Police investigations into the role of local company Scope in the nuclear black market revealed the secretive steps taken by a foreign consultant, hired to provide expert advice on how to manufacture the components, in covering his tracks.

The police, in a special 12-page investigation report released today, outlined the extent to which Swiss citizen Urs Friedrich Tinner went about in keeping his activities away from the prying eyes of Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd (Scope) staff.

The police quoted Scope staff as saying that Tinner would never leave his drawings and plans at the office and had the habit of taking them away with him. He even removed his computer hardware at the end of his service.

"He was seen by Scope staff as carrying out his duties with care and would always take back his component drawings once a component was finished," said the report.

Tinner had apparently told the staff that his careful attitude was to safeguard trade secrets.

"Many Scope staff also said that Tinner would erase all technical drawings that were kept in the computer at the Scope factory.

"In October 2003, Tinner ended his term of service at the Scope factory and just before this, is said to have taken the hard disc of the company's computer that was designated for his use," added the report.

No trace

The police said that Tinner also removed his personal file from the company's records, giving the impression that he did not wish to leave any trace of his presence there.

"He wanted to ensure that the technical drawings did not fall into the hands of Scope factory staff."

The police said that Tinner was sent to Scope by middleman BSA Tahir sometime in 2001 as a consultant to give expert advice on how to manufacture components for petroleum and gas. He was made a full-time technical consultant to Scope in April 2002.

The police said Tinner's responsibility was to import and set up the necessary machines, which he bought from a company in Switzerland owned by his father Friedrich, and brother Marco. He also obtained various other machines for that purpose.

Earlier in 2001, Tahir had entered into a business partnership with a listed oil-and-engineering company Scomi, controlled by Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's son Kamaluddin , to produce these components for Gulf Technical Industries LLC (GTI) in Dubai.

Scope was specifically set up as a result of this RM13 million venture.

It was reported in the New York Times early this week that Tahir had forged a friendship with Kamaluddin in the mid-1990s and subsequently acquired a stake in Scomi through his Malaysian wife. She has since given up her stake.

Tahir is now embroiled in an international nuclear trafficking scandal after he was identified as a major operative for Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who confessed to illicitly selling nuclear know-how and hardware to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

Scope's role in the nuclear trafficking came to light when European intelligence officials intercepted a Libya-bound ship last October and seized five containers that contained centrifuge parts packed in boxes carrying the name Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd.

Legitimate deal

While the Malaysian police have questioned Tahir, who holds a permanent residence status in Malaysia, on his role in the nuclear trafficking racket, his whereabout is still unknown.

The police investigation report states that Tahir was aware of the real purpose for the components, but cleared Scope of any wrongdoing.

"The management of Scope was unaware that the exported components were part of a certain centrifuge unit for Libya. They considered it a legitimate business deal."

The police said that to the untrained eye, such components would not raise any concern as they were similar to components that could be used by the "petro-chemical industry and water treatment and other industries".

The police said that the work carried out by Scope involved non-controlled items and that both Tahir and Tinner had not declared the use of these components or the true nature of the business to Scope.

"Moreover, the components that were confiscated cannot be used as one complete unit of centrifuge... To build one centrifuge unit, a number of sophisticated components are needed and Scope only prepared 12 types of component."

The police said that no local factories have the know-how to manufacture a complete centrifuge unit, what more, the construction of hundreds of centrifuges.

European connection

The police also revealed that the raw materials for the making of the components were obtained from a German subsidiary company - Bikar Metal Pvt Ltd - in Singapore.

"A total of 300 metric tons of aluminium grade 6061 and 6082 were bought in the form of round bars or round tubes... these materials are not controlled items.

"Therefore Tinner recommended the purchase and this did not give rise to any concern or suspicion among the Scope staff," said the police.

The police said that they will submit their full report to the Malaysian nuclear agency so that it can be forwarded to the International Atomic Energy Agency for further investigations into the involvement of Tinner and several other individuals from Europe.