On the surface, Burmese Prime Minister General Khin Nyint appeared to have chosen an odd time to pay state visits to Malaysia and Thailand.

The premier's visit came amidst the all-important National Convention in Rangoon where more than 1,000 ethnic and opposition leaders have been meeting since May 17 to hammer out a new constitution. His absence while this is on-going seems out of place considering that Burma's political future hinges on trade-offs made during the constitutional talks.

More puzzling was Khin Nyunt's decision to land in Kuala Lumpur exactly a year and two days after the re-arrest of Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The trip could only highlight the anniversary and expose the Burmese leader to uncomfortable questions in his host countries.

By one reading, the arrangements may be confirmation of what critics of the Burmese junta have said all along. The military is so confident of its ability to ride roughshod over the wishes of negotiating groups that the attendance of its top brass is not required. The timing of the visits could be interpreted as direct defiance at the international community's calls for Suu Kyi's release.

More likely though, Khin Nyunt's state visits to two of Burma's closest neighbours are signs that things are not going well back home. Despite a year-long campaign to deflect criticism over the regime's crackdown on the opposition, Rangoon's efforts have come to nought with the withdrawal of the National League for Democracy (NLD) from the National Convention just days before it was scheduled to begin.

For all its bravado on proceeding with the convention, Rangoon is painfully aware that without the participation of the largest opposition party, the talks would lose credibility in the eyes of the world. The visits to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok were but barely masked attempts to salvage the

convention's legitimacy.

Cosmetic changes

Looking back at the developments over the past 12 months, it is undeniable that the regime was worried by the all-round condemnation of Suu Kyi's re-arrest on May 30 last year. For the first time, Burma was subjected to strictures by its allies - particularly China and its neighbours in Southeast Asia.

Breaking its traditional silence on the internal affairs of member states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) took the unprecedented move last August to call for Suu Kyi's release.

Since then, the generals have been busy with a number of moves purportedly aimed at introducing political reforms. Most visible was the elevation of Khin Nyunt, then the regime's second secretary, to the position of Prime Minister to replace retiring strongman Senior General Than Shwe. The change was a tactical move to shift the spotlight from the intractable Than Shwe to the military intelligence chief - the man often considered the highest ranking official in favour of engagement with the outside world.

Rangoon also submitted uncharacteristically to extensive discussion of its affairs with its traditional foe, Thailand. The sum of these talks, brokered by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was a seven-point "road map", which, among others, charted the resumption of the suspended work on the drafting of a new constitution to pave the way for democracy.

However, closer scrutiny would reveal that many of the changes made by the junta were merely cosmetic. Khin Nyunt may be wearing the hat, but he is clearly without the clout to make any decision against the known wishes of Than Shwe. The 71-year-old senior general has kept his grip on power by retaining his posts as chairperson of the ruling State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC) and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Judging from the negotiations right up to the NLD's boycott, military hardliners appear to be firmly in control of the situation. A sticking point for the NLD that brook no compromise by the SPDC was the latter's refusal to release Suu Kyi and NLD vice-chairperson Tin U from house arrest.

Khin Nyunt's inability to resolve this issue and the SPDC's reluctance to be subjected to prodding by its Asean counterparts are likely to have been two of the main reasons behind the delay for the courtesy calls around the region. Khin Nyunt's ten-month wait stands in contrast with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's tour which took place within three months of the latter's appointment.

Mutual obstinacy

At the heart of the endless stalemate in Rangoon is an insurmountable amount of mutual obstinacy which has prevented the United Nations-backed national reconciliation process from heading anywhere.

The faults of the military have been well threshed out. Although it has been four years since UN envoy Razali Ismali first embarked on his facilitation visits, the process has failed to go beyond "confidence-building" stages.

Army hardliners continue to resent the UN's role in Burma and oppose any arrangement which would confer Suu Kyi and her party with political legitimacy.

Rangoon has backtracked on its commitments so many times that the UN envoy has refrained from making any public statements on their promises for fear that his own credibility would be further eroded by the failure of the regime to carry them out.

At the same time, the opposition is not entirely free from blame for the quagmire either. The political parties' dogged insistence for the junta to uphold its earlier promise of multi-party democracy and to honour the 1990 election results (which saw the NLD win 80 percent of all seats) has ruled out any meaningful discussion on power-sharing arrangements. These were some of the underlying tensions that set the stage for the NLD boycott of the National Convention in 1996, and also its withdrawal from joining the resumed talks last month.

The uncompromising approach by the NLD leaders has clearly frustrated the UN. In an interview with the Washington Post last year, envoy Razali said "both sides" were responsible for the stalled negotiations on national reconciliation.

Razali criticised sections of the SPDC for finding him "inconvenient" but he also said that Suu Kyi was "very difficult" and had not done her part to "charm the generals".

On another occasion, the envoy made a clear departure from the position of the Burmese opposition by suggesting workable models of government which include a political role for the military. He cited Turkey and China as examples.

The NLD's reluctance to have the role of the military written into the constitution is understandable but by hanging on to the 1990 election results, it is also creating an untenable situation for the man-on-the-street who continues to suffer the direct consequences of living in a pariah dictatorship.

UN Sanctions

With matters as they stand, Burma's future seems increasingly shaky. The SPDC is well aware that the country faces a larger potential threat. Fed up with what they consider as sham moves, Burmese activists have been furiously lobbying American policy-makers to raise the issue of UN sanctions against Burma at the Security Council.

Such calls already receive the backing of segments of the United States Senate. One virulent critic of the junta, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, was instrumental in getting import bans on Burma passed last year with an overwhelming 97-to-1 vote.

Although Burma is still fairly assured of Chinese support in the Security Council to block moves by the Americans to bring the issue of sanctions to vote, this may become less certain with time as Beijing starts to distance itself from problematic regimes. Should UN sanctions be imposed, it would deal a fatal blow to Burma's teetering economy.

At this juncture, rather than offer comfort to the junta, Asean governments should step up the pressure on Rangoon to institute real reforms. Failure to do so could only be detrimental to regional interests in the longer term.

YAP MUN CHING, a former malaysiakini journalist, is currently pursuing further studies in the United Kingdom.