Recently a so-called professor of international relations regaled someone for having the temerity to suggest that outsiders' perceptions of Asean's seeming lack of unity and purpose were bad for the expected rebuilding of the region's economic foundations.

He went on to add that what mattered most was how member states regarded themselves and their willingness to work for the common good. He had apparently been irked by an article he had just read which pointed to the dangerous implications for Southeast Asia if the rest of the world continued to view us as a region in perpetual turmoil.

Today we stand witness to the recent debacle in Bandar Seri Begawan where the erstwhile Asean 10 took the unprecedented step of rejecting outright Malaysia's bid to host the proposed secretariat for the Asean + 3 grouping that they had formally approved at last year's summit meeting.

Members with a vested interest in the potential of the region's economic future advanced all sorts of reasoning to resist the setting up of an official central clearing-house for the proposed grouping of 13 states. The fact, nevertheless, remains that the likelihood of Dr Mahathir Mohamad's original plan for some kind of regional economic block to handle increasingly coordinated trade and investments policies in the West will hardly get anywhere if it is left to the well-known unwieldy devices of the Asean Secretariat in Jakarta.

Subsumed under Asean

Looking at the process which resulted in the Asean + 3 becoming a regional entity, one cannot help but be struck by the systematic manner in which the East Asian Vision Group under the able leadership of former South Korean foreign minister, Han Sung-joo, had gone about in working out the details of the proposed economic bloc.

Indeed, it can be said that once Asean had endorsed the functioning of this preparatory body comprising officials from all the interested parties, the matter should have been allowed to move ahead on its own steam without Asean itself having to further monitor and control its evolution. Thus, the fundamental mistake appears to have been to turn the East Asian Vision Group into yet another Asean-monopolised diplomatic initiative just as the Asean Regional Forum eventually became, and consequently, fumbles along.

It is somewhat difficult to understand how the chief initiators of the entire project, namely Mahathir and his strategic planners, could have allowed it to be subsumed under the Asean consensus protocol.

Didn't they remember how our neighbours and great friends were the silent forces that helped to sabotage the visionary appeal of Mahathir in 1990 for the formation of an East Asian Economic Grouping to counter the then fast evolving European and American protectionist blocs? How had the situation changed so much by 2002 for the Wisma Putra boys to assume that those original opponents to the Malaysian proposal would not create trouble again this time around? Granted that it was the US decision not to stand in its way as it had done originally that enabled the Japanese and the South Koreans to come on aboard when Asean mooted the idea again while it was China's vote in its favour that was the critical final hurdle in realising the long-term goal of a regional bloc in East and Southeast Asia.

Slow pace of reform

Looking at it in another way, by the dawn of the new millennium there was undoubtedly an urgent need to forge a semblance of unity and order in intra-state relations among the 10-member Asean given the ongoing internal instability that plagues countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma and Cambodia.

Hitherto, various experiments with nebulous concepts of regional solidarity have been stillborn and unsuccessful while lingering over the region is the hangover from the 1997 financial collapse and its undetermined impact on Southeast Asia's socio-economic fabric. Foreign direct investment is desperately needed to jump-start the region's economies but the unfortunate geopolitical uncertainties present a major stumbling block to economic resurgence. China's increasing attractiveness as an alternative home for external funds seeking maximum returns on large-scale manufacturing and high-technology investments no doubt worries Asean leaders.

But this is where they have been slow in learning the valuable lesson of South Korea's recovery based on the principle of separating politics from business and economic management thereby regaining the trust of foreign investors.

Unfortunately the slow pace of political and economic reform in the Philippines and Malaysia, and the rise of big business at the epicentre of Thai politics, on the other hand, paints a depressing scenario for the future of the region.

As if Southeast Asia is not already sufficiently plagued by endemic internal troubles, this post-1997 period has also seen a marked increase in bilateral wrangles especially between countries which were at one time at the vanguard of the "One Asia" and "New Society" hype.

Thus, in the context of the latest development over the Malaysian proposal to host the secretariat for the East Asian Economic Grouping, it would seem that Asean leaders will continue to prioritise national needs over what is good for the long-term benefit of the region as a whole.

KL's share in the action

It is here that one feels quite strongly that something needs to be done in a rather bloody-minded way if necessary to prevent the hopes for regional economic growth through the East Asian connection from being effectively buried in the lethargic morass of the Asean Secretariat, now with a Singaporean as its new secretary-general.

Having come up with the proposal independently in 1990, for which Mahathir was roundly criticised in Jakarta and Singapore particularly at that time, one feels that it behoves on him to move the idea forward by lobbying with his counterparts in Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing and going ahead with the establishment of the Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur unilaterally.

By all means invite the relevant countries in Southeast Asia that are at least amenable to the idea, possibly Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei, to lend a modicum of support to the effort as the others in mainland Southeast Asia, for example, will have little to contribute to the region's economic resurgence in the short run.

Our argument to go ahead with such an audacious move should, at least in part, be based on the fact that at present Bangkok (Escap), Manila (ADB), Jakarta (Asean Secretariat) and Singapore (Apec Secretariat and Asem Foundation) all have their plates full with one or other of the international institutions that they host. So what can be so wrong with Kuala Lumpur taking its share of the action particularly as we were the ones who stood through thick and thin with the vision of East Asian economic cooperation and we are now offering to provide the seed money for the formalisation of the process?

JAYAVARMAN II is the pseudonym of a Southeast Asian analyst who has taught and worked in regional universities and research centres.