COMMENT One of my colleagues used to paint the rocket green to show solidarity and eagerness to work with PAS. But now he is so upset with PAS that he looks as if he is going to spit on anyone he comes across who even mentions the name of PAS.

I could tell he feels betrayed, awfully betrayed by PAS for his relentless effort to help PAS to get away from its extremist Islamic image among the non-Malays in a noble attempt to see more democratic changes in the country.

Many of us tried all we could, not only to help PAS get out of its usual role in the Malay Muslim-dominated East Coast states to other parts of the country, especially the more multicultural West Coast states of the peninsula.

It is just how the Kelantan PAS government’s relentless effort to amend its Syariah Criminal Code with its hidden agenda to form an Islamic state has turned off its most loyal supporters and comrades within Pakatan Rakyat.

A Private Member’s Bill is also being brought by its president to Parliament to amend Section 2 of the Syariah Court  (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 to extend  the criminal jurisdiction of the syariah court in order to make the Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code effective.

Many feel that it is a betrayal of Pakatan’s common platform, by which common working grounds were laid down for all component parties. The common platform is a matter of give-and-take, whereas the Federal Constitution has to be the basis for reforms.

Working with Umno in response to its urging of “satu bangsa, satu agama” (One race, one religion) to get hudud implemented has not only caused a split between the Muslims and the non-Muslims, but more worryingly, it potentially splits the Muslims, by-and-large, as well.

It has diverted the general public’s attention from more pressing and realistic issues, such as the goods and services tax (GST), rising costs of living, rapidly depreciating ringgit, the sagging economic development and protection of human rights as reflected in the passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, poverty and  environmental degradation.

The 12th general election (GE12) of 2008 brought the opposition parties a surprise victory in four states and gave rise to the birth of Pakatan Rakyat, a loose coalition, nonetheless, but bound by a comprehensive common platform.

The birth of Pakatan was actually mandated by the rakyat in an incidental way. It seemed to have brought a new light of hope in Malaysian bipartisan politics and a healthier parliamentary democracy.

The birth of Pakatan was not only incidental but a necessity of modern Malaysian nation-building.

More similarities than differences

Despite there being some differences among the three component parties of Pakatan, there are more similarities among them if the common policy framework in the Buku Jingga is strongly adhered to by all.

The Buku Jingga, or the Pakatan Rakyat Common Platform, is one of the most influential and successful political documents in history that provides a new Malaysian way forward.

Closing the gaps between the component parties and providing a formidable force for the ruling Barisan Nasional to reckon with has been the aspirations for not only those in the opposition  but also the inspiration that many Malaysians have longed for.

Nonetheless, Pakatan’s failure to wrest power in Putrajaya during GE13, despite its slight advantage in popular votes, has actually brought about an identity crisis among the component parties. Pakatan maintains its power in Selangor, Kelantan and Penang but lost the Kedah government.

Many blamed Pakatan’s failure in retaining the Kedah government on its failure to impose more Islamic laws, without referring back to the one-term Terengganu PAS government between 1999 and 2004, which had a more enthusiastic approach to making an Islamic government than improving efficiency of governance.

In the midst of the recent major floods, prominent Kelantan PAS government figures had blamed the disaster as a punishment for its failure to impose hudud.

Needless to mention the fears of the non-Muslims and a sense of betrayal by PAS for its insistence in pursuing hudud, do the majority of Malays actually condone PAS’ insistence on hudud and Islamic laws?

Will PAS destroy itself or progress to be a pan-Malaysian party by championing Islamic fundamentalism? Especially in times of international upsurge of Islamic movements, how would the ordinary Malay ground respond to that, and PAS’ fundamental Islamic stance?

If PAS loses its government in Kelantan in the next GE, as had happened in Kedah and Terengganu, will it blame this on opposition from “the others” to the imposition of hudud once again?

The tragedy about PAS is that it has never learnt from the past and stayed aloof even on the general culture and sentiments of Malay Muslims. In the aftermath of the 9-11 incident, PAS and all other opposition parties lost badly in the 2004 GE. The Sept 11 incident of 2001 should have aroused an Islamic awakening among the Malay Muslims who were expected to throw their support to a more fundamentalist Islamist PAS.

But it went the other way around, where Malay Muslims felt more comfortable with the establishment that they were familiar with.

In times of identity crisis, the Malay masses are utterly more pro-establishment, by which they tend to maintain their determination to preserve the status quo - that is, their faith, culture, language, relatively comfortable socio-economic status and the Malay royal institution which still has great influence over religious matters.   

Even though there is a small niche of Malay Muslims who would be sympathetic towards the fundamentalist stance of PAS, the support is largely restricted to the East Coast states.

The top PAS leadership might be aware of this, but it decides to remain as a regional political force by championing a cause that is confined to a small niche for its own internal power struggles than external reasons.

Stay regional or become pan-Malaysian?

Nonetheless, expanding its wings nationwide means PAS  has to formulate policies that are well-accepted by Malay Muslims beyond its traditional East Coast fortresses, but it also needs to appeal to the non-Malay electorate. It is not prepared to expand its power base from the East Coast to the more populous West Coast and the rest of the country, for this could even cause the conservatives in the party to lose their grip on power to the new rising ideologues.

Expanding its power base to many west coast States also means that the conservatives from the east coast would lose its grip on the power within the party. It  is hard to see conservatives letting go of power at this moment in order to further PAS’ expansion of its political influence beyond religious rhetoric.

The passing of the Syariah Criminal Code Enactment (Amendment) by the Kelatan state assembly is nothing more than appeasing that rhetoric in an attempt to consolidate its power base, while risking losing its newly-conquered grounds in other states such as Selangor and Johor.

The current uproar of PAS conservatives by blaming the less-than-satisfactory GE performance of their party on Pakatan and DAP, especially for losing power in Kedah, is merely a way to camouflage their own weaknesses and worries of losing their grip on power at the expense of the coalition.

Unfortunately, PAS’ incumbent leadership has diverted its leadership crisis to an issue such as the Syariah Criminal Code Enactment in Kelantan, risking the eventual break up of Pakatan by also purportedly ignoring its recent new political inroads in the West Coast and down to Umno’s fortress of Johor.

The present PAS leadership has destroyed what its grassroots have worked and hoped for. The grassroots inspirations were transpired through Pakatan but will its grassroots decide to pick a Pro-Pakatan leadership, or a leadership that bites the hand that feeds them? Or will they decide to retain the status quo? It is an answer for the PAS members to work on.

How PAS progressed with a multiracial outlook

PAS has made substantial inroads beyond its traditional East Coast fortresses that was not contributed by its fundamentalism but instead by its efforts to portray a more pragmatic and inclusive image, including championing a welfare state rather than an Islamic state, setting up a non-Muslim wing and standing up for the rights of all Malaysians.

Nonetheless, its recent backtracks on these progressive efforts have caused a bigger setback for the party than before the GE11 of 2004. Even if all could explain to the non-Muslims that it is legally and technically impossible to push through hudud, PAS has lost all the trust and good wishes showered upon it during the GE13. For the non-Muslims, it is an irreversible betrayal of trust, confidence and brotherhood.

It is perhaps right to say that the present PAS leadership is repeating the similar mistake made before GE12 by the Umno leadership, who raised the keris in an extremely inflammatory way to unnecessarily arouse minority ethnic discontents towards the powers-that-be within Umno. PAS now champions religious fundamentalism in place of Umno’s once ultra-nationalism.

Is PAS’ intention to replace Umno’s Malay supremacy claim with Islamic supremacy more morally right?

In Malaysia, race is religion, and religion is race. PAS tries to portray itself only as a substitute for Umno’s Malay supremacy with another form of religious supremacy that is equally questionable of its morality.

Religious supremacy further polarises Malaysians along not only racial lines but also religious lines. It also polarises and splits the Muslims by-and-large by shaking the very basic constitutional foundation of this nation - Islam is the official religion while civil law and criminal law are, by-and-large, secular to suit the demands of a multi-racial and multi-religious society.

What does secularism mean?

Secularism is not a vulgar term. Secularism does not antagonise freedom of religion but denies any form of ideological and religious supremacy. It means that the state has to remain ideologically neutral in a democratic society. In a democratic country, the constitution shall not profess ideological, religious or racial supremacy like the former communist bloc and apartheid regimes.

Even though both have contrasting ideology of extreme left wing and right wing authoritarian states, ideological supremacy in any form cannot be the basis for a democratic government.

Malaysia is a Muslim majority but multiracial, multicultural country. Islam being the official religion is meant for official ceremonial purposes, notwithstanding the fact that Malaysia is a multi-religious, multiracial and multicultural, Muslim-majority society such that maintaining peace and delivering non-racial, non-religious equality will continue to remain a challenge.

Once upon a time the left wing socialists failed to become a dominant political force for championing pro-Sukarno or pro-Mao Zedong ideologies due to the failure to appreciate the unique multicultural populace and its sensitivity. Likewise, will overzealous attempts to mimic what has transpired in the Middle East and North Africa actually cause a backlash?

Forcibly trying to implement something that is alien to Malaysian culture has been proven to have failied. But have PAS, Umno or all of us, as a matter of fact, learnt from the mistakes we made in the past?

DR BOO CHENG HAU is Johor opposition leader and DAP's Skudai state assemblyperson.