Whither the opposition?
Is the opposition Barisan Alternatif coalition doomed? No, not yet, says Universiti Malaya's political economist Prof Dr KS Jomo in the second part of the interview with malaysiakini .
Malaysiakini: How do you see the passing of PAS president and Opposition Leader Fadzil Noor?
Jomo:
For me personally, he was a great loss, a friend from the late 1970s, ever modest and generous to me, and more respectful of me than I deserve.
Fadzil had a special rapport with (jailed ex-deputy premier) Anwar Ibrahim when he (Fadzil) was deputy president of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (or Abim). Anwar was then the president of Abim.
Perhaps precisely because he was not as much of a theologian as (Kelantan Menteri Besar) Nik Aziz Nik Mat or (Terengganu Menteri Besar) Abdul Hadi Awang, Fadzil had very broad appeal and respect, enjoying good relations with non-Muslims as well as less Islamist Malays. That is, he was a role model for PAS leaders if it is to retain and extend broad popular appeal as memories of Anwar's plight recede from political consciousness.
So PAS' appeal will decline with Hadi at the helm?
First, one must remember that PAS has long had a collective leadership, but with different leaders often saying rather different things in different voices and with varied emphases.
For many of them, in the name of Islam, everything, outside Islam, sorry lah . This can mean a significant openness for those familiar with Islamic discourses, but also a closed exclusiveness for others.
But even this is changing. Both candidates in the recent by-elections (in the Anak Bukit state seat and Pendang parliamentary seat in Kedah) were not ulama (religious scholars), sending a clear signal as to which way the party is growing.
Differences of perspective are being publicly expressed. While the Dewan Muslimat (women's wing) leader has not insisted on a more prominent role for women, other PAS women leaders have been increasingly assertive about a greater role for women in the party and in public life.
And what about hudud (Islamic criminal law)?
While the hudud draft was strongly condemned by others, there was considerable ferment within the party as well, with many disagreeing not only with details, but also with pushing hudud itself.
With his educational background and early celebrity status as theologian-orator, Hadi has not had the more varied and diverse exposure and experiences of other PAS leaders such as the late Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, Nik Aziz or Fadzil.
What's your opinion on Hadi who is known as an Islamic firebrand?
On the occasions I have heard him in peer group discussion, I have been struck by his moderation quite unlike his media persona. He was not playing to any gallery, but demonstrated a genuine desire for pragmatism and accommodation albeit in rather abstract ways sometimes with the multicultural realities of Malaysian politics.
For example, in the mid-1990s, he argued that PAS should emulate Turkey's now defunct Refaah (Welfare) Party which does not even call for the establishment of an Islamic state rather than the far more militant and radically Islamist movements many other PAS leaders were citing as models in those days.
Many non-Muslims as well as more cosmopolitan Muslims find many of his speeches and much of his rhetoric culturally alien, and hence, perhaps threatening, but he is aware that an exclusive or dogmatic Islamist approach will be the end of PAS.
Do you think PAS leaders are aware that a more moderate approach is needed in multiethnic Malaysia?
The PAS leaders know, for example, that the Pakistani Jamiat Islami has never been able to get more than 5 or 6 percent of electoral support in Pakistan, which has more than a 98 percent Muslim population.
Thus, there is significant support for an Islamic approach that simultaneously remains true to basic Islamic values and is open to the changing spiritual, intellectual and material conditions of the world.
Unfortunately for PAS, it has often been successfully out-manouevred by Umno and Mahathir into painting itself into dogmatic ideological corners.
PAS leaders also realise that their unprecedented electoral success in 1999 was due to the Anwar factor, Malay disenchantment with (Prime Minister Dr) Mahathir (Mohamad) and Umno and the historic opposition coalition, rather than public support for its notion of an Islamic state.
Unfortunately, there are also dogmatic Islamist tendencies in the country who are often able to hold the party leadership who fear being accused of being less than Islamic to ransom.
At the same time, they are tempted to make the most of Malay disenchantment with Mahathir and the status quo, and the popular legitimacy of ostensibly Islamic alternatives.
In overwhelmingly Malay Kelantan and Terengganu, they believe they won on their own steam and feel obliged to honour their own manifestos for these two states while also honouring their national commitments made in the BA (Barisan Alternatif) manifesto where there is no question of establishing an Islamic state.
For them, honouring these manifestos at the state level does not contradict their commitment to the BA manifesto at the national level, which does not envisage the establishment of a theocratic state in the unlikely event of a BA electoral victory.
Besides reiterating their previous commitments not to make any fundamental changes to the character of the national constitution, they may well support this with additional safeguards such as requiring a two-thirds majority in a national memorandum before such changes can be made.
Does this mean that the BA is finished?
The BA still exists, but it has been weakened by DAP's withdrawal and some DAP leaders' subsequent and often ill-advised and 'misinformed' attacks on the BA and all its component parties, not just PAS.
There are many problems, including serious cross-cultural ones; the BA leadership allowing bilateral negotiations between the DAP and PAS to resolve their differences turned out to be a formula for disaster.
The differences are real and serious, but not irresolvable if properly handled. But after the break, it will be difficult to rebuild trust, though perhaps Keadilan, PRM and the DAP elected representatives who campaigned for PAS in the recent by-elections can play leading roles in creating fresh conditions for renewed cooperation.
Do you think it will be easy for BA to work with DAP after the party's constant attacks on the former via the media and vice-versa?
It will not be easy, but the BN's political gains over the last year should be sufficient motivation. And DAP knows that, contrary to its hopes, it has failed to gain any significant ground by breaking with the BA.
One of the most difficult and contentious issues will probably be the interpretation of political trends in the last decade. DAP maintains that it would have done much better in the 1999 election if not for its alliance with PAS via the BA.
But others have persuasively suggested that the DAP's decline in 1995 when it contested on its own may be indicative of declining support for DAP due to what national chairperson Lim Kit Siang termed as Mahathir's partial or limited liberalisations as well as internal party problems.
But after the bitter experience of last year's break, DAP and PAS will have to demonstrate goodwill, for example, by disciplining its own leaders and to stop allowing the BN-controlled media to use them against the BA.
Seeking cooperation through media declarations, no matter how sincere, is unlikely to succeed, especially with an unpredictable and sensationalist media with its own interests and priorities. Spontaneous, subjective, ill-considered and unauthorised statements have only served to worsen things.
What do you suggest the parties do disengage completely and fight their own battles or form some sort of cooperation for the coming by-elections?
With an early election increasingly likely despite the mixed by-election results, BA and DAP leaders will not be easily forgiven by the electorate for allowing personal egos, narrow party interests and ill-discipline to get in the way of renewed and principled cooperation.
All BA leaders have to be more directly involved in BA. BA cannot emulate BN and leave coalition matters only to the top leaders. The next few months will be decisive in determining whether BA leaders successfully rise to overcome the challenges they face together, or allow history to pass them by.
This is the final part of a two-part Q&A series.

