While Malaysia has opposed the US-led war in Iraq through a parliamentary motion o­n March 24, its neighbour down south has done the opposite.

Singapore is among the 43 countries o­n a list released by the White House o­n March 20, which were reportedly supportive of its war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.

Philippines is the o­nly other Asean country o­n the list, which includes three regional powers in the wider Asia-Pacific region, namely Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Although Thailand is not officially o­n the list, it has acceded to the US request to expel Iraqi diplomats, signaling its discreet political support for its US ally. Malaysia has refused to do so.

According to the White House release, "Contributions from Coalition member nations range from direct military participation, logistical and intelligence support, specialised chemical/biological response teams, over-flight rights, humanitarian and reconstruction aid, to political support."

A day after the release, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Dr Tony Tan (photo) was quoted by the Singapore-based Channel News Asia as revealing that while Singapore will not commit troops, it will allow US aircraft to overfly Singapore, and US military assets and ships and aircraft to call at Singapore to use our military bases".

Tan added: "We have made these facilities available to the US during this campaign as we did in the campaign in Afghanistan."

Singapore's connections with and participation in the Anglo-American global and regional defence system is neither novel nor surprising.

Its geopolitical reason has also never been a secret, or very difficult to understand.

Lessons from history

Horizontally, located in the Straits of Malacca, the former British colony has always been regarded as the most strategic "choke-point" linking the Indian Ocean o­n o­ne hand, and South China Sea and Java Sea o­n the other. Keeping the vital East-West sea lanes free and safe from hostile or unfriendly state powers and disruptive forces (like pirates and terrorists) has always been o­ne of the most pressing considerations of industralised states in Europe, the US, Britain and Japan, since its founding as a British trading centre and military outpost in 1819.

As early as the Napoleanic Wars (1792-1815), British and American warships often frequented the waters surrounding Singapore to protect their maritime interests against French naval actions. O­ne of such American warships was Essex which appeared in 1800. (see Pamela Sodhy, The US-Malaysian nexus - themes in superpower-small state relations , Kuala Lumpur, ISIS Malaysia, 1991, pp2-4)

History was to repeat itself in January 1971 when the sighting of a naval vessel of the Soviet Union in the Singaporean waters during a (British) Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference held in Singapore "caused a diplomatic flurry. "(Michael Leifer, Singapore's foreign policy - coping with vulnerability , London, Routledge, 2000, p122)

In fact, the Asia-Pacific naval activities of the Soviet Union, operating from Vladivostok and attempting to dominate the Indian Ocean, had been felt as a threat to the Anglo-American alliances since 1960s.

The inroads made by the Soviet Union into Indochina after 1975, especially the building of its naval and airforce facilities in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, further increased the sense of vulnerability to Singapore and the non-communist part of Southeast Asia. Major joint air and maritime exercises were revived under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in 1980 in and around the Straits of Malacca with Singapore as the centre.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and end of Cold War in 1991, there has not been credible challenge to the American naval supremacy in the Asia-Pacific, although there are still some fears about accidental disruption in the South China Sea as the result of the overlapping claims of the Spratly and other islets among Malaysia, China (and Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia, and potential terrorism.

There is also a longer-run concern about the China-Burma security relations which may allow China to gain military access to the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca through the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Vertically, Singapore is the first north-south buffer between Southeast Asian mainland o­n o­ne hand, and Australia o­n the other. The second buffer is Indonesia.

The historical lesson of this aspect of geopolitics of forward defence is learnt through the fall of Singapore and its naval base and airfields into the hands of the Japanese militarists o­n Feb 15 1942. Soon after that, Darwin was bombed o­n Feb 19, Timor invaded o­n Feb 20 and the Battle of Java Sea was fought o­n Feb 27 and won by the Japanese o­n March 1.

Another historical lesson for Singapore seems to be that its fall o­n Feb 15, 1942 was the result of land-borne invasion from the north by Japanese who swept through peninsular Malaya, and not sea-borne attack from its southern sea-front as anticipated by the British defence planners in the 1930s.

Thus, for Singapore, peninsular Malaya has always been its buffer against Indochina.

Countervailing Powers

Given its geographical location and the historical lessons, the Anglo-American system of global security has always been factored into the defence planning of Singapore.

As a British colony from 1819 to 1965, its defence was certainly under-institutionalised under the British. When Malaya gained independence in 1957 and concluded the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), Singapore was designed as the transit point for the British-led Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) which was stationed in peninsular Malaya under AMDA but barred from being used for operations outside any Malayan and British territories in the 'Far East'.

Britain, as a member of the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (Seato), then used Singapore (its territory) as a place to withdraw some CSR troops and redeploy them for Seato operations in Indochina, such as Laos in early 1960s. Independent Malaya refused to join the US-led Seato.

When Singapore joined Malaya to form Malaysia in 1963, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement was re-named Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. By then, Australia and New Zealand had also joined AMDA as associated members. AMDA proved to be useful in the defence of Singapore, and for that matter, the whole Malaysia when Indonesia launched its Confrontation against Malaysia in 1963.

According to o­ne estimate, "at the peak of hostilities" between Malaysia and Indonesia during the Confrontation which o­nly officially ended in 1966, Australia and other Commonwealth allies like Britain and New Zealand, committed to the defence of Malaysia "70 warships, all the combat aircraft used, and 50,000 troops, including Gurkha fighters" (Pamela Sodhy, ibid : p 249).

Although Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 1965, its effective status under AMDA was not affected because the doctrine of "indivisiblity of the defence of Malaysia and Singapore" were (and still are) shared by leaders o­n both sides of the causeway.

Operational structure

Meanwhile, in the period between 1965 and 1971, the independent government of Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew strongly supported US military involvement in Vietnam. So did his Malaysian counterpart, Tunku Abdul Rahman.

To court the US as a protective and countervailing (against Malaysia and Indonesia) at a time when British commitment was seen to be wavering, Singapore also provided "rest and recreational facilities" for US military servicemen in Vietnam.

In 1971, Singapore joined the Five Power Defence Arrangments (FPDA) which include Malaysia, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. FPDA and which superceded AMDA after Britain decided to reduce its military commitment East of Suez, is still valid and operational till today.

FPDA maintains a Headquarters Integrated Area Defence System (HQIADS) as an operational structure in Butterworth, Malaysia.

As Australia is also the bilateral ally of the US under the 1951 Anzus Treaty, it serves to link the defence of Singapore (and Malaysia), albeit indirectly, to the US global and regional defence system.

The 1979-1989 invasion and occupation of Cambodia by the Soviet-backed Vietnam further enhanced the defence cooperation between Singapore o­n o­ne hand, and the Anglo-American allies o­n the other.

In 1989, when the US was re-negotiating with the Filipino government o­n the terms and conditions of the leases of the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, news broke out that Singapore was prepared " to accept some US military facilities". It was construed in Malaysia as a signal that Singapore was to be made a US military base in its southern tip, and a political controversy ensued.

The controversy was o­nly settled after the US reassured Malaysia that it was not interested in setting up "a permanent military base" in Singapore, but o­nly "in obtaining bunkering services for its military ships and its aircraft o­n a rotational basis". (Pamela Sodhy, ibid : p412)

Regular joint exercise

In 1998, Singapore concluded an agreement with the US to allow the latter's capital ships to berth at the Changi Naval Base o­n its completion after 2000. o­n March 22, 2001, the US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk became the first foreign warship to berth at the base being built for the Singapore Navy o­n 86 hectares (212 acres) of reclaimed land overlooking the Straits of Malacca.

Besides hosting the Western Logistics Group of the US Pacific Command, Singapore also holds regular joint exercise with the US military. Cope Tiger, for example, is the annual aviation combat exercise conducted by the Singaporean, US and Thai air forces.

Since 2000, Singapore has also been a full participant of the annual and large-scale US-Thai war game code-named Cobra Gold.

As Michael Leifer in Singapore's foreign policy - coping with vulnerability bluntly remarks, Singapore, as a puny city-state located in between two relatively giant neighbours and o­n a choke-point of the most active sea lane in the world, needs to maintain and upgrade its defence cooperation for a very realist reason: to enhance its security in a competitive world.

After all, neither Asean nor NAM is a Nato that has established a collective defence system.

It is clear from historical and geopolitical points that Singapore has no other option but to calibrate as closely as possible with the Anglo-American system of global security.

Though Singapore's stand to support the United States in its war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq "should be of concern to Malaysia as it is a close neighbour", according to Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar, nothing much can actually be done about it, except through the usual Singapore-bashing campaign in the official media.