COMMENT | N Sembilan crisis: When a disputed proclamation becomes an order to govern
COMMENT | Negeri Sembilan’s crisis is no longer simply about who wears a crown. It asks a more fundamental question: can officials treat contested authority as settled, then make the government act on that assumption? Legitimacy cannot be created through successive announcements. It requires a clear chain of lawful decisions.
The chronology matters. After disputes over several undangs, an April 19 proclamation purported to remove Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir and elevate Tunku Nadzaruddin Tuanku Ja'afar. A Seremban High Court injunction on June 5 preserved the status quo pending litigation.
Menteri Besar Ismail Lasim reportedly signed the proclamation in August, but later said he had done so under coercion, a claim disputed by the other side. September brought executive recognition, a contrary assessment from the Attorney-General’s Chambers, attempted suspensions of two officials, and a gazetted revocation of 10 exco appointments, effective Sept 20.
None of these developments, by themselves, settles the validity of the original proclamation.
Article 10 of the Negeri Sembilan constitution gives the undangs a specific power concerning the ruler, subject to specified grounds, a full and complete enquiry, and a joint proclamation with the menteri besar. The menteri besar’s participation is therefore part of that process; it does not give him, his exco, nor the state assembly an independent power to depose or install a ruler.
Articles 14 and 16 separately deal with questions concerning the undangs and the Yang di-Pertuan Besar. It remains disputed whether the April proclamation was issued by the proper authorities, whether the required enquiry complied with the constitution, and whether Ismail’s (below) later signature was legally valid. The AGC says the proclamation failed mandatory constitutional requirements, but that assessment does not itself settle the matter.
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Courts must determine
The June injunction also needs to be read precisely. Its terms, the people bound by it, how it was served, and any subsequent changes determine what conduct it covers. Whether someone breached an injunction, and whether contempt occurred, are ultimately matters for the court.
At the same time, Article 16(3) says advice from the Dewan Keadilan dan Undang (The Council of the Yang di-Pertuan Besar and the Ruling Chiefs) on specified matters of Malay custom is final and cannot be challenged in court. The scope of that protection, and the extent to which courts can examine the constitutional limits surrounding such decisions, remains an important legal question.
Article 34 provides a mechanism for specified constitutional questions to be referred to the Federal Court.
The September administrative escalation shows why these questions matter. The AGC says Article 37 assigns appointments of the state secretary and state legal adviser to the relevant service commissions, rather than the exco that purported to suspend them. Gazette NS PU 18 records Tuanku Muhriz’s revocation of 10 excos under Article 38(5). Ismail disputes whether the ruler could do so without his advice.
The gazette establishes that the instrument was issued; it does not, by itself, establish that its legal effect has been settled. Meanwhile, the administration still has to function: salaries must be paid, approvals made, and essential services maintained.
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Disputed power cannot become settled fact
A constitutional dispute does not automatically establish sedition, treason, an offence against parliamentary democracy, guilt, disqualification, or dismissal from office. Former Dewan Negara president Rais Yatim’s Sept 25 sedition charge, to which he pleaded not guilty, illustrates the distinction between being charged and being convicted.
Federal constitutional Articles 38, 40, 43, 71, 150, and 181 do not automatically trigger a federal takeover, suspension of the state assembly, or emergency. The Conference of Rulers may provide counsel, but it does not replace the state constitution or the courts.
Malacca’s legislative assembly was dissolved on Sept 23. The political parties now face a broader institutional question. Umno and BN must reconcile their defence of the royal institution with demands for lawful procedure from their own officeholders. Pakatan Harapan should avoid turning the dispute into partisan leverage.
The Madani government should respect state autonomy while ensuring that federal appointments are handled lawfully. Perikatan Nasional can scrutinise inconsistencies without presenting contested assertions as established facts. Malay-Muslim voters may judge who keeps institutions functional, not who professes loyalty the loudest.
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The immediate danger is institutional laundering: an unresolved proclamation becomes an executive announcement, then a personnel instruction, then an administrative act. Each step can create an appearance of settled authority without resolving the original dispute.
The reverse is also true: royal prerogative cannot simply be assumed to be unlimited. It too must operate within the constitution’s rules on powers, advice, and tenure. The same constitutional scrutiny must apply to every side.
The practical answer is straightforward. Publish the authenticated instruments and court orders. Keep the administration functioning through agreed interim arrangements. Seek prompt judicial clarification where the courts have jurisdiction. And have political and state leaders explain the legal basis for their actions rather than pressure civil servants to choose sides.
A transparent process protects adat and democratic accountability better than proclamations of victory.
The dispute ultimately turns on three questions. Under Article 10, was the required process for removing and replacing the ruler properly followed? Under Articles 14 and 16, which matters belong to the customary authorities, and what is the legal scope of Article 16(3)’s protection? Under Articles 37 and 38(5), who has the power to appoint, suspend, or remove the relevant officials and excos?
Those questions should be answered through the constitutional processes designed to resolve them.
AZAM MOHD is an independent political and economic analyst.
The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.
The AGC seems to be the final decision maker in a lot of things as reported. Rightly or wrongly it is sometimes quite confusing as years of work can just be ceased or overturned at the stroke of a pen. Wonder who the AGC really answers to ?
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