In the 1980s, it was conventional wisdom that the DAP would almost automatically win seats where the Chinese electorate comprised more than 70% of the voters. This was no longer the case in the 1990s as many Chinese majority areas fell to the MCA and Gerakan and the DAP had difficulty in trying to regain them.

The loss of many of the union stalwarts within the DAP, defections to BN parties, and the falling out of many prominent DAP leaders with Lim Kit Siang - all contributed to the weakening of the once mighty "Rocket."

The lynchpin in the fortunes of the Peninsular Chinese parties was Dr Mahathir Mohamad himself. Mahathir "lost" the seats to DAP in the 1980s and "claimed" these seats in the 1990s with a healthy dollop of economic growth, cultural and educational liberalisation, development funding for community projects, and other electoral strategies. The changed perception of the Chinese by Mahathir himself, from "enemies" to "loyalists," as well as greater appreciation for Mahathir's leadership among Chinese voters underlined the shift.

The shifting fortunes of Peninsular Chinese-based parties have left their imprint on Malaysian politics. The critical role that the Chinese played in the 1999 election led many to believe that the Chinese community should demand more influence.

The political waters were tested by Suqiu - a grouping representing a collection of Chinese NGO's, educationist groups, and community and clan-based organisations. Prior to the 1999 elections, Suqiu had presented the BN with a list of election requests that was tacitly accepted.

Controversial points

These requests included many points which echoed the BA manifesto in calling for greater transparency, respect for human rights and the like, but also included more controversial points such as revising the constitutional provision regarding Malay rights. After the elections, Suqiu pushed for their requests to be honored, and this incurred the wrath of Umno, particularly Umno Youth.

An Umno Youth demonstration was staged in front of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, an important landmark for the Chinese community and Chinese-based organizations. Threats were made to burn down that symbolic building. The confrontation died down when a group of Umno Youth Exco members sat down with key members of Suqiu and negotiated for seven points in the Suqiu list that touched on Malay rights and other "sensitive" issues to be taken out.

The tone had been set. The "wounded tiger" of Umno was in a defensive mode and in no mood to compromise. Any hopes that the Chinese community had to negotiate for a greater share of the political pie were severely dented by this episode.

What is surprising, however, is that the Chinese Peninsular-based parties were not leading the fight for the Chinese community. Rather, a NGO led the charge and faced the brunt of Umno Youth anger. Neither the BN parties nor the opposition DAP opted to go head-to-head against the dominant Umno and Mahathir himself, unlike 1969. Why had the terrain shifted so significantly - so much so that Chinese-based parties were not leading the fight for Chinese political power?

Part of the explanation has to do with the realities of inter-BN dynamics. When the MCA suffered "setbacks" in the elections of 1986, and 1990, these losses were not accompanied by a reduction in the number of MCA cabinet positions. Opting to push for greater power would break earlier norms and potentially damage the Chinese position in the future. In the cycle of elections, the BN parties recognize a degree of co-dependence in which some parties may win a greater lion's share of the votes in a given election. This does not necessarily translate into changing the coalition dynamics.

Equally significant is the appreciation of many Chinese BN leaders who understand that their own political fortunes are tied to Malay votes. Even a cursory examination of parliament seats held by MCA and Gerakan leaders in 1999 shows that many of them competed in mixed seats with a large percentage of Malay voters, including the former MCA President Ling Liong Sik in Labis (43% Malay), the Gerakan President Lim Keng Yaik in Beruas (31% Malay), and the newly appointed MCA President Ong Ka Ting in Pontian (53% Malay). Exaggerated claims of the dependence of Umno on the Chinese vote ignore the political reality that key MCA and Gerakan leaders depend equally on the Malay vote. Any attempts for the Chinese Peninsular parties to "bargain" for additional power within the BN framework have to be examined in the context of electoral history and the cross pooling of votes between Umno and the two Chinese-based parties.

Long-standing practice

The infighting within the BN Chinese parties further cements the limited room for maneuver for these parties. This pattern is a long-standing practice, in which the MCA and Gerakan attempt to carve out great positions within the BN. This has been played out historically over the Chief Minister position in Penang, the only Chinese majority state in Malaysia. Currently, Gerakan holds the position and has done so since 1969. In the last few years there have been rumblings between these two BN Chinese partners. This was seen in MCA's attempt to takeover the Penang state government by getting two Gerakan state assemblymen, Lim Boo Chang and Lim Chen Aun, to defect to MCA, thereby increasing the number of MCA state assembly representatives from 9 to 11 and decreasing Gerakan's reps from 11 to 9. Since Umno had only 10 state reps, this meant that MCA had the highest number of state reps in the state and would logically be in a position to lobby for the Penang Chief Minister position.

The attempt failed when Umno intervened to arbitrate the conflict and protect Gerakan's position. More than the infighting between parties, changes in the broader political system reinforce Chinese loyalty to Umno. As the results of the 1999 election and subsequent conflicts within the opposition Barisan Alternatif (BA) front evolved, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) became the strongest opposition party, replacing DAP. Many Chinese voters, and certainly the parties, recognize that of the two Malay political alternatives, Umno is the more "moderate" choice.

Even if Umno ups its ante on Islamic matters, such as Dr. Mahathir's announcement that Malaysia is already an Islamic state, Umno remains the more acceptable choice to the Chinese electorate. PAS has not helped its own cause by pushing through hudud legislation in the Terengganu state assembly and implementing policies which have been used by the government media to further "demonize" PAS as a party of Islamic "extremists."

The government has recognized this new dynamic and increased their dependence on Chinese voters in the latest delineation exercise. In previous exercises, the trend was to create more Malay majority seats for Umno (more than 70% Malay). In the 2002 exercise, more mixed seats were created (at least 30% non-Malay). Chinese voters were seen as "stabilizers" or "insurance policies" for Umno. The impact of these changes have yet to be felt, but clearly seem to have empowered Chinese voters and may strengthen Chinese parties, especially those in the BN, whose machinery has become more important for elections.

Although it is difficult for MCA and Gerakan to make any political headway, their respective positions are also less likely to erode in the near future. The creation of more mixed seats means that the grassroot networks of both of these parties have increased in importance, even if this does not translate into a larger percentage of seats allocated to these two parties. This dynamic will strengthen inter-ethnic alliances among the BN since the support of all communities and the parties that represent them in the BN will be crucial in mixed seats. While this benefits MCA and Gerakan, DAP is likely to come out as losers since they are not able to appeal beyond their traditional Chinese heartland.

But the longer-term trends are not so encouraging. The nature of ethnically based politics in Malaysia is that MCA and Gerakan are limited to fighting for representation within the Chinese "box". This "box" is likely to shrink as the percentage of the Chinese population begins to decrease over time. It currently stands at 27 percent, and some demographic studies have estimated that this will drop to below 20 percent in 20 years time. By similar estimates, the proportion of the Chinese population in Penang is estimated to drop below the 50 percent mark in the same time period.

If power were derived from representation and representation derived from one's share of the population, then one would see the erosion of MCA's power at the federal level and Gerakan in Penang.

Zero-sum games

Contestations between MCA and Gerakan against the DAP are zero-sum games in the ethnic framework of electoral politics. The political gains from these contestations will decrease as the size of the "box" decreases.

The shrinking Chinese "box," as it were, also decreases the rewards of infighting between the MCA and Gerakan within the BN framework. The zero-sum game for these two parties within the BN is also in operation. It is possible that this contestation would increase as rewards garnered from contestations outside this "box" become less and less for these two parties. MCA, seeing the erosion of its federal power, might want to "reclaim" Penang to bolster its political strength while Gerakan, not being able to broaden out its power base to other states, would hold on to its Penang leadership at all costs.

Beyond demographics, the continuing "Islamisation" of Malaysia will also play a significant role in constricting further the Chinese "box." Both MCA and Gerakan have traditionally left matters relating to Islam to their Umno counterparts and persist in this trend, even if these matters affect the rights or livelihood of non-Muslims. Umno and PAS, by playing the Islamic card, widen the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim, thereby marginalising and reducing further the Chinese "box."

The transition from Mahathir to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi will be beneficial for MCA and Gerakan, at least in the short term. As the new premier, Abdullah is not likely to "rock the boat" in terms of power sharing within the BN and hence will likely maintain the status quo. Hailing from Penang, this would also mean more federal funds for the development of that state.

The Islamic credentials of Pak Lah are also viewed positively in the BN's fight against more "extreme" forms of Islamisation.

MCA will remain the second largest component party within the BN with more or less the same political strength, and Gerakan will maintain control of the state of Penang. In other words, status quo in the BN remains in the short term.

The loss of Mahathir's leadership in the next general elections is not likely to affect MCA and Gerakan's electoral prospects. The Chinese voters will give Pak Lah the benefit of the doubt as they did for Mahathir 20 years ago. The "Chinese box" will not differ much from 1999.

These parties know that the battleground is over the Malay "hearts and minds." But underlying this period of relative calm and peace is the political reality that demographic changes, ethnic politics, and continuing trends of Islamization will reduce the political representation and power of Peninsular Chinese-based parties. These parties are caught in a Chinese "box," and that box is getting smaller and smaller.

ONG KIAN MING was headed for glorious riches as a management consultant before too much of the good life got to him. He now works at a think tank focusing on nation building. The above article is an abstract from an article which appears in 'Reflections: The Mahathir Years'.

'Reflections' contains a collection of essays of over 40 authors reflecting on the Mahathir era in areas such as domestic politics, foreign and defense policy, the economy, society, public health, the media and the arts. It offers fresh perspectives on the changes during the last 22 years and points to some of the key challenges for the future.

The book will be launched tomorrow (Jan 17) at 4.30pm in Bilik Wawasan, Rumah Universiti, Universiti Malaya.