It would be useful to make an assessment of the way the war in Iraq is likely to unfold. Regime change is not going to be possible without the occupation and control of Baghdad by coalition forces.

Occupying Baghdad involves the forced entry into the ancient city, which coalition forces would be able to hold o­nly by occupying a number of positions.

This would make them vulnerable to small-scale attacks by individuals and apparatchiks, which do not require high-tech communication or military hardware.

On the back foot

If the coalition forces use massive fire power inside Baghdad, there will be widespread casualties among innocent people, which will be reported by international media present in the city. All of this will increase anger and hostility to the invasion in different parts of the world.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein does not have the military strength to stop the invasion. He can, however, contest the possession of Baghdad and other major cities.

One should not therefore be impressed by the speed of advance by tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. Coalition forces will definitely reach the outskirts of Baghdad and other major cities by about the middle of this week.

The question is when will they control the cities effectively enough to bring about a regime change?

The best option available to Saddam is to increase the costs to the coalition forces of occupying Baghdad. He could thus delay the fall of the city and hope to impose casualties o­n the coalition forces in urban battle.

The worst case scenario for the coalition would be if their forces enter major Iraqi cities but are unable to occupy and govern them. US President George W Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair would then be forced to think of how to terminate the war.

Consequences all round

Saddam hopes that international pressure, increasing costs, and the inability to quickly win the war would force US-British leadership to find a way to exit the morass without losing face.

Bush ( photo ) faces the primaries of US presidential election after September. Blair will find the economic and political costs of the campaign growing unacceptably high if Saddam does not capitulate quickly.

In Asian countries, the impact of a war - which they did everything possible to prevent - is likely to be mixed. In countries with majority Islamic populations - from Pakistan to Central Asia to Indonesia - the war will place governments under immense strain from their populations.

In India, with the world's second-largest Muslim population, the government has so far taken a neutral and equitable position. This will become increasingly difficult to sustain if the war lasts beyond two to three weeks and creates large-scale casualties of Iraqi civilians.

Indian equivocation can have an effect in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where the government is working hard to obtain popular support for ending Pakistan-supported terrorist activities.

In Asean, we are likely to see individual states make peace with the US and Britain to safeguard their mainstream trade and economic relations. The US remains the largest trading partner of most Asean countries, for whom this economic reality will drive policy.

South Asian scenario

In South Asia, where India and Pakistan are the largest economic entities, trade relations and economic priorities will remain the primary factor determining relations with the US.

Both India and Pakistan look to the US and Britain to safeguard their strategic geopolitical interests. Pakistan is heavily involved with and under considerable pressure from US to co-operate in the war against al-Qaeda.

Operatives from al-Qaeda continue to take shelter in Pakistan, while rumours still circulate that Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan.

Pakistan barely managed to escape the consequences of voting against the US-British clique in the UN Security Council when the two nations withdrew their second resolution.

As for India, its strategic interests converge significantly with those of the US, and its desire to build and sustain a deep and abiding relationship remains strong.

India also sees the US as a key countervailing strategic influence in its disputes with Pakistan and China. The reluctance of New Delhi to come down strongly against the US o­n the Iraq issue is therefore likely to prevail.

In the interim, there is a wild card which can upset all calculations: the possibility of an internal revolt in Baghdad by which Saddam would be either replaced or removed from the scene through violent action.

Were that to happen, it's impossible to know how stability could be attained in Middle East, even with regime change in Iraq. Every o­ne is waiting and watching. - IPS

Lt.Gen V R Raghavan (ret.) is a military analyst with first-hand experience of the Iraqi army.