By now, it is rather clear that the two prominent losers in the protracted power struggle in MCA are senior vice president Chua Jui Meng and Youth chief o­ng Tee Keat, but how long would they accept the Umno-brokered arrangments is still a legitimate matter of serious concern among observers and analysts of MCA politics.

Although Chua was reported by The Star o­n May 24 as offering his "congratulations" to the new party president and deputy president, he also reportedly refused to comment o­n whether he was "sidelined".

Chua, together with Youth chief o­ng Tee Keat, did not attend the evening session of MCA's May 22 central committee meeting which elected Ka Ting and Chan to be the new party president and deputy president respectively.

Also absent from the crucial meeting was Team B's political strategist, Wong Mook Leong. Wong, a low-profile lawyer, is a party veteran who was also actively involved in the 1984/85 intra-party power struggle.

Earlier in the day, when Chua arrived at the KL International Airport to attend the morning session of the meeting, he was received by Tee Keat as well as the deputy women chief, Dr Tan Yee Kew. Chua, Wong, Tee Keat and Tan are still Team B members in the central committee.

Signals

In particular, Tan is the nemesis of MCA women chief, Dr Ng Yen Yen who is a staunch supporter of Team A. Ng was recently forced to publicly admit that she o­nce held a Australian permanent residence status after she had already been appointed a senator in Malaysia.

These signals seem to point to the strong possibility that factional politics in MCA is still alive and kicking, although it may take some time for another round of massive mud-slinging in the public. For the moment, fatigue seems to prevail after three years of intense and passionate infighting.

The reason is not difficult to understand. According to a May 24 news analysis in Sin Chew Daily , Chua and his supporters "obviously" find it difficult to accept the Umno-brokered "Peace Plan" which has excluded them and failed to accommodate their interests.

Moreover, according to the analysis Tee Keat and Tan as well as their supporters and followers, have also found themselves still "in trouble" in the youth and women wings respectively.

There are already angry murmurs within segments of Team B and the non-MCA Chinese community that Chan, in accepting the position of deputy president in a central committee still dominated by Team A and members loyal to Ling and Ka Ting, has "betrayed" the faction for his personal interests.

Indeed, if the Umno-brokered arrangements continue to be perceived as o­nly co-opting Chan into Team A, without benefiting other members of Team B, especially Chua, Tee Keat and Tan, factional hostility and confrontation could erupt again.

'Self-help' strategy

And there is no lack of reasons or pretexts for Team B leaders and supporters o­n the ground to 'open fire' again. The selection of MCA parliamentary and state assembly candidates for the coming general elections will most likely be such an occasion.

Given the perception that Chan has "deserted" Team B and "joined" the Team A establishment, the remaining leaders and supporters of the rebel faction could decide to adopt a "self-help" strategy and slug it out with Team A (which now include Chan) before they are "eliminated" in the candidates' list for the coming general election.

A new factional alliance anchored o­n the English-educated Chua and Chinese-educated Tee Keat is potentially powerful, if they are willing and able to provide leadership to all the anti-establishment elements and forces in MCA.

One possible way of neutralising that explosive situation is for Ka Ting and Chan to co-opt some Team B leaders into the new party leadership now, but how many Team A leaders would voluntarily make way and to create vacancies for their ex-detractors and ex-critics?

It is certainly to the personal interest of Chan to co-opt as many of Team B leaders and former factional comrades as soon as possible in the top party leadership, so as to legitimise his new position as the deputy chief of the party, and neutralise the image of being a "traitor" to the faction.

However, how many Team B leaders should be co-opted to achieve a "balance of forces" is also a matter of personal judgement that may re-open the rift between Ka Ting and Chan.

In position

Moreover, what is even more unsettling is that the Big Duo, namely Chua and Tee Keat are "un-co-optable" because their o­nly way of moving up are from vice presidencies to the presidency and deputy presidency, but the positions have already been occupied by Ka Ting and Chan. To fully satisfy Tee Keat, a full ministerial post for him may be required. Tee Keat is currently deputy youth and sports minister.

To keep his presidential hope alive until 2005, Chua also needs to maintain his own ministerial position and vice presidency, now and after the next general election.

However, assuming Chua, Tee Keat and other Team B leaders and supporters still entertain the hope to launch another battle (without Lim Ah Lek and Chan) against the Team A-dominated establishment, they still have to find ways and means to break the monopoly of the Chinese-language media. They certainly need more financial resources.

On the other side of the divide, Ka Ting is also not politically invulnerable. There is, for example, a grave concern inside and outside MCA that the image of the new president is tainted by the widespread allegation that he is "linked" to triads.

Although he has denied it publicly and also lodged a police report against a poison-pen letter, popular suspicion seems to have intensified after his nemesis, Tee Keat publicly called for police investigation into the contents of the letter.

Whether Tee Keat still stands by his public call or not does not seem to be relevant now because a public perception has been created and the speculation has taken a life of its own.

Cleared of allegations

For a cabinet minister and chief of the second largest component party of the ruling coalition to be publicly accused of such involvement also seems to be of regional and international concerns as transnational organised crimes are now considered to be o­ne of the three top agenda in the management of post-Cold War global security.

His public credibility and political legitimacy can o­nly be established after he is cleared of the allegation by competent authorities.

Politically, how to co-opt as many interests from Team B without making the die-hards of Team A feel threatened and alienated in the run-up to the coming general elections, also tests the balancing skills and wisdom of Ka Ting.

The o­nly comfort Ka Ting could take is that another senior vice president, Dr Fong Chan O­nn does not seem to be very ambitious or threatening.