Malaysia's about-face in participating in a joint military exercise code-named Cobra Gold with the US, Thailand and Singapore was a "real surprise", according to a Bangkok Post report of Jan 3. An examination of the players involved and regional security developments certainly supports that reaction.

Cobra Gold is said to be the US' largest annual troop exercise in the Asia-Pacific. Last year, it sent 12,723 troops, eight warships and 73 warplanes to join 7,125 Thai military personnel in the war-game.

The exercise originated in 1982 as a US-Thai multi-service exercise prompted by regional political developments from the mid-1970s which had turned Thailand into the front line non-communist state of Southeast Asia, confronting Soviet-backed Indochina, Vietnam and Cambodia.

Singapore, an observer at Cobra Gold since 1993, became a full participant in 2000 at the invitation of the Royal Thai Supreme Command. Although not an official security ally of the US like Thailand, Singapore has maintained increasingly close security co-operation with the US and Australia since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979.

Singapore, Thailand and the US also train together in an annual aviation combat exercise code-named Cope Tiger . Since 1971, Singapore is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement together with Malaysia, Australia, Britain and New Zealand.

Malaysia, though formally or nominally a 'non-aligned' country, has linked its defence and external security to the US-centred Western alliance system ever since the country achieved independence in 1957.

Existing agreements

In 1984, two years after Mahathir became the premier, the Malaysia-US Bilateral Training and Consultation (Bitac) agreement was concluded.

William E Berry Jr, in a September 1997 paper Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore for the US Institute for National Security Studies, wrote that the Bitac "established a series of working groups involving exercises, intelligence sharing, logistical support, and general security issues".

In 1992, Malaysia also offered repair and replenishment facilities at its Lumut Naval Base to "encourage" the continued deployment of US fleet units to the region.

Last year, the government agreed to host an anti-terror centre in Kuala Lumpur, of which the US is believed to be the proponent and leading participant. The centre will become operational this year.

Given these security relations, what could have prompted Malaysia's change of mind about Cobra Gold , thus risking the government being seen as dishonouring a commitment?

'Undesirable' connections

In the absence of an official explanation, the Bangkok Post report pointed out that while the earlier acceptance was made by Malaysia's "army commander", the subsequent refusal "might be on the orders of the central government in Kuala Lumpur".

There is validity in this conclusion. The government could be signaling its displeasure with Singapore with regard to recent rows over water pricing and territorial sovereignty of Pulau Batu Putih (or Pedra Branca to Singapore) and other bilateral disputes.

It could also be due to deep uneasiness that Singapore now enjoys increasingly close security relations with Thailand, positioning itself to both the south and north (front and rear) of the peninsula and gaining 'strategic depth' in the defence of the tiny city-state.

However, a more probable reason is that the Mahathir government, given its security relations with the US, is posturing to distance itself from any American or Western security connections at a time when a US-led war on Iraq seems imminent.

Participating in the 22nd Cobra Gold exercise in May could be popularly and strongly construed by many in the third world and Islamic world to be 'treacherous'.

Moreover, both the 13th Non-Aligned Movement summit and the 10th meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference will be held in February and October respectively, in Kuala Lumpur. In between, the 7th World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention will be held in July.

Given the politically symbolic value and rhetorical utility of these international functions, to be seen as 'Western-connected' would understandably be 'undesirable'.

Mahathir also seems rather desperate to preserve his image as a global spokesperson of the non-Western world, as well as to re-establish a united front at home for successor's benefit.

Last 'recalcitrant' act

There is of course, still the possibility that Mahathir is personally and seriously registering for the last time in his political career, his symbolic defiance of Western security alliances, especially those in this region, which may have served to check his personal freedom of political action or, as he terms it, "national independence and sovereignty".

Yet the Malaysian government or Mahathir himself could be under intense nationalist pressure, and from other foreign quarters which are unfriendly or hostile to the existing architecture of security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Regardless of the reasons, the very fact that Malaysia has pulled back from a multilateral commitment does not speak well for its international and regional credibility.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia, which produces the subscriber-based political report, Analysis Malaysia . Wong is a former member of parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily ). He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew , he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute in 1998 and 1999.