Recently, I received an email with a link to Youtube , which shows Kevin Rudd, the Australian prime minister, wishing the Chinese people a happy new year in impeccable Mandarin.

Rudd’s strong command of the Chinese language is a huge asset in his effort to boost the relations between Australia and China. It would however be useful to remind many a Chinese nationalist that, despite his keen interest in Chinese culture, Rudd’s thesis back in the late 1970s was about Wei Jingsheng, the famous democracy activist who was released into exile by the Chinese government more than a decade ago.

kevin rudd australia pm 150208 The world has moved on, and Rudd has certainly “wised up”. His oft-repeated commitment to a better and stronger relationship with Beijing indicates either that he has shelved his erstwhile sympathy with Chinese democracy, or that he is determined to influence changes in China through engagement, aided by his impressive language skill.

It could be both, but the most marked, and at times controversial, remark that Rudd has made since becoming prime minister in regard to foreign policy is about his desire to create an Asia Pacific Community (APC). By appointing Dick Woolcott, a former trade minister, a special envoy who will tour within Rudd’s first term all the countries in the Asia Pacific region, plus Taiwan and Hong Kong, Canberra has clearly embarked on the country’s most significant foreign policy initiative since the end of the White Australia era.

A hidden agenda?

The vision spelt out by Rudd aims to overhaul the current arrangements in the region, which should materialize by 2020 encompassing political, economic and security issues. One of the boldest proposals is to expand the existing East Asia Summit by including the United States and Russia. That President Barack Obama is committed to enhancing US institutional ties with Asia also helps, and it is in this area that the Rudd government believes it can play an important role as a “go-between”, especially when Washington is eager to rebuild its image after eight years of reckless foreign policy adventures by the Bush administration.

But the response from the regional countries is lukewarm at best. China, in particular, is wary that such initiative could supersede the current frameworks, including Asean Plus Three for which Beijing is clearly in the driving seat.

Meanwhile, political analysts from the Asean countries view Rudd’s latest foreign policy exercise as having a hidden agenda, ie. strengthening its position in Asia Pacific in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. The proposal has also got some paranoid Asian nationalists thinking if Canberra is a “Trojan Horse” to promote Washington’s interests.

After all, both the US and Australia have begun to carry out some activities that are perceived to be steps towards firming up the APC idea, with a view to enhancing US presence in the territorial waters of the Asean countries.

In October last year, Stephen Smith, Australian foreign minister, expressed the idea that both Canberra and Washington should be given the opportunity to participate in the patrolling exercises in Philippine waters, since an joint action as such could assist Manila in strengthening its hands in handling territorial disputes. Technological and logistical support from the two countries would also enhance the Philippines’ substandard naval forces in safeguarding national security.

Manila has been rather responsive to this option, agreeing to deploy in its territories the Coast Watch South (CWS) troops as part of the plan to set up a tripartite network to fight against terrorism. Given the separatist threat and a restive population in the south, the Philippine government’s position is understandable. With financial aid and training from the US and Australia, the effort to protect the southern maritime borders and to curb Muslim militancy will be more fruitful.

Noises of displeasure

Still, the CWS is, by and large, a strategic plan to guard the dangerous and ecologically abundant waters of the Sulu and Celebes seas bordering Malaysia and Indonesia. Whether this will go down well with the two closest neighbours remains to be seen.

If the plan is to be widened in its scope in the future, it will invariably be interpreted by other Asean countries as providing additional pretexts for the US and Australia to deploy naval forces in the Philippine waters that could destabilize the security environment in the region. Even China would be deeply suspicious given its geo-strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

Throughout Asean, noises of displeasure in response to the APC notion are already noted. Singapore, despite being the closest Asean ally to the West, is particularly concerned due to the lack of consultation with the regional countries as well as the fear that any “foolhardy” and unilateral action on the part of the US and Australia could upset the security arrangements between Asean members, putting the island state in a dilemma.

For instance, Barry Desker, head of Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, has dismissed Rudd’s vision as ‘dead in the water’.

Meanwhile, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a visiting research fellow at the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, wrote an opinion piece in the Bangkok Post * that was highly critical of the APC idea, calling it “a dangerous concept” especially for Asean.

At a time when the regional grouping is being confronted with an identity crisis and an increasingly unsettled international climate, the last thing that Asean leaders want is for an important and, so far, trustworthy neighbour to attempt at any project that could undermine the cohesion of the organization in the long run.

Rudd is no longer the idealist student that he once was. Faced with the current challenges, he may however realize making diplomacy work is a far tougher task than being merely a keen learner of the Chinese language.