While ideologically multiethnic, the 'grand old' opposition party DAP is Chinese-predominated with some Indian participation. Formed in 1966, DAP was the largest opposition party in Parliament until it was replaced by PAS after the1999 general election.

Although it still retains a certain amount of hardcore support in Chinese-predominated urban constituencies, DAP did suffer serious setbacks in terms of seats won, votes obtained and the failure of its heavyweights to be re-elected, in the last polls.

In recent years, it has also been confronting the twin problem of ageing membership and sloth of mobilisation.

After its withdrawal from Barisan Alternatif (BA) - the opposition coalition formed by PAS, Keadilan and PRM - it has also cut off its source of Malay/Muslim political goodwill. Now it has to rely on non-Malay/Muslim support in its effort to regain power and influence.

Even its chairperson and political veteran Lim Kit Siang, in recent interviews with the Chinese-language media, admitted that the 'Abdullah Ahmad Badawi effect' is not conducive to the opposition. Citing the Dr Mahathir Mohamad precedent 22 years ago, Lim argued that voters may decide to provide the new premier with a chance. In the 1982 general election, the first under the then new leadership of Mahathir, DAP fared badly.

Acid test

Some political observers opine that the 2004 general election is critical to DAP's struggle to survive and regain honour, and the caution and anxiety shown by Lim and DAP are understandable.

From a historical perspective, the rise of DAP to prominence can be traced back to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s when the Chinese Malaysian community strongly felt they were being excluded from the mainstream of the political power structure, as well as the ethnically discriminatory policies of the ethno-nationalist Umno. That period was characterised by the politico-ideological battle between Umno's assimilationist cultural policy and race-based affirmative action on one hand, and DAP's 'Malaysian Malaysia' slogan on the other.

DAP reached its nadir in the 1986 general election when it won 24 parliamentary seats.

The turning point came in the 1990 when a splinter group of Umno led by former finance minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah formed a Malay opposition party, and also teamed up with DAP and PAS to challenge the Umno-dominated Barisan Nasional. The outcome was mixed: while DAP won rather handsomely in the Chinese-predominated constituencies and PAS captured Kelantan, Semangat 46 led by Tengku Razaleigh performed less well than expected. In the aftermath of the 1990 general election, Mahathir's Umno restructured its political discourse by appealing to the 'Vision 2020' slogan and it also began to 'enter' Chinese political discourse directly.

Mahathir's strategy brought changes: in the 1995 general election, DAP lost badly, winning only nine parliamentary seats. Later, Tengku Razaleigh and his supporters returned to Umno. The opposition dream of setting up a two-coalition political system was shattered.

However, in the aftermath of the sacking and detention of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998, DAP decided to join PAS, PRM and the pro-Anwar Keadilan in the BA, thus reviving the dream of institutionalising a two-coalition political system in Malaysia.

The outcome of the 1999 general election saw DAP losing badly again, including the defeat of Lim and another senior leader, Karpal Singh in their parliamentary constituencies. DAP blamed PAS advocacy of an Islamic state and argued that it 'frightened' Chinese voters. DAP also clashed with the multiethnic Keadilan.

Just as Mahathir announced that Malaysia is already an Islamic state on Sept 29, 2001, DAP withdrew from the opposition coalition.

Two problems

In the 2004 general election, DAP faces two set of problems, one internal and another, external.

Externally, like all opposition parties, DAP has to operate on a playing field that is not level. After its withdrawal from the opposition front, it also has to confront pressure coming from both the ruling BN as well as the opposition front. There may be three-cornered fights to be engaged.

Internally, DAP is bedeviled by weak organisational structure, poor finance, lack of creative campaigning themes as well as sharp images of 'fighting leadership' as well as local factionalism.

In term of campaign themes or issues, DAP is only obsessed with the Islamic state controversy, and does not seem to be able to create new issues. When it was still a component party of the opposition front, DAP battled on two fronts: it was under fire from MCA/Gerakan for 'supporting' the Islamic state but it was also unable to stop PAS from advocating the Islamic state in the latter's ideological struggle for political identity with Umno.

By withdrawing from BA and posturing itself as a defender of 'secularism', DAP hopes to defuse the MCA/Gerakan attack and also to 'desensitise' itself. However, it seems that the DAP strategy is not effective in that it does not stir the passion of the non-Muslims, and at the same time, serve to alienate Muslim voters. DAP is now besieged within a narrow circle of hardcore Chinese supporters.

When PAS puts up a rather moderate programme of Islamic state and when the image of the new prime minister overshadows that of his predecessor, DAP has to admit its failure in posturing itself as the most principled opposition to the Islamic state.

Overlapping identities

Although DAP's opposition to the notion of 'Islamic state' - which is also the reason it cited to quit the opposition front - is based on the Federal Constitution, and deserves respect, but its unhappy experiences within the opposition front were more than that. One major problem was with Keadilan which is multiethnic like DAP and had recruited a number of ex-DAP leaders.

The overlapping political identity as well as clashing interests in Chinese-predominated constituencies between DAP and Keadilan may cause three-cornered fights, benefitting the ruling front. Ex-DAP leaders and members in Keadilan is also a cause for friction.

At present, DAP"s 10 parliamentary seats are concentrated in the Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory, Penang, Perak and Melaka. With the exception of one or two seats, it seems that the party can retain the rest. If its leaders Lim and Karpal could contest in some strategic seats, they could stir the passion of the voters again in favour of the party. For Lim, this could be his last election before an honourable retirement.

In term of maximum votes gained, DAP already reached it height in the 1990 general election. Although it still retains some hardcore support from the urban middle and lower classes among the Chinese, its future depends on broadening its support base into more multiethnic masses and constituencies. To do this, it has to reform itself in terms of intra-party organisation, human resources as well as to strengthen cooperation and integration with other opposition parties.

So, the challenges faced by the DAP are not in this general election, but after it.

Phoon Wing Keong is a Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies. This exclusive article was originally written in Mandarin and translated by malaysiakini .