Peace in Sri Lanka will depend very much on whether the government will allow for the implementation of an interim administration in the north and east of the country, in the predominantly Tamil areas.

After the cessation of hostilities was brokered by the Norwegian government came into force earlier this year, both the parties entered into peace negotiations.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) then withdrew from the process because it felt that the government was not serious about implementing an interim administration that will be under LTTE control.

Although the governnment has agreed in principle to the provision of an interim administration, many factors impede its implementation, mainly President Chandrika Kumaratunga's opposition to the idea.

Alternative plan

The LTTE feels that, without an interim administration, it may not obtain funds pledged for development and reconstruction of war-torn areas in the north and east. Such funds are also needed to resettle internally-displaced people.

This is the main reason why the LTTE refused to participate in the recent donor conference organised in Tokyo.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickermesinghe is not opposed in principle to the call for an interim administration. In fact, one or two proposals earlier sent to the LTTE through the Norwegian government were rejected by the LTTE as being not very significant.

However, the LTTE has decided to look into a Discussion Paper offered by the government even though the proposal is not a full fledged formula. Rather than reject it outright, the LTTE is considering an alternative plan.

The LTTE recently set up a panel of constitutional, legal and political experts mainly from the Tamil diaspora to examine the discussion paper.

In the next two weeks, these experts will gather in Paris for a detailed discussion of what the government has offered and to work out a new proposal for submission to the LTTE. If this is approved, it will be sent to the government for consideration.

The LTTE has several reasons for insisting on an interim administration being established. First, it would constitute a good preparatory stage for the devolution of political power to Tamils in the north and east.

It could also be the forerunner of eventual settlement of the country's ethnic problems on the basis of federal political structure.

Second, an interim administration with power concentrated in LTTE hands would provide it legitimacy and responsibility from an international perspective.

Third, it would provide the LTTE with the necessary funds for reconstruction.

Fourth, an interim set-up would recognise the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils, as reward and recognition for championing their cause for more than two decades.

Tamil interests

The LTTE has particular expectations of the type of interim administration that is created. It is not interested in the idea of provincial councils that do not have much power and autonomy.

It wants the government to provide a radical structure that gives the LTTE power and authority to manage regional affairs effectively and without being bound by too many constraints imposed by the centre.

Such a body would have to recognise fundamental aspects of the Tamil national question - that Tamils constitute a nation, they have the right to self-determination and a right to their homeland.

In this respect, an interim administration should not be construed as a temporary solution, but as sowing the seeds for derivation of substantial autonomy for Tamils in the north and east - the agreed basis for eventual settlement of the ethnic conflict.

The structure should be conceptualised and concretised outside the sphere of the Constitution. Since the cessation of hostilities agreement was arrived outside the Constitution, the same should be done to implement an interim administration. Any amendments to the Constitution should come much later.

The LTTE also wants its presence recognised in the structure, by way of control over the security apparatus, vast tracts of land in the region, and its vigorous revenue collection system.

If these were denied to the LTTE, then an interim administration would not serve the interests of the Tamil people.

Balance of power

It would be impossible for the LTTE to relinquish control of these without shifting the balance in favour of the government.

While the LTTE would not be opposed to the idea of a quasi-governmental structure with representation from other ethnic groups, it will not tolerate mechanisms introduced by the government to weaken the outfit.

In other words, while members of the Muslim and Sinhala ethnic groups would have some representation, this should not be constituted to sabotage or wreck the LTTE's dominance.

Whatever the structure adopted, it is important for the government to listen to, and act on, the LTTE's advice. Real power should rest with the LTTE, not the government.

The government could have the right to appoint non-LTTE members, but in consultation with the LTTE. At the same time, the LTTE would retain the sole right to appointment its representatives at regional and district levels.

Failure on the part of the government to take the LTTE expectations seriously may endanger the peace process.

If an interim administration proposal cannot be the basis for the derivation of future substantial autonomy, there is a likelihood that the LTTE may be forced to opt for a separate state. It must be remembered that the LTTE has never given up its quest for a separate state.

Whether or not this happens depends very much on the government's ability to recognise the legitimate rights of Tamils.

P RAMASAMY is a professor of political economy at the Political Science Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and has an academic interest in Malaysian politics and labour issues. He has written extensively on conflict management in Sri Lanka.