Twelve years ago, o­n the eve of the first Gulf War, I was a student at the University of Sussex in Southern England. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 sparked off what has been regarded as the biggest media war ever fought in the history of the human race. The American establishment declared that the Iraqi invasion was a gross violation of human rights and the national sovereignty of Kuwait - which was then a firm ally of the United States.

President George Bush declared that the forces of the free world had to unite in order to counter the threat of an expansionist Iraq, which boasted of having the fourth largest army in the world.

In response to this threat, the United States (which had an army even bigger than Iraq's) orchestrated a concert of nations that led to the formation of an American-led alliance whose aim was to expel Iraq's

invading forces from Kuwait, liberate their ally and re-establish the lines of communication that kept the world's oil supply flowing towards the free world. (The often-repeated claim that the people of Kuwait would also be liberated from the undemocratic rule of their royal masters was deferred indefinitely.)

Then, as now, the main actors o­n the stage of world politics were the same: The US was led by a war mongering hawk whose knowledge of global politics and basic geography was next to nothing; Iraq was

under the dictatorial rule of a despot armed with the same moustache as Mr. Wilson from the comic strip 'Dennis the Menace'; and Britain was led by a lifeless cardboard character whose o­nly claim to fame was being the lapdog of his master in Washington.

But not everything was the same though. The stance of the rest of the countries in the world was markedly different. France was then far more aggressive in its foreign policy and it should be remembered that troops from the French Foreign Legion were among the first to enter Baghdad when the Iraqi lines broke. Germany was not allowed to say very much, the stigma of its own military past being evoked to keep it in line. Both Japan and Germany were sideline players who were instead expected to pay up the costs of the war instead.

In tight spot

The Malaysian government found itself in a tight spot as a result of its own political success o­n the international scene. The fact that Malaysia was a member of the UN Security Council meant that it was obliged to cast its vote with the prevailing current of popular opinion in the UN. This was not the case with other Muslim countries that had a lower international profile. The government of Jordan, for instance, was able to condemn the US-led military action against Iraq openly and without reservation, a move that effectively took the wind out of the sails of the Jordanian Islamist opposition movements and parties like the Ikhwan.

Malaysia then supported the military effort o­n the grounds that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a direct attack o­n a sovereign state and this compromised the sacred principle of national sovereignty upon which institutions like the UN were based. Saddam's case was impossible to defend, though nonetheless the US-led invasion of Iraq was seen by many as an attack o­n Arabs, Muslims and by extension Islam itself.

The Gulf War, as it came to be known also marked a turning point in the relationship between the West and the Muslim world. Throughout the Muslim world, popular sympathy and support was showered o­n Saddam Hussein and the people of Iraq, o­n the grounds that he was a Muslim leader and that a Muslim country was being attacked by a coalition of infidel states led by a Western superpower.

Worse still, the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, long regarded as the holy land of Islam, infuriated Islamist organisations and movements all over the world. In time, not o­nly were the Americans the targets of Muslim anger, but so were the governments of the Arab states and Saudi Arabia in particular. The Jama at-e Islami of Pakistan, for example, condemned the leaders of Saudi Arabia for allowing American troops to be based in the country. As a result the Saudis promptly stopped channeling financial support to the

Pakistani Islamist organisation that had for years been o­ne of the principal benefactors of Saudi aid to the country.

So strong were these anti-American and pro-Iraqi feelings then that Malaysia and many other Muslim countries were swept by 'Saddam Fever'.

Upon my return to Kuala Lumpur I found the capital city swimming in Saddam T-shirts, posters, stickers and calendars. (Till today I regret the fact that I never purchased any of this memorabilia - I've been looking for the stuff o­n ebay, but so far no luck.) Some Malay parents even named their sons 'Saddam' or, worse still, 'SCUD'. Just what has happened to these unfortunate 'Saddam Abdullahs' and 'SCUD Muhammads' no-one knows, but o­ne of the few tender mercies of Patriachy is that it does not produce female militarist despots whose reputations and popularity will blight the lives of young girls forever.

'They are killing us, they are killing us...'

For me the first Gulf War was a major turning point in my life. Being a Malaysian student abroad meant that I was free to not o­nly study politics but also engage in it. I joined many student movements and NGOs, and by the time the war began I was already involved in the work of numerous human rights NGOs, environmental

groups and had my share of tear gas after more than o­ne demonstration against Fascists and Racists.

But the Gulf War opened my eyes to something that I had hitherto noticed o­nly in passing: The growing power and ambition of the United States, fresh from its victory in the Cold War and already claiming that the 'Vietnam syndrome' was a thing of the past. Like thousands of others the world over, I was appalled and disgusted to hear the speeches of men like George Bush or the lipless John Major.

It seemed as if the American-British 'special relationship' that crystalised during the Thatcher-Reagan era had mutated into some kind of unholy alliance bent o­n recolonising the world at whatever cost.

The reaction of my Muslim friends was even more interesting: They spoke of a war against Muslims and Islam, and how the West was bent o­n revisiting the Crusades all over again. Suddenly what was to me a

straightforward war for oil and natural resources was transformed into a epic moral struggle complete with its transcendental vocabulary of absolutes.

This fact was driven home to me when I received a call in my flat in England from my mother, the exact moment when the Americans began launching their missiles and rockets against the Iraqi positions.

Her voice was torn with sobs and tears, and she broke down crying: "Can you see what they are doing? They are killing us, they are killing us..."

For my mother (and remember for every Muslim there has to be at least o­ne Muslim mother at least) and millions of others, this was not a war between a Western power and an Arab state. It was not a war ordered and planned by a government backed up by economic agents and actors against another set of political agents and actors. This was, for her and millions of others, an attack o­n Islam and Muslims.

I was stunned by her reaction, and the following day I was moved by the reaction of the other Muslims I met. The Muslim world had been united by this affront o­n their collective pride and dignity. They knew Saddam was a tyrant and a despot, and most of them would not care very much if the man was toppled by his own people. But here was a case of a Western superpower using every weapon in its arsenal to blast a country of less than twenty million souls back to the dark ages.

There are times when a political scientist like myself cannot make sense of politics and cannot predict the outcome of events. (In any case, political scientists should not dabble in fortune telling.) But politics - fine art that it is - is nonetheless hostage to variable factors that remain unpredictable and beyond calculation. Emotions and religious commitment is o­ne of them.

Martyrdom again

In Malaysia, the Gulf War ignited a debate about the future of Islam and the trajectory of the Islamist project. With Malay-Muslim sympathy clearly moving in the direction of Saddam's regime, criticism of the Malaysian government's stance came from all quarters: The leaders of PAS, Semangat 46 and Darul Arqam insisted that solidarity among Muslims and the unity of the Muslim Ummah should come before the needs of realpolitik.

The leader of the Darul Arqam movement, Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, even went as far as claiming that any Muslim leader who took sides with the West was a munafik and a treacherous enemy of Islam and the Muslim Ummah as a whole. In his book Perjuangan Teluk: Islam Akan Kembali Gemilang (The Gulf War: Islam Shall Re-emerge Triumphant), Ustaz Ashaari predicted that the American-led international force against Saddam Hussein would be defeated and that the conflict would result in the victory for Saddam Hussein.

For him Saddam was a Muslim hero and his defeat would spell the defeat of Islam and Muslims as a whole. Here was a case of an external variable having a direct impact o­n domestic politics.

Saddam, ironically, was transformed overnight into a hero and martyr for Islamists the world over. Since then we have witnessed the rise of dozens of others - from Mullah Omar of the Taliban to Osama ben Laden of the al-Qaeda. The monochromatic logic of the hawks in Washington has left no middle ground where moderate progressive Islam can emerge; and instead the US government continues with its aggressive expansionist foreign policies heedless to the warnings of the world.

I witnessed the birth of a whole generation of Muslim radicals thanks to the clueless warmongering of George Bush Senior and his minion John Major. Today, living as we do in a world populated by the likes of Osama and Mullah Omar, a new generation of frustrated, angry and helpless Muslims awaits their calling.

Nobody can predict what will happen in the years to come, but o­ne thing is for sure.American foreign policy over the past decade has isolated and alienated it from the rest of the planet and the costs will not be long in coming. Unfortunately, it is the rest of the world that will have to pay the bill.

Endnotes:

1) Trying to walk the middle path the government of Malaysia called for a negotiated settlement of the conflict and argued that it was the UN, and not the United States, that should play the leading role in the resolution of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. (See: Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. ISEAS and Routledge press, London and Singapore. 1997. Pg. 245.)

But these appeals fell upon deaf ears, as a significant section of the Malay-Muslim constituency had already been won over by the arguments of the Islamist camp, who argued that territoriality and nationalism were concepts alien to Islam and the Islamic way of life. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein had managed to score a coup against his detractors by claiming that the US-led campaign against Iraq was part of larger crusade against Islam and Muslims in general.

2) See: Ustaz Haji Ashaari Muhammad, Perjuangan Teluk: Islam Akan Kembali Gemilang. Jabatan Sheikhul Arqam, Kuala Lumpur. 1991.