Suppose that two owners of refreshment stands, Jane and Oliver, are trying to decide where to locate along a stretch of a road. Imagine there are three points along the road, with point A at the left end, point C at the right end, and point B in between A and C. There are 100 customers located at even intervals along this road from point A to C, and a customer will buy only from the closest vendor.

Imagine that initially Jane locates at point A while Oliver at point C. This would minimise customers' average travelling costs and would result in each vendor getting one half of the business.

However, if Jane moves from point A on the left to point B in the middle, she would keep all customers to her left, and get some of Oliver's customers. To compete, Oliver would also want to move towards point B in the centre, so that he can keep the customers to his right, while not losing the customers who are at the centre to Jane. Thus, in order to gain the most customers, both vendors would eventually locate together in the middle.

This story is an example of a model developed half a century ago by Harold Hotelling, and is called Hotelling's model. Though it can give some insights into businesses' decisions concerning location and product characteristics, the model is equally useful in explaining certain political phenomena.

Instead of two refreshment stands along a road trying to attract dollars from customers, consider two political parties along the political spectrum from left-wing to right-wing trying to attract votes from voters. Only the party which attracts the most votes will win, and a party must locate or identify itself as being nearer to more voters than its opponent to attract votes. With these rules, there is a strong tendency for each party to move to the middle - where they are more likely to get more votes.

In short, in order to gain the most votes, the parties would try to locate themselves somewhere in the middle-ground, with the hope that they will garner more votes by 'stealing' more votes from the opponent. Since both of them locate to the middle, they eventually minimise the differences between themselves.

Personality war

After the Anwar Ibrahim debacle in 1998, the Barisan Alternatif went all out to hunt Dr Mahathir Mohamad's head. They created names for him - Mahafiraun, Mahazalim, etc etc. They exposed his long list of corruption. They exposed who's who in Mahathir's list of cronies. They did everything they could to defame him.

Mahathir eventually stepped down and handed over the premiership to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Mahathir stepped down with a bruise. His image was damaged. People do not trust him as much. And when he cried on stage, the Malaysian public did not cry with him.

Mahathir's departure created a big headache for the opposition. Now that the hunted head is no more, what should the opposition do? They can no longer continue the hunt and the character assassination as the target no longer existed. What's worse, the subsequent PM is squeaky clean. He was even dubbed as 'Mr Clean'

The outcome? The opposition lost massively in the 2004 general election.

That was the result when political fights were conducted on the basis of personalities or issues rather than ideologies. When you fight on the basis of personalities or issues (e g: Mahathir is corrupt, Mahathir makes his cronies rich, Mahathir is un-Islamic), you will land yourself into trouble when the issue is seen as no longer relevant. When you hunt for Mahathir's head, you may eventually 'get' his 'head' when he resigns. But does that benefit the party? Suddenly Malaysia now has Pak Lah in Mahathir's place. You don't get a change of party. You only get a change of personality or a resolution of the problem, but from the same pile of rubbish.

Fighting the political war on the basis of personality or issues did not bring benefit to the opposition. The opposition did not gain anything. They lose out. In fact, they landed in deeper trouble now that Pak Lah is seen as 'more clean' than Mahathir. Benefit of such strategy to the opposition is miniscule.

But the Malaysian opposition tried to fight on. Once again, they tried to fight Pak Lah on the basis of personality, similar to what they did with Mahathir. They tried to expose Pak Lah's shortcomings. They challenged Pak Lah about the Anwar saga. They declared that Pak Lah is not as clean as claimed. Pak Lah's hands are dirty too because he did not free Anwar.

What happened next? Anwar was unexpectedly released. And once again, the opposition lost out. Their call was answered and Anwar is now a free man. The opposition tried to "play the issue" and when it was answered, the opposition did not get any benefits (apart from Anwar who ended up a free man). On the other hand, Pak Lah's image was boosted when he bravely answered the opposition's call.

What next? Will the opposition continue to fight on the basis of personalities and issues? Will they learn from past experience?

BN's rules

It seems that Barisan Nasional (BN) is now winning the personality fight. Feeling more confident, BN is creating a personality war of their own, and at the same time dictating the rules of the game. They created a negative image for PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang. They created another negative image for PAS deputy president Hasan Shukri. And PAS has to fight this personality-war like never before. For the last 20-odd years, PAS has been on the offensive in this personality war. All the times, Mahathir was there to be attacked. But this is no more. The rules of the game have changed and PAS has fewer issues to stay on the offensive. PAS now has to be on the defensive and what's worse, PAS can no longer dictate the rules. BN has taken over that role.

Does PAS have enough experience to be on the defensive now? Is PAS ready to play by Umno's rules?

If PAS falls for the game, and unwittingly play the personality war by BN's rules, I fear that at the end, it is PAS that will lose out. BN has all the strength to fight the personality war. They have the money, the media is on their side, and they blatantly abuse the government machinery. PAS cannot win this war for PAS has no weapons. PAS doesn't even have enough issues to raise.

Moving to the middle

PAS was established on the basis of an ideology. It is not merely a political party, but it is an Islamic movement exploiting the benefits of democracy. Islamic political system is PAS' unique selling point (USP). This is the factor that differentiates PAS from others. If PAS was to forget this, BN will surely benefit.

But, looking at current trends, there is shift towards the middle ground. The middle ground in this case is what many would call 'moderate' Islam. I personally do not know what 'moderate' Islam is. As far as I am concerned, Islam is already moderate. Islam is the middle-way. How can you make something that is already moderate, more moderate? Islam, practised in its totality, is the moderate way.

But, for the benefit of the argument, let us assume that 'moderate' Islam exists. It seems that PAS is moving towards this direction the middle ground.

Umno now wants to be seen as Islamic. They created the terms Islam Hadhari. This 'concept' is, unfortunately, believed by many Malaysians. Thus, Umno is also shifting towards the middle. It is also moving towards a point where they want to be seen as the proponents of moderate Islam.

The only difference between PAS and Umno is the starting point. While Umno moves to the middle by becoming more Islamic and leaving their assabiyyah origin, PAS comes to the middle by 'softening' their stance on the Islamic state issue and leaving aside their 'hard-line' image. They are both heading towards the same direction. Both want to be seen as moderate.

As both parties move more and more towards the same middle-ground, they are increasingly seen as calling for the same agenda. PAS calls for an end to corruption. So does Umno. PAS calls for the implementation of Islamic Syariah. Umno says they are already doing that and Malaysia has been declared as an Islamic country. Umno wants to get closer to youths. PAS Youth and Muslimat wings declared that they are doing that too. And many more.

Hotelling's revenge

What PAS has to remember is, as they move more and more towards the middle, some supporters will feel left out.

Look back at Hotelling's stretch of road. If vendor C (Oliver) moves too far towards the middle, some of his customers at position C will feel that the new location is too far for them. They will leave Oliver. They may search for a new, nearby vendor. Or they may even create a new shop to replace Oliver's. This is what I call 'Hotelling's revenge'.

The same has happened to PAS. When PAS tried moving to the middle ground and cooperated with Semangat 46, some of PAS' supporters left and started a new party called Al-Islah. For these people, PAS shifted too far and they can no longer follow the drift.

Now, when certain quarters in PAS want to bring PAS even closer to the middle ground - moderate Islam - another group started voicing out their dissatisfaction. This group is labelled as the 'older generation' by certain media. Some even went as far as calling them the ulama (religious scholars) in PAS. I do not agree with both terminologies but let us not argue about terminologies here.

And, surprise, surprise, BN is exploiting this to the max. They highlight the differences everywhere and every time. PAS' image is severely dented. Where does it now stand in terms of the Islamic state? Was it a mistake to release the Islamic state document without careful preparation?

Since both are moving towards the same, middle direction, is Umno now an 'Islamic party' too? Why should anyone vote for PAS, now that Mahathir - who was the focus of PAS attacks for the last 20-odd years - is no longer in power? How should PAS respond when the non-Muslims say that a vote for any opposition candidate is a vote for a Taliban-style rule? Add this to the debacle of Kohilal and Kosis - which is being played by BN as an analogy of how PAS would manage Malaysia's economy - PAS has a very difficult war to fight.

There is a big dilemma. Going back to Hotelling's model, if PAS was to stay at the same place, they will fail to garner votes from those in the middle. And they will not be able to steal votes from Umno supporters with Islamic inclinations.

Move too far to the middle, and they risk losing hard-core supporters. What's worse, if the shift to the middle is too abrupt, PAS would then enter a new ground in which they have to fight Umno on the basis of 'who is more moderate', not 'who is more Islamic'.

Is PAS ready to play according to this new scenario? Is PAS ready to face Hotelling's revenge?

WAN SAIFUL WAN JAN is currently conducting research in business ethics, with a particular focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR), at Middlesex University Business School, London. His main interests are philosophy of management, business ethics, and politics - particularly the dynamics of British and Malaysian politics. In terms of political positioning, he is still undecided whether he is on the centre-left or centre-right, although he believes that he definitely belongs somewehere at the "centre". He can be reached at wansaiful@gmail.com.