The complaint in the run-up to the 11th general election of alliances between politicians in power and businesses is not a mere electoral grievance. It is a grievance of governance in general.

A handful of prosecutions is a good start but it should not be the be-all and end-all in the eradication of graft.

In the book, Political Dimensions of the Asian Crisis (2000), Uwe Johannen ( The Political Causes of the Asian Crisis ), notes that, "A vicious circle exists between weak democratic institutions and structures and corruption."

Editors Johannen, Gomez and Rudolph conclude from the contributions of scholars and human rights defenders in the book, that political reform is needed in several areas to combat corruption at all levels. These reforms must address the following: (1) electoral systems, (2) a separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, (3) protection of civil and human rights, (4) support of an effective civil society, (5) free media and (6) civil-military relations.

The editors observe that in most post-colonial Asian regimes, political elites have sold entire electorates the idea that political development had to be compromised for economic development.

"This allowed many governments in the region to exercise central authority and to enter all sectors of the economy, society and politics. Amazing growth rates or 'performance legitimacy' of authoritarian regimes legitimised central state authority as necessary for economic development". The emerging middle class by the 80s and 90s had become entirely dependent on the political authority for material benefits. It did not act as a counterforce nor question the centralisation of power.

Asian values

Economic prosperity did not encourage democratisation as assured by the ruling elite-peddlers of 'Asian values'. Scholars predict that to prevent future crisis, economic performance is not enough. The crisis economies would have to strengthen or further strengthen its institutions and deepen reforms.

Although democracy does not guarantee lack of corruption, non-democratic governance allows for high levels of corruption.

WA Callahan in Political Corruption in Southeast Asia , (in the book, Party Finance and Political Corruption , R. Williams (ed). 2000), echoes similar sentiments. The Asian values "a k a crony capitalism", dubbed as the secret of the region's success has backfired. "Corruption has gone too far: citizens were disillusioned with parliamentary democracy."

Referring in parts to writings by Rodan, Crouch, Jomo KS and ET Gomez, Callahan, states that Umno owns a wide portfolio of assets, "at times raising campaign funds from manipulating the stock market". Umno is capable of doing this as political power allows its "politico-business" people to generate income from business.

The well entrenched ruling elite relies on control of state power to "guarantee their re-election". Ruling parties can manipulate the election through official channels and reproduce their power on a regular basis. There is an "elite hegemony".

Electoral corruption

Callahan makes the argument that as the rule of law in Malaysia is a tool that the state uses to restrict activity in civil society, a legal concept of corruption does not help us in our understanding of the politics of corruption.

Corruption is more than the legal transgressions of taking or giving bribes and paybacks. Callahan suggests that we must re-define corruption to encompass a broader moral sense.

Transactions are corrupt because they avoided the democratic process, which is not to be regarded simply as the institutional formalities of politics but as embodying major values such as representation, accountability, open debate and equality. In this light, electoral corruption includes the manipulation of the electoral process through political co-optation, gerrymandering and selective coercion.

Where there is elite hegemony, running a campaign from outside the ruling party becomes difficult. Even if voters consider opposition candidates, there would be "political recession", where that constituency suffers a cut in public services and development funds. Parliamentary elections in Malaysia constitute a stunted political expression and not the end product of broad contests over social and political power.

Again as with previous authors, Callahan thinks that genuine reform efforts should encourage broader political competition and the opening of more routine lines of accountability and access to elites, "remaking them into public servants."

He also cites the work of M Johnston (1997), whose recommendation include the enhancement of independence of the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the press from the entrenched elites as well as promoting competitive elections and nurturing a stronger civil society.

Moral health

In April 2002 members of the opposition met with the Election Commission to request the setting up of a register of political campaign donations as first step in the scrutiny of campaign financing. This did not materialise.

Party finance is a wider term than campaign financing. However the element of corruption may prevail in both.

Political competition requires resources and the issue of how political parties acquire and use money is central to understanding the relationship of the party system to the wider political system. The important challenge is the search of a model of party finance that reconciles party building, competition and campaigning with the need to minimise corruption of the electoral and policy processes.

Researchers on the subject say that there is no hard and fast rule. There is only a need to balance competing claims and that is a matter for political judgement, cultural traditions and local circumstances.

There is a general consensus that where governance is weak, enforcement takes a back seat. In the absence of enforcement, the opportunities for corruption multiply.

The Barisan Nasional government having been in power since independence, have devised political arrangements which impede the ability of opposition parties to compete effectively. Adequate party finance is not a problem for the ruling elite.

In such a situation of elite hegemony it would appear to be quite futile to limit our understanding of corruption to legally inspired meanings or to understand democracy to mean only electoral politics.

Where ruling elites are so entrenched, corruption should mean the broader moral kind in which the moral health of the body politic is at issue.

Note on References

H. Crouch (1993), ' Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic' in Kevin Hewison et.al (eds), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

E.T.Gomez (1997), Electoral Funding of General, State and Party Elections in Malaysia, Journal of Contemporary Asia 26:1

Jomo K.S. (1997), "Elections' Janus Face: Limitations and Potential in Malaysia" in R.H. Taylor (ed), The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

M. Johnston (1996), The Search for Definitions: the Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption, International Social Science Journal, 149 Sept.

G. Rodan (1996), Political Opposition in Industralizing Asia, London: Routledge.