The High Court in Kuala Lumpur allowed the transfer of the defamation suit filed by Lynas Corporation Limited and Lynas Malaysia Sdn Bhd against Anti-Lynas group ‘Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas’ (SMSL) to the Kuantan High Court.  

Justice John Louis O’Hara agreed with the defendants’ counsel Bastian Pius Vendargon that it would be much more convenient for his five clients who currently resided in Kuantan to attend the trial there.    

Justice O’Hara ruled that the court was guided by Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 with regard to the issue of jurisdiction and issue of most suitable forum and concluded that the Kuantan High Court had the jurisdiction to hear the suit.  

He disagreed with the contention by plaintiff’s counsel Rishwant Singh that the course of action by his clients was prompted by the fact that almost 45 percent of the 4,562 people who viewed the said article were located in the Klang Valley.   

He also dismissed Rishwant’s verbal application for a stay of the court order pending an appeal and told the counsel to file a formal application if he wished to pursue the matter.   

Earlier, Vendargon submitted that it had been proven to be costly and inconvenient for the defendants and their supporters to attend proceedings at the Kuala Lumpur court.  

He also argued that every High Court of Malaya had concurrent jurisdiction to hear proceedings regardless of where the course of action arose.  

On April 19, Lynas Corporation of Sydney, Australia, and Lynas Malaysia filed the suit against SMSL Sdn Bhd and its two directors, Tan Bun Teet and Lim Sow Teow, and three volunteers, Hang Chong Leung, Lee Chow Fong and Ismail Abu Bakar, over an alleged defamatory article published on its blog on March 22.  

Lynas had sought for an injunction to have the defendants remove the article titled ‘Civil Society Organisations Joint Statement on Lynas Issue: SMSL Malaysian NGO Statement Against Lynas’ from its blog pending the disposal of the suit.   

On July 26, Justice O’Hara dismissed Lynas’ application for the injunction and held that, at this stage, the court could not conclude whether the statement was defamatory or otherwise, until it heard the evidence in a full trial.    

- Bernama