the US terrorist watch list. Their training camps and supply lines are located in Pakistan. Their destruction will relieve some of the pressure that New Delhi experiences in Kashmir.

More important, India has shed its traditional stand on conflicts and means of resolving them -- always through multilateral bodies like the United Nations Security Council.

India has conventionally opposed unilateral action by states or groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and insisted that any use of military force by them be properly authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Cross-border terrorism

This time around, India has not even requested the United States to seek such a mandate. This is largely explained by its preoccupation with ''cross-border terrorism'' in Kashmir, and the urge to isolate and corner Pakistan.

Musharraf may have his ''domestic compulsions''. But so does the leading component of New Delhi's 24-party ruling coalition, the Hindu-chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party.

Its agenda, closely linked to official approach, is to paint all Muslim organisations, societies and states with the ' jehadi ' or terrorist brush and present Muslims as a threat to India as well as to other ''civilised'' countries such as the United States.

This sectarian view is deeply ingrained in the BJP's politics and is crucial to its strategy to win votes by making India's Hindu majority feel insecure. The party faces elections to the legislature of India's bigges - and the world's six most populous - state, Uttar Pradesh.

Indian leaders are disappointed at the emerging US-Pakistan compact. They too want a piece of the action. To this end, Jaswant Singh has made a rather unusual proposal. He says a ''concert of democracies'', rather than a broad international coalition, should fight the coming war against global terrorism, under America's leadership.

India, being the world's largest democracy, will naturally have a role in this concert. This is a crude tactic to exclude and isolate Pakistan. It is unlikely to find many takers.

What Indian (and Pakistani) leaders are losing sight of, as they pursue their Kashmir obsession and agenda of mutual rivalry, is the likely impact of a large-scale military operation in South Asia.

This could create enormous turmoil and disaffection in Pakistan and lead to the destruction of its already fragile institutions.

The extreme stresses could well produce social implosion and collapse - with serious consequences for India too: A destabilised nuclear power on India's borders is surely a nightmarish prospect.