If most people agree on one thing on the subject of Burma, it is that the national reconciliation process is in tatters following the May 30 arrest of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The 1991 Nobel Peace laureate was ambushed and arrested by the military junta following clashes between her supporters and opponents.

Three weeks later, she is still being held incommunicado , with no hope of release until things go back to 'normal', as the junta says.

Her arrest has come as a deep blow not only to opposition parties and ethnic groups working with her National League for Democracy, but also to scores of Burma observers outside the country.

Not unexpectedly, disappointment has focused on UN special envoy Razali Ismail, whose task its has been to facilitate political dialogue between the two sides. Earlier this month, he completed his 10 th mission in three years.

Once hailed as a peace broker, the envoy has increasingly been hit by criticism over what is perceived to be an inadvertent role in providing legitimacy for the Rangoon junta.

Confidence building

In their latest show of dissatisfaction, Razali's detractors have accused him of "corroborating" the junta's excuse for detaining Suu Kyi.

This followed Razali's upbeat comments about the state of Suu Kyi's health to quash rumours that she had been seriously injured following the attack on her convoy.

The Wall Street Journal , in an editorial last week, came close to calling for Razali's resignation over his inability to secure substantial meetings with Burmese top leader Senior-General Than Shwe, as well as "conflict of interest" via his part ownership of a company that does business with the Burmese government.

Dissident groups exiled in Thailand have also expressed their impatience with Razali.

"The Burmese have already lost confidence in Razali. We do not want him in the process anymore," says one Chiang Mai-based journalist.

But others see various reasons for Razali ( photo ) to remain in the process, not the least of which is that there are few viable alternatives to the present arrangement.

For a start, a change of envoys at this juncture would lead to little beyond providing the junta with another excuse to postpone the start of dialogue.

There would have to be a necessary confidence-building period which, judging from past experience, would delay substantive talks by months, if not years.

Razali, having negotiated this process, has not only gained the confidence of some Burmese officials and but equally important, that of Suu Kyi herself.

The strong-willed Suu Kyi's earlier reservations about Razali (partly due to his close ties with Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, to whom he is special advisor) were overcome only after several visits stretching over more than a year.

Modest achievements

As Razali himself notes, the task convincing the junta that something has to be done for their country is a remarkably time-consuming one.

"When I first went to talk to them about (letting the UN start a project) to help the 500,000 people who were HIV-positive, they did not believe (the figures). It took two years of persuasion before they believed me," he recalls.

So while his diplomatic efforts may not have resulted in actual political dialogue, the envoy can chalk up modest achievements - among these, Suu Kyi's year-long freedom to tour her country and the communication channels that have been opened up with military leaders.

Clear proof of the junta's intractability was on display during the Asean Regional Forum last week when even the combined persuasive might of Asean and its partners - including the US - could not convince the military to put a date on Suu Kyi's release.

Razali's mediation efforts must be viewed in this context. During his most recent visit to Burma, he managed to seek an explanation for her detention, visited her and assured the world that she was uninjured during the May 30 fracas.

Recent reports have hinted at a split in the military between the conservatives and pragmatists. If the information is accurate, then it is all the more important for the international community to maintain a link with the Burmese government.

While Razali admittedly has had difficulty engaging with Burmese Prime Minister Than Shwe, he does have access to pragmatist leaders led by influential military intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt and - since the last visit - conservative No 2 leader, army chief General Maung Aye.

Razali may not be able to influence Than Shwe, but may still be able get his message across via these two most senior deputies.

As he said recently , "I don't know where Than Shwe stands (on the issue of reconciliation)...It is hoped that Maung Aye would be able to influence (Than Shwe) not to do the drastic thing."

Waning interest

Whether Razali should remain in the Burmese national reconciliation process is not the most important point that critics should be underscoring. A wider dimension has largely been neglected.

It is crucial to note that Razali's ineffectiveness is also directly related to waning interest among countries that have been most outspoken against military rule in Burma.

Although retaining unilateral sanctions against Burma, the US and Britain have been diverted by other concerns, such as the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq.

Over much of the past 12 months, there have only been sporadic statements from these two governments expressing concern over the lack of progress in Burma.

It was only after Suu Kyi's most recent arrest that the US Congress voted to widen sanctions on Burma, banning travel by junta officials and cutting off Burma's access to lucrative US markets.

However, it is uncertain how long this attention will last after the these governments exhaust direct coercive options available through the imposition of sanctions.

Deborah Stothard of the Alternative Asean Network on Burma (Altsean), a Bangkok-based human rights lobby, says that for things to move forward, Razali would have to get support from Asian governments.

"The real flaw is Razali's lack of clout amongst Asian countries and within the UN system. The military junta's allies including Asean, India and China, have not actively supported Razali's efforts," she says.

In fact, Stothard points out that it was only under great international pressure (mainly from the US) that last week's Asean meeting came up with a position at all on Burma.

Unless and until these governments are willing to set aside their national interests to address this regional problem, Razali is likely to remain powerless to bring about real dialogue.

His predecessor, Alvaro de Soto, had faced the same predicament. His colleague Sergio Paulo Pinheiro, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma, has found it an insurmountable obstacle to report progress.

Therefore, rather than seeking to change envoys, a more effective strategy would be to lobby influential Western governments to exert more pressure on Asian governments.

Finding replacements

In the face of all these problems, Razali himself has maintained that while there has to be more pressure from the international community, a diplomatic channel must remain open.

"Pressure in itself does not get the job done. You must always keep one window open. It is about reconciliation. It is not about what is bad and what is good," he says.

The envoy insists he has no intention of keeping the job if there is a better alternative.

In a recent interview, he said, "In all modesty, if someone has a formula for us to get out of this, I would exit and pass the mantle over."

On a previous occasion, Razali had stated his intention to quit if convinced there is no willingness at all on the part of the military to progress. His staying on the job may be indicative of a chance that talks may yet take place.

Replacing Razali will not be easy. As an observer notes, mindful of the suspicions of the junta and the bitter Burmese memories of colonial rule, his successor would have to be another non-Western outsider with more than mere academic knowledge of the country.

Recognising this, none of the governments pushing for conciliation is likely to want to see Razali go.

As for Rangoon, there is certainly no reason for the junta leaders to ask for Razali's removal. They may even lose some support from Mahathir, a key advocate of Asean's constructive engagement tactic with the junta.

"The generals would not ask him to go because they have nothing to gain from it. What they may do is to try and wear him down and (thereby) make him go on his own account," says the observer.

The opposition too would have nothing to gain from a change.

As a Rangoon-based diplomat says, "As long as he has the confidence of Suu Kyi, I don't see how anyone else would have any say on his involvement."

On this basis at least, Razali can expect to look forward to a few more visits to Rangoon.