The controversial death sentence against Iranian liberal scholar and history professor Hashem Aghajari last November was a case in point of the intense political struggle between reformists and conservatives taking place in Iran today.

At the heart of this struggle is the dispute over what the Islamic state should look like, the role of the clergy and whether or not such a state can be democratic.

Hashem ( photo ), 46, a close ally of reformist President Mohammed Khatami and a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 , was sentenced to death for "insulting the prophets" or blasphemy on account of his call for a "religious renewal" of Shi'ite Islam.

In a speech commemorating the 25th anniversary of the death of progressive thinker Ali Shariati on June 19 last year, he said clerics were not divine and that Muslims should not blindly follow their teachings

While the death sentence was quashed in February following widespread protests in Iran, Aghajari still faces 74 lashes of the whip, eight years' banishment to jail in desert cities, and a 10-year ban on teaching.

The Iranian revolution

The Shi'ite clergy has always played an important role in Iranian politics. Their recent ascent to the pinnacle of power, however, is a consequence of the Iranian Revolution.

Muhammad Reza Shah, the last Shah, was both brutal and corrupt. His rapid modernisation program, devoid of any significant political reform, threatened Iranian identity and culture. A broad spectrum of Iranians opposed his autocratic rule.

A series of massive demonstrations and a wave of strikes, which paralysed industry and ground oilfield operations to a halt, made it impossible for him to remain in power. He was deposed and left Iran in January 1979.

Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in triumph to become the Supreme Leader until his death in 1989. His radio broadcasts and taped speeches, which were played in mosques throughout Iran during his exile, had an important role in delegitimising the Shah's rule.

The movement to overthrow the Shah was made up of diverse political and ideological groupings - from clerics and Islamic activists to liberal democrats and Marxists.

Ideological differences

In the aftermath of the revolution, deep ideological differences surfaced as to what the new political and social order should look like. In particular, there were serious disagreements over the role of the clergy and the implementation of Islamic law.

The group around Khomeini, which advocated direct rule by the clergy, emerged victorious. Their active role in the mass movement and the skillful way in which they were able to form temporary alliances, helped them out-manoeuvre opponents.

Their radical anti-imperialist posturing (especially after the takeover of the US Embassy) and the war of aggression by Iraq helped them expand their base and establish near total power for themselves.

They came to dominate the Revolutionary Guard, the military, the media, the judiciary and parliament. In the name of Islam, there was censorship of news and publications as well as ideological control of university curriculae. Islamic law was implemented.

Many groups and individuals who had played a significant role in the revolution fell by the wayside. Among them were Islamic modernists like Mehdi Bazargan and clerics like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who believed that the clergy should only have an indirect role in government.

Dissent - both Islamic and secular - was crushed. Some very driven out of office while others were driven into exile. Many were imprisoned. It is estimated that some 20,000 opponents of the regime were executed.

Political structure

The political system that emerged, Iran's velayat-i-faqih (Government by Jurists) is an innovative attempt to combine an Islamic theocracy with democracy. It is a complex political system that is like no other.

In this system, all Iranians aged 16 and above are entitled to vote. There are direct elections for the Presidency, the Majlis (Parliament) and the Assembly of Experts. However the most powerful centre of power is the Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The Supreme Leader is at the top of the political pyramid. He appoints the head of the judiciary who, in turn, appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor.

He also appoints six out of 12 members of the powerful Council of Guardians and the head of radio and TV. He is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The Supreme Leader is chosen from within the ranks of 86 'virtuous and learned' clerics who make up the Assembly of Experts. These clerics are elected directly by the electorate every eight years. The last election took place in 1998.

The assembly has the power to appoint, oversee and if necessary dismiss the Supreme Leader. The current assembly is dominated by conservatives. It has been criticised for being subservient to the Supreme Leader and for failing to fulfill its supervisory function.

The 12-member Council of Guardians, a conservative bastion of power, comprises clerics and jurists in equal number. The Supreme Leader appoints the clerics while the jurists are nominated by the judiciary and officially appointed by the Majlis.

The Council has the authority to decide who is eligible to contest elections.It can veto unsuitable candidates for the Majlis, the Presidency or the Assembly of Experts. It also has the authority to determine whether laws passed by the Majlis conform to the Constitution and Islamic Law.

The president, who heads the executive branch. is elected by the popular vote and can serve a maximum of two five-year terms. While responsible for the day-to-day running of the country, his powers are limited.

There are important portions of the Iranian power structure over which he had absolutely no control. Under the constitution, the executive appears to be subordinate to the Supreme Leader.

Control over legislation

The Majlis, whose members are elected by popular vote every four years, is responsible for drafting legislation. All legislation must, however, first pass the scrutiny of the Council which thus has effective veto power.

The Council can send bills back to the Majlis for revision. Over the past three years, much of the legislation sponsored by the reformist Majlis has been blocked.

Disputes over legislation between the Majlis and the Council are sometimes referred to the Expediency Council, formed to arbitrate between the two.

This is headed by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and has for the most part sided with the Council of Guardians in any dispute with the Majlis.

In a nutshell, the reformists control the Presidency and the Majlis, while the conservatives control the office of the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians, the Judiciary and the Assembly of Experts.

Successes and failures

Today, 24 years after the revolution, there have been some successes. Education is free, and more than two million students - many of them women - are enrolled in tertirary institutions. Well-run campaigns have improved the literacy rate (84% among men and 70% among women).

Iranians have also had the chance to participate in a series of elections - the recent presidential and parliamentary polls were models of transparency. Women vote and there are today 11 female legislators in the Majlis.

Iran, though, faces challenges on many fronts. Its economy is ailing. There is widespread corruption, 15% of Iranians lives below the poverty line and there is the serious problem of unemployment - 800,000 young people enter the job market each year in an economy only capable of creating half this number of jobs.

The youth are restless. They resent the strict dress code and other social restrictions like the prohibition against the mingling of the sexes. Two-thirds of Iranians are too young to remember the revolution and for them what is important is that the regime stays out of their personal lives.

On the political front, difficult questions are being asked about the nature of the system. Iranians are asking why non-elected religious leaders should have more power than the democratically elected president.

Interestingly, even some senior clerics are questioning the wisdom of the clergy being so entwined in the power structure. They worry that Islam might suffer from the regime's unpopularity and might even be held responsible for its failures.

Ayatollah Seyed Hossein Mousavi-Tabrizi, the former chief prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court, believes that the ruling regime has strayed: "In more than 100 references, the Qur'an states that the will of the people must be fulfilled.

"The idea that only a select number of clerics have the right to make decisions for the masses is un-Islamic and illegal. God hasn't given anyone an exclusive right to rule. If religion interferes in every detail of government, it will fail."

Khatami's reforms

The first significant crack in the clergy's stranglehold of power was Khatami's victory in the 1997 presidential elections.

He quickly relaxed censorship and licensed numerous new publications. The increased flow of information created a healthy intellectual climate that further accentuated the desire for reform.

Some publications also managed to expose embarrassing domestic scandals like the murder of several intellectuals in 1998, apparently linked to elements within Iran's Intelligence Ministry.

Iran's ruling conservatives do not like being challenged. The judiciary responded to this "liberal" climate by jailing journalists and intellectuals and closing down more than 95 reformist newspapers. Often, the rationale used was that the reformist elements disparaged Islam and the religious elements of the Iranian revolution.

The 5th Majlis (1996-2000) was controlled by conservatives. Khatami thus spent much of his first term having to contend with a Majlis which was hostile to him and which delayed the passage of legislation whenever possible.

The victory of reformists in the 2000 parliamentary elections was a major breakthrough. It meant that for the first time since the revolution, both the executive and the legislature were in the hands of the reformists.

Those seeking reform have no desire to return to the past. Rather they are concerned that the revolution has been hijacked by the Shi'ite clergy that has run out of ideas and is incapable of moving the country forward.

What they are demanding is a greater respect for human rights, greater democracy and political participation, freedom for intellectuals and artists to express criticism, a loosening of social restrictions and increasing access for women into positions of responsibility.

The overwhelming victory of reformists in the 2000 Majlis elections and Khatami's re-election in 2001 are clear signs that this agenda has the full support of the majority of Iranians.

Reformists frustrated

Two bills recently approved by the Majlis are a modest attempt by reformists to prise open the clergy's tight grip on power and move the agenda along.

The first bill seeks to curb the power of the Council of Guardians by taking away its right to veto election candidates, often used by conservatives to keep opponents out of power.

Such stringent ideological screening denies the electorate a choice to a broad spectrum of candidates, thereby undermining the democratic process. Reformists want to put an end to this before parliamentary elections next February and presidential elections in 2005.

The second bill gives Khatami the power to sanction judges and suspend court rulings that are unconstitutional. This is intended to end the use of the courts to muzzle the press and jail journalists and intellectuals.

In a major setback, the Council rejected both bills and returned them to the Majlis, alleging that these contain numerous items that contravene the constitution and that they are in conflict with Islam.

In response, 127 members of the Majlis have issued an open letter to Khamenei, calling for his intervention to break the deadlock. They said also called for a national referendum. It appears, however, that Khamenei is likely to ignore their request.

Reformists are frustrated at the manner in which they have been blocked at every turn. Time is running out for them. Their failure to meet the high expectations of the electorate could see them fairing poorly in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Some reformist legislators argue that they should resign en bloc in protest, but there serious doubts as to how many legislators favour such an approach and, more importantly, what it would accomplish.

In any case, confronting the institutional hegemony of the conservatives will require a huge show of force. Many analysts doubt whether Iranians would, at this point in time, be willing to take to the streets in large numbers.

They certainly sympathise with the reformist agenda, but have become increasingly disillusioned by the lack of real reform. Many may be too fed up to persuade themselves to be mobilised. Thus it is possible that the conservatives will survive this round with all their powers intact.

Lessons for all

No one however should underestimate the powerful sense of disillusionment and discontent that lies just below the surface. If the Islamic Republic is to survive, then it has little choice but to yield to the reformist mood by opening up and becoming more democratic.

Iran's velayat-i-faqih is a bold and radical attempt to forge a new political model. As Iranians grapple with the intricate question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy - of how involved clerics should be in the political process, of reforms and alternatives - they offer to the world a plethora of ideas and lessons to be learnt.

Iran has a rich history and vibrant intellectual tradition. It provides advocates and opponents of an Islamic state with much needed food for thought.

Those who seek to transform the present order would do well to take note of the successes and failures of the Iranian model.

What has happened in Iran challenges the simplistic notion that the establishment of an Islamic state will resolve all ills. It also illustrates the complexity of issues that need to be addressed in a just and rational manner.

As reformists and conservatives battle it out, it is crucial that Iran be given the freedom and space to evolve. The last thing that Iran needs is US military intervention.

Imperialist aggression will only strengthen the hand of conservative hardliners and stifle the movement for reform. It is important that the Iranian experiment be allowed to unfold and work itself out unhindered.

In writing this article - first published in Aliran magazine - human rights advocate RAJEN DEVARAJ sourced material from: Islam The Straight Path (John L. Esposito, Oxford University Press 1991); Reform in Iran (Ignacio Ramonet, Le Monde diplomatique March 2000); The Clash Of Fundamentalisms (Tariq Ali, Verso 2002); and The Prophet and the Proletariat (Chris Harman).