opinion

Although DAP national chairperson Lim Kit Siang has been quickly discerning enough to detect a 'patriotic' propaganda blitzkrieg aired in the government-controlled television stations and directed against the opposition, he may not be very right in over-estimating its strength and real effect.

Historical studies show that the intention of propagandists and the effect of propaganda on its target audience often mismatches, diverges and even backfires.

Generally, two reasons account for propaganda failure:

  • One, propagandists are not as smart, effective, efficient or efficacious as they themselves would naturally like to believe, or as their protesters conservatively assume to be on the safe side; and this, as we shall see, applies to even Dr Joseph Goebbels (Nazi propaganda minister) himself; and
  • Two, the ordinary people in the streets or the targets of propaganda are not that credulous and malleable as some bookish or desperate self-styled Machiavellians would like to believe. Niccolo Machiavelli himself, in his second, and more balanced, treaty on politics, namely The discourses on the first ten books of Titus Livius (London, Penguin, 1983) suggests that ordinary people or the masses, if combined or gathered together in larger groups or stronger organisations, could be more intelligent or smarter than isolated and lonely princes.
  • For example, David Welch, a British professor of modern European history, observes in his study of Nazi propaganda, The Third Reich - politics and propaganda (London, Routledge, 1993) that:

    "Although the standing of his party dropped considerably, Hilter's personal standing remained remarkably high. However, following the catastrophe of Stalingrad, a defeat for which Hitler was held responsible, his popularity began to decline... In the final year of the war, Goebbels attempted to resurrect the Fuhrer cult by depicting Hitler as a latter-day Frederick the Great, ultimately triumphant in the face of adversity. This absurd image, in the face of the gathering Russian occupation of Germany, represented an alarming flight from reality which no amount of propaganda could sustain. The 'Hitler myth' and 'charismatic leadership' could not survive such lack of success and on the verge of extinction.' (pp 88-89)

    It means there were times when even the smartest propagandist the world has ever known, could fail miserably.

    Falsehood repeated

    Goebbels also failed on earlier occasions, especially with regard to the control of the printed media. American journalist William L Shirer, who was on assignment in Germany in the 1930s, records in his magnum opus , The rise and fall of the Third Reich - a history of Nazi Germany (Touchstone, 1990, first published in 1959) that:

    "With all newspapers in Germany being told what to publish and how to write news and editorial, it was inevitable that a deadly conformity would come over the nation's press. Even a people so regimented and so given to accepting authority became bored by the daily newspapers. Circulation declined even for the leading Nazi newspapers such as the morning Voelkischer and the evening Der Angriff . And the total circulation of all journals fell off steeply as one paper after another went under or was taken over by Nazi publishers. In the first four years of the Third Reich the number of daily newspapers declined from 3,607 to 2,671." (pp 245-246)

    Thus, although Goebbels often asserted that "falsehood repeated a thousand times would be accepted as truth", observations of reality on the ground suggest that repetition could breed boredom, apathy and even cynical disbelief. There are always the Yang (positive) and Yin (negative) in all secular schemes of things on earth, including propaganda, however cleverly designed and circulated.

    In International politics: states, power and conflict since 1945 (London, Prentice Hall, 1997), GR Berridge observes that there are times when propagandists and their masters are deluded by the propaganda they themselves churn out and repeat overtime.

    Also, as Berridge points out, if propaganda is too hysterical, it may fail to keep certain distinctions clear and may, as a result, ending up antagonising one's friends, while merely amusing one's enemies.

    Last but not least, if propaganda is too radical in content and shrill in tone, it would be a blow to the prestige of the propagandists and their masters if it is finally decided that a change in course is required.

    Counter-propaganda efforts must, therefore, not only take into account the strengths and successes of propaganda and propagandists, but also understand their weaknesses, limitations and failures so as not to be self-defeating.

    There are always ways and means, as well as hope, to successfully counter propaganda with empirical facts and figures, analyses based on natural reasons, and the psychic strength based on the firm conviction of the ultimate triumph of truth over falsehood.


    JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia (SAM) which produces the subscriber-based political report, Analysis Malaysia

    . Wong is a former member of parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily. He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew , he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute (MPI) for 1998 and 1999.