Traditional Islamic law dating from the 7th century, does not accord equal rights to dhimmis. All non-Muslims are classified as dhimmis - the 'protected minorities' in a Muslim majority territory.

The Ottoman Hatti-Sherif (1839) which first introduced the nationalist idea of a community whose members share the same political identity and the liberal idea of civil and political rights was not well received.

Sustained opposition to reforms came from an intellectual group in the 1860s known as the New Ottomans. A leading figure of this opposition is reformer-poet Namik Kemal (1840-88). The 'reforming Pashas of the Tanzimat' were accused of merely aping Europe. The Gulhane Rescript was seen as a concession to European powers and an abandonment of the Syariah.

In leveling their accusations, the New Ottomans were however themselves inspired by the French revolution ideas on liberty. They were beneficiaries of the Tanzimat (organisational reforms from 1839-1876) with many of their members, European educated.

The middle of the 19th century saw the emerging of the New Imperialism which was generated and sustained by the Industrial Revolution. It was not enough to import from Europe the latest technologies. The New Ottoman reformers insist that reforms also keep faith to the heritage of Islam.

However, the ideology for reform had a variety of contradictory discourses on European reform and the Ottoman polity, and collective identity and nationalism.

Predicated on politics of empire

The discourse on collective identity in that formative period was predictably predicated on the politics of empire: the historical achievement of Islamic civilisation, the innate superiority of the Islamic message and patriarchy. The Ottoman empire originated as a ghazi or conqueror state, in the same manner in which other dynasties were founded in the Middle East by nomadic warriors.

Thus, at times, Islamic identity reinforced Ottoman reformism-the sultan as patriarch of a large family who protects all Muslims and non-Muslims in his domain. In their discussion on a constitutional government, the New Ottomans would impose a system of accountability to ensure the survival of an Ottoman 'Islamic state'.

They questioned the grand vizerate of Ali and Fuat Pasha (between 1856 and 1871) but not the sultanate. However, the legal right of the sultan to issue laws (kanun) was considered as an infringement of the individual rights of his subjects.

They complained about the decline of the ulama when worldly fields of knowledge were privileged to the detriment of religious sciences. The ulama were partially blamed for this state; they should "apply themselves to teach subjects which would be of use in both this world and the next" and not "theologising in the mosques".

The New Ottomans were indeed unhappy with a whole host of things including the economic and cultural aspects of Ottoman administration at this time. They were also critical of the rampant corruption of government officials and bureaucrats.

In a leading article, The Question of Equality (1868), Namik Kemal wrote about the double standards in the treatment of dhimmis in the empire. As an example, Kemal wrote that the implementation of equality was not limited only to an equal distribution of offices between Muslims and non-Muslims. Rather it was extended to every non-Muslim millet: Greek Orthodox, Bulgarian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Protestant and so on.

The logical conclusion of this type of implementation, according to Kemal, would lead to a proliferation of appointments and fragmentation of Ottoman society. These efforts on implementation of equality of dhimmis were seen as pandering to European powers.

In sum, the opposition to the Tanzimat reform on abolishment of the dhimmi status was fuelled by the perceived preferential treatment of non-Muslims, the disloyalty of non-Muslims due to European patronage (which was said to encourage efforts of succession and rebellion), and the decline of the empire due to European interference. The preoccupation of the territorial integrity and cultural unity of the empire shaped views on the position of non-Muslims in the empire.

Constitutional Ottomanism

In one of his reforms of constitutional Ottomanism, Kemal ( pix ) promoted the idea of the empire's political integrity and the preservation of its cultural unity as embodied in the Syariah. The Syariah was the quintessential expression of Islamic civilisation, according to Kemal.

He wrote plays to disseminate his views. His plays which were meant to preserve the empire's unity and public sentiment for the fatherland (the term, 'nation' did not exist then) was about heroism in Ottoman and Islamic history. These appealed more to Muslims rather than Ottomans.

Kemal accepts that the principle of egalitarianism was considered to be in conformity with the Syariah. In normative legal traditions in Islamic history, dhimmis had maintained and preserved their cultural identity.

In practice, Kemal was critical of what he perceived to be the special treatment of non-Muslims. His arguments on equality were seen largely to impair the semi-autonomous position of dhimmis (by making them the same to Muslims by abolishing the military tax and introducing military service) and yet in other aspects, he presented arguments based on difference. In the latter he laid emphasis on the religious unity and dominance of the Islamic community.

The constitutional-Ottomanism discourse on non-Muslims from then on, became a principle of inclusion and exclusion in the empire. This Ottoman discourse permeates the discourse of minorities in Muslim majority states as well.

In Egypt, the majority Sunni Muslim community and the minority Coptic Christian community have formed the two sides of a sectarian divide since the 7th century Arab-Muslim conquest. The Copts are geographically concentrated in Egypt where they make up 10-16 percent of the population. In 1988 that percentage accounted for 6.15-9.84 million Copts in Egypt.

Growing Islamic orientation

Copts possess multiple identities as Egyptian, Arab, Coptic, Christian. They see themselves as authentic Egyptians and as Arabs sharing a common history and culture with Muslim Egyptians as part of the Islamic world.

During the last decades of the 19th century, Copts held some 25% of Egypt's total wealth and constituted some 45% of its public service employees. Towards the middle of the 20th century, the growing Islamic orientation would dampen Coptic political participation.

Nasser's defeat by Sadat in 1967 marked this decline. Sadat's appeal to Islam alienated Copts. Between 1980-81 Sadat attacked the Coptic church in his speeches, using traditional stereotypes. He alleged Copts were causing sectarian strife, harboured separatist ambitions and collaborated with Egypt's enemies. By recreating the myth of a Coptic conspiracy he projected himself into the role of Islam's defender and this diverted attention from his failures.

Mubarak's regime remains under Islamist pressure. The compromise with Islamic moderates did not end the discriminatory trends of the status quo.

Egyptian Coptic complaints relate to the lack of permits for building new churches ( photo ), the confiscation of Coptic waqf lands for Muslim purposes, disadvantages in personal law and conversions, the imposition of Syariah on non-Muslims, discrimination in government and public service appointments and in education.

Copts complain that the chief markers of their discrimination were not removed in 'secular liberal' Egypt. For example the old dhimmi ruling codified in Ottoman law that any new building of a new church or renovation of an existing one needs a special permit from the head of state.

Syariah law

Following Nasser's abolition of Muslim and Coptic religious courts, Copts suffered legal discrimination in cases involving Muslims and Copts. Copts appear before Syariah-trained Muslim judges seconded to the new civil courts. Coptic religious judges were retired.

Sadat's constitutional arrangements turning the Syariah into the main source of legislation raised Coptic fears that their constitutional guarantees of equality would disappear as Syariah law took priority over any law incongruent with it, leaving their legal status ambiguous. The campaign to implement Syariah and apply it to non-Muslims were regarded by Copts as an attempt to reimpose their dhimmi status and abolishing all improvements gained over the last two centuries.

A new younger leadership of the Copts emerged in the 70s and they rejected the traditional discreet dealing with the regime via respected Coptic leaders and opted for public confrontation and pressure on the state. They were committed to maintaining the secular character of the state and the protection of Coptic rights against creeping discrimination. They had support of the middle and lower classes and the Coptic diaspora but failed to forge alliances with political parties.

The traditionalists opposed the mixing of religion and politics and preferred quiet diplomacy using dialogue and patronage with the regime. A section of the traditionalists were willing to accept the Islamic Syariah state if they could insulate the Coptic community from Syariah as under the millet system.

Egyptian Muslims are not monolithic in outlook. Commentators note that in recent years Islamic movements of all kinds have experience a resurgence while secularist liberal and leftist movements are on the decline. Liberals in Egypt have come to regard Islam as Egypt's authentic culture, but they still struggle for the separation of church and state and advocate equality for Copts.

Farag Fawda, the well-known Egyptian liberal assassinated by extremists in 1992 had opined that the vacuum left by the decline in liberal nationalism caused the rise of political Islam and the demand for an Islamic state was a regression that destroyed national unity. The growing islamisation of the state and its organs reinforces the traditional dhimmi status while state manipulation of Islam contributed to the growing anti- Coptic groundswell expressing itself in communal violence.

Latter day Muslims who just do not give a fig would simply see dhimma principles as the logical norm. They tend to view dhimmis as traditional Muslim men view Muslim women-inferior, segregated, weak, having specific and limited functions in society-in a nutshell, not equal.

References:

Ayubi, Nazih N (2001 Reprint), Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East . London: I.B. Tauris Publishers

Rahme, Joseph G (1999), Namik Kemal's Constitutional Ottomanism and Non-Muslims, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 10, No.1, 1999, p.23

Zeidan, David (1999), The Copts-Equal, Protected or Persecuted? The Impact of Islamisation on Muslim-Christian Relations in Modern Egypt, Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations, Vol. 10, No.1, 1999, p. 53