The new security environment brought about by the Sept 11 attacks and the resulting US-led 'global war on terrorism' provided an opportunity for the Internal Security Act (ISA) to obtain a new-lease on life.

In 2001/2002, the Internal Security Department (ISD) arrested and detained several members of a local Jemaah Islamiah (JI) cell for terrorist-related activities that included plans to destroy US and local installations. The ISA was credited with indirectly preventing a potential terrorist disaster by enabling the ISD to pre-emptively act against the JI.

As Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng explained: When we resort to the ISA against any person to protect the country's security interests, we recognise that the ISA is dictated not by punitive but preventive considerations,"thus through preventive detention (as set out in the ISA) the ISD was able to" neutralise the entire clandestine network and disrupt the terrorist plan to mount the planned or any further attacks.

Like its colonial predecessors, Singapore's ISA was enacted in 1963 to empower the executive with enhanced capabilities to deal with current or emergent threats to national security. The ISA's main prescription is the 'preventive detention' of a suspect(s) without trial in an open court for a period of two years.

The Act also allows the police or more specifically, officers from the Internal Security Department (ISD), to arrest and detain suspects pending investigations for a maximum period of 30 days.

In the pre-Sept 11 environment, the detention of 22 alleged Marxist Conspirators in 1987 raised serious concerns about the Singapore government's use of the ISA. Unconvinced by official allegations that the detainees were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the government, many speculated and indeed argued that the detentions served to silence the government's political opponents rather than address a national security threat. Consequently the political backlash that followed had a de-legitimising effect on the ISA.

Anti-terror legislation

In contrast, the JI arrests seemed to demonstrate that the ISA had now been used in a capacity that reflected its original objective, that is, as a tool to deal with an actual security threat in the form of international terrorism. As such, the government's use of the ISA in this case was generally perceived as legitimate.

The Singapore government proceeded to promote the ISA in its new role as an anti-terrorism legislation. This was envisaged to recast the ISA as a vital tool to combat terrorism, which would help (re) legitimise the Act.

The promotion campaign took on a direct approach with the Home Affairs Ministry initiating a series of public awareness programmes. This was done to dispel some of the negative perceptions about both the ISA and the ISD that had developed over the years. As part of this campaign, the ministry published two documents, which provided detailed information on the JI arrests and the ISA itself.

The publications were complemented with other initiatives designed to raise the profile of the ISD and reveal the inner workings of the department to the general public. For instance, the ISD Heritage Centre was commissioned to "showcase the operational history of the department" and although the centre was a designated training facility for officers, members of the public were allowed to view the displays and exhibits.

A smaller but more mobile version of the Heritage Centre exhibits was also set up and made its way into schools and community centres. ISD officers were present at these exhibitions to answer questions from the public. Also, ISD officer promotion ceremonies that were previously unheard of were conducted in public venues such as hotels.

The economic dimensions of the 'War on Terrorism' have also provided an opportunity for the ISA to be promoted indirectly. Singapore's unequivocal support for the US in the old and new security environments coupled with her role in preventing the JI attack on American interests, were seemingly 'rewarded' with the signing of the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA). As US Congressmen Pete Sessions notes:

Singapore supported us not only on the day of the terrorist attacks, but has since been very involved in our war on terrorCountries which are our friends are those who ill continue to reap the rewards of a closer relationship.

The advantages to Singapore stemming from the FTA were both economic and strategic. As ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh explained:

For Singapore the USFTA is not just about securing tariff-free entry for Singapore's exports to the great US Market. It is not just about attracting more FDI to Singapore. It is also about enhancing the prospects of peace and stability of the region.

US support

The tying of such benefits to the 'war on terrorism' and particularly the JI arrests, allowed the government to allude to the ISA as having facilitated the arrests thus indirectly contributing to the resulting economic and strategic benefits. Furthermore the US, a once ardent critic of the ISA, had expressed its support for the government's use of the Act to neutralise the local JI cell. This support provided a measure of international legitimacy to the government's actions as well as the ISA.

The promotion of the ISA (both directly and indirectly) as an effective weapon against terrorism lent credence to the government's argument that the ISA was still relevant in contemporary times and thus had to be retained.

The success of this promotion exercise in convincing the public about the benefits of retaining the ISA in its altered form remains a moot point. What is clear however is that the inherent limitation of the Act in terms of the definitional ambiguity of national security threats, continues to raise concerns.

The Singapore government has defended its retention of the Act, arguing that the "ISA is a critical legal instrument of last resort to counter security threats such as racial and religious extremism, espionage, terrorism and subversion" and is "not used to suppress political opposition but to counter extremist groups or radical groups that threaten Singapore's internal security or do harm to our people".

However, with the exception of terrorism (defined in the United Nations (Anti-terrorism Measures) Regulations 2001), other forms of national security threats subversion, espionage, extremism and so on, have not been explicitly defined either within the ISA or in other accompanying regulations/legislation.

That national security threats are not defined in law, and the definition of such threats still falls exclusively within the purview of the executive, is the basis of concern. In the absence of explicit definitions of security threats, the executive can interpret certain variants of political dissent as excessively confrontational or adversarial. This implies that dissidents falling within this category can be deemed as national security threats and thus liable for detention under the ISA.

The safeguard of judicial review on executive decisions to order preventive detention has been absent since1989. This not only further entrenches the ISA as an exclusive instrument of the executive, but also gives rise to the concern that there are no recourses available in the law for individuals who may have been wrongfully detained. Although the advisory board review exists to ensure that an individual has not been wrongfully detained, this process has limitations. For example, the board cannot secure a detainee's release without the concurrence of the president. Thus in effect, preventive detention under the ISA is still an executive decision.

In sum, the major limitation of the ISA since its inception is that the Act vests too much discretionary power in the executive to act on matters of national security. The absence of explicit definitions of national security threats either in the Act or in corresponding legislation, coupled with the absence of judicial review, makes it easier for the ISA to be used against political dissidents.

Although in contemporary times it seems that civil defamation suits have been used to keep such dissidents at bay, the fact still remains that if the executive so chooses it can still wield the ISA against political opponents. As a general consequence, the existence of the ISA has seemingly become a deterrent to vibrant political debate and/or the expression of dissenting views in certain circles.

Aug 18: Singapore's Malay problem

Monday: Gays and lesbians in 'nanny state'

DAMIEN CHEONG is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University. This article is part of the Singapore Studies series edited by James Gomez.